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This dissertation contributes to the growing literature of international finance on capi-
tal market integration and consumption risk sharing in emerging economies. I identify
threshold effects in terms of financial market integration to demarcate regimes with vary-
ing extent of international risk sharing in emerging economies. In Chapter 2, I study a
model of a small open economy to see how default decisions affect incentives for in-
ternational consumption risk-sharing based on varying levels of debt to capital ratio in
emerging economies while in Chapter 3, I employ a novel endogenous threshold identi-
fication method developed by Hansen (1999) for balanced panels, to empirically identify
threshold effects of capital market integration on consumption risk-sharing in emerging
economies. Finally in Chapter 4, I study the determinants of the capital market integra-
tion via level and composition of foreign assets held by emerging economies, exploiting
temporal and cross-sectional variation in a panel data set of 37 emerging economies
from 1970 - 2007.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Over the past 20-30 years, a significant group of developing economies – often referred
to as “emerging market economies” – have undertaken substantial market-orientated re-
forms, and opened up their national economies to international trade and capital flows.1
The rising importance of emerging market economies in the global economy is due in
part to the rapid growth rates they have been able to achieve since beginning the process
of international integration, as well as their ever growing share in international output,
trade and capital flows.
A central component in the integration of emerging economies into the global econ-
omy has been the removal of restrictions on capital flows to attract international capital
(referred as capital inflows) and stimulate domestic investors to accumulate interna-
tional assets (referred as capital outflows). Despite the fact that financial flows to and
from emerging economies have increased dramatically as a result of the opening up
of capital markets, the consequences of financial liberalization remain contentious and
are a continued area of academic study. Proponents of capital market liberalization in
emerging economies can justify their position with basic theoretical arguments. Greater
financial openness should – in theory – facilitate a more efficient allocation of capital
1Categorization of countries as emerging economies is based on income limits, but these calculation
can change from year to year which may result into a given country qualifying under the legislative and
administrative criteria one year as emerging economy but not the next year. The World Bank, IMF and
other international institutions have not established a fixed list of emerging market countries. In this
dissertation I use a conventional definition of emerging economies commonly followed in the existing
literature. In particular, the list of emerging economies used in this dissertation is based on the country
being categorized as emerging market in either one of the following indexes: Columbia University EMGP
List; FTSE list; MSCI list; S&P list; Dow Jones list; Frontier Strategy Group (F10) list; BBVA Research
and Emerging Markets Index.
1
across borders, to the benefit of capital scarce developing economies. Moreover, finan-
cial linkages should, in principle, promote international consumption risk-sharing be-
tween countries through one of at least two possible channels: (1) Income risk-sharing,
achieved when the income flows from foreign asset holdings delink a country’s income
growth rates from the domestic output growth rates, and/or (2) consumption smoothing
achieved through international borrowing and lending ex-post to the realization of short-
term idiosyncratic output shocks. Although these are distinct mechanisms for decou-
pling domestic consumption growth rates from output growth rates, both should result
overall in reduced correlations between domestic consumption volatility and domestic
output volatility, and an increased correlation between domestic and global consump-
tion growth rates that provides smoother consumption by reducing the dependence of
domestic consumption growth on country-specific components of output shocks.
Despite the possibly large welfare gains associated to increased consumption risk-
sharing by emerging economies, the empirical evidence suggests that financial market
integration has not increased consumption risk-sharing in emerging economies by nearly
as much as the basic theoretical models would predict.2 This is in contrast to industrial-
ized countries where risk-sharing is still not perfect, but seems to have improved notice-
ably with the integration of financial markets over the past two decades. For example,
Kose et al. (2009) show that capital account liberalization has had insignificant or neg-
ative effects on consumption risk-sharing in emerging economies. This is in contrast to
industrialized economies, where they find that consumption risk-sharing remains imper-
fect but has improved noticeably with financial market liberalization. Flood et al. (2009)
and Yeyati and Williams (2011) use alternative measures of consumption risk-sharing
2See, for example, Kose and Prasad (2010, Chapter 6) and the references therein for an overview of
recent literature documenting the divide between theoretical predictions about financial market liberaliza-
tion and the empirical evidence on consumption risk-sharing by emerging economies. Imbs and Mauro
(2007) provide a detailed analysis of the potential welfare gains from consumption risk-sharing in emerg-
ing economies. In general they find that perfect consumption risk-sharing would lead to a welfare gain
equivalent to a permanent 3-4% point increase in domestic GDP.
2
but also find significant differences between industrialized and emerging economies in
terms of the response of consumption risk-sharing to financial market integration.3
Given that consumption risk-sharing even amongst industrialized countries remains
far from perfect, it is not surprising that emerging economies have not reaped all of
the potential welfare gains of capital market integration in terms of smoother domes-
tic consumption. However, the puzzling aspect pointed out by the existing literature
is that liberalization of domestic capital markets does not seem to have even improved
consumption risk-sharing in emerging economies at all. Based on the theory of the sec-
ond best, a number of authors have long argued that it should not come as a surprise if
capital market liberalization does not lead to the consumption risk-sharing benefits an-
ticipated by standard, complete market models of the economy; especially in emerging
economies where capital markets are still relatively underdeveloped and other institu-
tions are still in transition towards a market orientated economy. As a result, identifying
exactly what impediments and challenges are central for emerging economies as they
open up to international capital flows is a central ongoing topic of research.
1.2 Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation contains three chapters that contribute to our understanding of the lim-
ited consumption risk-sharing achieved by emerging economies in the wake of financial
3Sorensen and Yosha (1998) argue that improved consumption risk-sharing in industrialized countries
is largely due to increased diversification of capital ownership. For example, in a study of European
economies, Demyanyk et al. (2008) show that membership of the EMU has significantly increased cross-
border investments, and led to marked improvements in consumption risk-sharing across EMU member
states. Asdrubali et al. (1996) find similar effects of interstate investment within the US. Obstfeld (1994a)
also show that among the G-7 countries there has been a marked tendency for domestic consumption to
become more closely correlated with world consumption over the period 1951 – 1988, and they attribute
this decoupling of domestic consumption from domestic output volatility to increased cross-border diver-
sification of capital.
3
globalization over the past 20 years. Chapter 2 presents a theoretical model that links
limited risk-sharing to another salient feature specific to emerging economies, namely,
the presence of default risk on external debts. Chapters 3 and 4 investigate different em-
pirical predictions of the the model in Chapter 2, and further illustrate potential sources
of the lack of consumption risk-sharing in emerging economies.
In Chapter 2, I study a model of a small open economy to see how default decisions
affect incentives for international consumption risk-sharing. Default risk is a central
aspect of the transitional nature of emerging economies, that distinguishes them sub-
stantially for industrialized countries. In fact, over the past 20-30 years there have been
more than 80 sovereign default event in emerging economies, compared to none in in-
dustrialized countries; and it has only been with the very recent default concerns in
the EU that default risk has featured prominently outside of the analysis of emerging
markets.
Chapter 2 illustrates that this feature of emerging economies is important for under-
standing the asymmetric response of emerging economies to capital market integration.
The model is based on a simple economic intuition. Risk-sharing reduces the exposure
of domestic consumption to country-specific productivity shocks. However, default de-
cisions have an option value which comes from the randomization over ex-post default
regimes, and therefore depends on the exposure to shocks. I show that this inherent
trade-off can lead to endogenous risk-taking: Even if the country is risk-averse and full
insurance against productivity shocks is possible, the optimal plan may keep consump-
tion volatile because of the option value of default. I relate the value of the default
option to the external debt to capital ratio, and demonstrate threshold effects that deter-
mine whether risk-sharing or risk-taking is optimal. The qualitative implications of the
model are consistent with the lack of consumption risk-sharing, history of serial default
4
and heterogeneity in international diversification observed in emerging economies.
A central empirical prediction of the model in Chapter 2 is that consumption risk-
sharing may be subject to threshold effects. Even in the absence of formal models to
illustrate where such thresholds come from, the existing empirical literature has often
pointed to the possibility that threshold effects could help to explain the limited con-
sumption risk-sharing in emerging economies (see, e.g., Kose et al., 2003, 2007). In
Chapter 3, I therefore employ a novel endogenous threshold identification method de-
veloped by Hansen (1999) for balanced panels, to identify threshold effects of capital
market integration on consumption risk-sharing in emerging economies. In a panel data
set covering 25 emerging and 20 industrialized economies from 1985-2007, I show that
for all types of capital inflows, except foreign portfolio investments (FPI), there are
generally three regimes. At low levels of integration consumption risk-sharing is negli-
gible. At high levels of integration, consumption risk-sharing remains imperfect but is
statistically and economically significant. However, intermediate to these regimes, cap-
ital inflows lead to negative risk-sharing (suggesting that capital flows are pro-cyclical
and therefore increase volatility in consumption growth rates relative to volatility output
growth rates). The results indicate that part of the reason why emerging economies have
achieved limited risk-sharing despite opening up to international capital flows, may be
that they have not yet achieved enough de facto capital market integration.
Furthermore, the previous chapter also shows that threshold identification is not very
prominent when financial assets are used for de facto capital integration measure. This
indicates that one potential reason could be that the levels and fractions to GPD ratios of
foreign assets are much smaller and hence confidence intervals for such threshold effects
seem very wide. However, in the recent years, there has been an increase in the foreign
asset accumulation by these economies and the literature does not directly explores the
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determinants of the total assets and different classes of foreign assets from emerging
economies point of view. Given the strong link between foreign assets and consump-
tion risk-sharing (see, e.g., Demyanyk et al., 2008), in Chapter 4 of the dissertation, I
therefore study the determinants of the level and composition of foreign assets held by
emerging economies, exploiting temporal and cross-sectional variation in a panel data
set of 37 emerging economies from 1970 - 2007.
As emerging economies become an increasingly important source of foreign invest-
ments in the world economy, the empirical results of Chapter 4 point to a number of
stylized facts that may help to understand and motivate future research on the patterns
in the large time and cross-sectional variation of foreign investments from emerging
economies. Focusing on the affect of domestic macroeconomic, institutional, financial
and trade factors on all asset types, I find evidence for significant positive effects of
trade openness and financial depth on all three asset types, and evidence for negative
effects of external debt and exchange rate volatility. However, there are also impor-
tant differences between the different asset classes over time and over different groups
of countries. In particular, I find stylized evidence for the theory that FPI was driven
largely by capital flight prior to 1990, though much less so after 1990. Foreign direct
investments (FDI) and foreign exchange reserves (FX), on the other hand, seem to have
been driven much more by standard portfolio considerations. Further, the analysis also
highlight that total assets behave very similarly in industrial and emerging economies
while stark differences are present for FPI and FX in these economies.
Overall the dissertation highlights that although many emerging economies are on
high growth trajectories and offer great opportunities for investors from stagnating in-
dustrialized countries, they also face unique challenges with regards to the development
of institutions to stabilize the macroeconomic environment and assimilate rising capital
6
flows. The apparent inability of greater capital market liberalization and integration to
manifest in improved consumption risk-sharing is, according to the analysis in this dis-
sertation, in part due to the ongoing nature of the general transition from underdeveloped
to advanced economy. Using theoretical models and empirical methods to understand
trade-offs and challenges in emerging economies, the dissertation therefore informs both
policy making in emerging economies where capital market liberalization remains con-
tentious, as well as policy making in industrialized economies who are grappling with
the changing role of emerging economies in the increasingly global financial market.
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CHAPTER 2
A MODEL OF RISK-SHARING AND DEFAULT IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
2.1 Introduction
Financial liberalization was supposed to lead to greater consumption risk-sharing by
emerging economies. On balance, the empirical evidence suggests that it hasn’t. Risk-
sharing remains imperfect for industrialized countries as well, but there is a general
consensus that it has improved with greater integration of financial markets (Obst-
feld, 1994a). The surprising finding from recent empirical studies (e.g., Kose et al.,
2009; Flood et al., 2009; Yeyati and Williams, 2011) is that risk-sharing by emerging
economies has – on average – not improved at all with financial globalization. In fact, it
may have become worse.
In this paper I study a model that leads to new insights about the lack of international
consumption risk-sharing. Consumption risk-sharing refers to the ability of a country
to exploit international market linkages to decouple domestic consumption growth from
idiosyncratic components of output volatility.1 The objective of the analysis in this pa-
per is to show how a particular channel for consumption risk-sharing – the international
diversification of capital – interacts with another public policy variable, namely the de-
cision about whether to service or default on external debt obligations. I highlight an
inherent trade-off through which domestic control over default decisions reduces incen-
tives for risk-sharing and can, in fact, lead to risk-taking. I also relate the qualitative
implications of the model to empirical observations on risk-sharing, credit-risk and de-
1Consumption risk sharing can generally be attained either by ex-ante income risk sharing (through
international capital diversification) or by ex-post consumption smoothing (through lending and borrow-
ing). In this paper, I use the former channel of risk sharing which smoothes income prior to the realization
of the shock and results in a smoother consumption thereafter.
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fault in emerging economies.
In order to focus on the feedback from default to risk-sharing decisions, I keep the
risk-sharing problem in the model abstract and simple. There is a single country with a
risk-averse representative agent. The country borrows in international capital markets in
period 1, and also has the opportunity to hedge against productivity shocks by investing
a share of capital in a negatively correlated foreign sector. There are no barriers to capital
and so full insurance against productivity shocks is possible, and would also be optimal
in the absence of default decisions. I then study the optimal plan when there is an option
to default in period 2, ex-post to the realization of productivity shocks. In the absence
of risk-sharing, consumption in period 2 is volatile and default may be optimal ex-post
in some states but not others. This implies that default has an option value. The optimal
policy depends on how the potential benefits of risk-sharing relate to the potential option
value of default. The latter, in turn, depends on the external debt to capital ratio, which
is determined by borrowing and capital accumulation decisions in period 1. I show that:
• For a country with a low external debt to capital ratio, the potential benefits of
diversification outweigh the potential value of the default option. The country
therefore shares its consumption risks, investing appropriately in the foreign sec-
tor to fully decouple domestic consumption in period 2 from domestic output.
Hence, while domestic output is stochastic, consumption is constant across states.
Since consumption in period 2 is not random, default is never exercised and has
no option value.
• For a country with a higher debt to capital ratio, the potential option value of de-
fault is greater than the potential benefits of diversification. The country therefore
does not share consumption risks, and domestic output and consumption in pe-
riod 2 remain volatile and perfectly correlated. The country services debts when
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the productivity shock is good, and defaults when the productivity shock is bad.
The exposure to productivity shocks induces a randomization over default regimes
which has an option value. It is the option value that makes risk-taking optimal.
There is a simple underlying intuition for the trade-off between risk-sharing and
default. International diversification facilitates consumption risk-sharing by hedging
against country-specific productivity shocks. The option value of default is related to
the randomization over different ex-post default regimes. Since risk-sharing reduces ex-
posure to productivity shocks, it curtails randomization and decreases the option value.
On the other hand, default exposes foreign assets to repossession (a direct default pun-
ishment) and therefore reduces the value of diversification. The option value of default
and benefits of risk-sharing are therefore interdependent. However, to find an optimal
plan it is sufficient to compare the potential option value of default (in the absence of
risk-sharing) and the potential benefits of risk-sharing (in the absence of default). These
potential benefits are determined by the external debt to capital ratio, and this leads to
the threshold effects for risk-sharing and risk-taking.
One complicating factor that this logic does not take into account, is that the debt to
capital ratio depends on the borrowing and capital accumulation decisions in period 1.
These, in turn, generally depend on whether risk-sharing or risk-taking is optimal. I cir-
cumvent this problem by first looking at a basic model in which international borrowing
is subject to an exogenous collateral constraint. I assume that technologies are linear
and that the expected productivity in the open economy exceeds the international cost of
capital. The first assumption is a simplification, the second has a clear empirical basis
for capital scarce emerging economies. The capital accumulation and risk-sharing deci-
sions are then still related, but the two assumptions imply that the collateral constraint
binds at an optimal solution, and so the external debt to capital ratio is independent of
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other decisions. As a result, threshold effects for risk-sharing and risk-taking can be
found by preforming comparative statics in terms of the exogenous collateral constraint.
Finally, in an extension of the basic model, I consider what happens when there is no
exogenous collateral constraint but the strategic interaction between the open economy
and international lenders is modeled explicitly. Under somewhat stronger assumptions
on productivity parameters, I show that the strategic interaction performs the same role
as the exogenous collateral constraint in the basic model: It separates the determination
of the external debt to capital ratio from the other decision problems that go into an
optimal plan. Although there is no longer an exogenous collateral constraint to use for
comparative statics, studying equilibria of the interaction between the open economy
and international lenders leads to similar insights about risk-sharing and default. In
particular, I identify two different types of equilibria. The first type features full risk-
sharing and no default. The second type features no risk-sharing and randomization
over default regimes. The equilibria are still identified by looking at the external debt
to capital ratio and I provide intuitive conditions on the basic parameters of the model
under which the risk-taking equilibrium is unique.
The basic insights of the model provide a new perspective on a number of empirical
observations on emerging economies. I discuss these next, and then discuss other related
literature. Section 2 presents the basic model with an exogenous collateral constraint and
derives the threshold effect for risk-sharing and risk-taking behavior in terms of the debt
to capital ratio. Section 3 looks at extensions of the basic model. I first introduce a risk-
premium to compensate international investors for the probability of default and derive
a similar threshold effect. I then look at the equilibrium between the open economy
and international lenders when there is no exogenous collateral constraint. Section 4
concludes. Proofs are collected in a separate Appendix A.
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2.1.1 Stylized Observations on Default and Risk-Sharing in Emerg-
ing Economies
The basic idea to relate international risk-sharing to default is motivated by a number
of stylized observations on emerging economies. First of all, there are a number of
recent empirical studies that document a surprising lack of consumption risk-sharing
by emerging economies. For example, Kose et al. (2009) show that capital account
liberalization has had insignificant or negative effects on consumption risk-sharing in
emerging economies. This is in contrast to industrialized economies, where they find
that consumption risk-sharing remains imperfect but has improved noticeably with fi-
nancial market liberalization. Flood et al. (2009) and Yeyati and Williams (2011) use
alternative measures of consumption risk-sharing but also find significant differences be-
tween industrialized and emerging economies in terms of the response of consumption
risk-sharing to financial market integration. Sorensen et al. (2007) argue that improved
consumption risk-sharing in industrialized countries is largely due to increased diversi-
fication of capital ownership. For example, in a study of European economies, Sorensen
and Yosha (1998) show that membership of the EMU has significantly increased cross-
border investments, and led to marked improvements in consumption risk-sharing across
EMU member states. Asdrubali et al. (1996) find similar effects of interstate investment
within the US. Obstfeld (1994a) also show that among the G-7 countries there has been
a marked tendency for domestic consumption to become more closely correlated with
world consumption over the period 1951 – 1988, and they attribute this decoupling of
domestic consumption from domestic output volatility to increased cross-border diver-
sification of capital.
The lack of consumption risk-sharing by emerging economies may therefore be due,
in part, to a lack of cross-border investments. Yeyati and Williams (2011), in particular,
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notes that “international portfolio diversification in the emerging world is still remark-
ably low, and have remained stable or declined” with financial globalization. However,
the low average outward investments from emerging economies masks a bifurcation in
trends over the past 10-15 years. While many emerging economies such as India, Roma-
nia and Turkey continue to hold negligible foreign assets (both FDI and equity) relative
to GDP, others like Chile, Hungary and South Africa have recently started accumulat-
ing considerable foreign asset holdings. The differences do not seem to be explained
entirely by differences in income or standard measures of capital market openness. For
example, South Africa and Turkey have comparable degrees of capital market open-
ness (see, e.g., Chinn and Ito, 2008). Both also have similar GDP/capita, which by
World Bank estimates was $10,309/capita in Turkey in 2010 and $7,274/capita in South
Africa. However, the stock of outward FDI and equity assets held by residents of South
Africa was worth approximately 22.46% of GDP in 2010, while the outward stock of
FDI and equity assets held by residents of Turkey was only 3% of GDP.2.
Similar heterogeneity is observed in the incidence of default in emerging economies.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) argue that while default events can be detached from fun-
damentals by well-known coordination problems (currency crisis, bank runs, sudden
stops, etc.), the “serial default” observed in some emerging economies is much more
systematic and appears to reflect the use of default as a conscience policy instrument.
They argue that external debt over GDP (a common proxy for external debt over capital)
is an important measure of default tendency, and also point out that “sovereign defaults
tend to recur like clockwork in some countries, while being entirely absent in others”
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).
Furthermore, casual empirical observations are suggestive of an empirical correla-
tion between the diversity in outward investment and default behavior. For the 36 largest
2Data is from UNCTADstat (2010)
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emerging economies (according to IMF classifications), Figure 2.1 depicts a general
downward trend in the average ratio of external debt to GDP (as a proxy for debt/capital)
over the past two decades, and a corresponding upward trend in average total foreign as-
set holdings (FDI and equity) over GDP.3 Many factors underlie these trends, but the
model in this paper also provides a theoretical way to understand a direct link between
them. External debt to GDP is a well-known measure of default risk (see. e.g., Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2004), and the model in this paper illustrates how default risk can reduce
international diversification incentives. A more refined picture is provided by Figure
2.2.1. Here I divide the emerging economies into two subgroups: One group (consisting
of 12 economies) has a credit rating of at least investment grade on sovereign debt for
the whole period 1990 to 2007; the other group (consisting of 11 economies) has a credit
rating of at most speculative grade over the same time period.4 The figure illustrates that
the economies with a better credit ratings have accumulated substantially more foreign
assets from 1990 onwards than the economies with a lower credit rating. As a group,
outward investment from countries with speculative grade remains negligible, while for-
eign asset holdings of the countries with an investment grade are catching up quickly
with industrialized countries. The trend is therefore towards further divergence. The
apparent correlation between credit-risk and international diversification behavior illus-
trated in Figure 2.2 provides an empirical motivation to look at this relationship from a
theoretical point of view.
3Data is from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
4Credit ratings data is from the credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s, and gives the credit rating
agency’s assessment of the creditworthiness of external, foreign currency denominated debt. Investment
grade is assigned to countries for which the “capacity and willingness to meet financial commitments is
strong”; while speculative grade refers to countries for which “adverse business, financial, or economic
conditions will likely impair the obligor’s capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitment on
the obligation”. 13 economies are omitted here because of lack of credit ratings data, or because credit
ratings switched between investment and speculative grade over the sample period.
5Description of Figure 2.1 is provided in Appendix A, SectionA.3
6Description of Figure 2.2 is provided in Appendix A, Section A.3
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2.1.2 Related Literature
The analysis in this paper is related to the large literature on home-bias in consumption
and equities. The consumption home-bias refers to the empirical observation that equal-
ity of consumption growth rates – an implication of the basic common priors, Arrow-
Debreu complete markets model – is dramatically rejected by the data (e.g., Backus
et al., 1992). Equity home-bias refers to the empirical observation that the proportion
of foreign assets held by domestic investors is too small relative to the predictions of
standard portfolio theory (e.g., Levy and Sarnat, 1970; French and Poterba, 1991). Lack
of consumption risk-sharing can be viewed as a reflection of a consumption home-bias,
while lack of international capital diversification is related to (though distinct from)
an equity-home bias. Sorensen et al. (2007) provide empirical evidence that both bi-
ases are closely linked, at least in industrialized countries. Lewis (1999) discusses both
home-biases, the relationship between them, and various explanations proposed in the
literature. Most theoretical explanations depend on market imperfections and/or the
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presence of non-tradable goods. To my knowledge, the general idea that a consumption
home-bias can be related to domestic control over ex-post policy responses has not been
explored in the literature.
The primary channel by which ex-post policy responses affect diversification incen-
tives in this paper is through their option value. Of course, the principle that the option
value of ex-post decisions can change the present value of an investment project is well-
known from corporate finance (see, e.g., Majd and Pindyck, 1987). But showing that
a similar option value from ex-post policy responses can reduce incentives for interna-
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tional risk-sharing is a novel contribution of this paper. The connection seems most
relevant for emerging economies because (1) emerging economies seem to have bene-
fited less from consumption risk-sharing in the wake of financial globalization – in part
because of the substantial home-bias in diversification of capital – and (2) economic
policies in emerging economies have generally been more responsive to bad output
shocks than in industrialized countries.7 I focus specifically on default as the ex-post
policy response because of the history of “serial default” in many emerging economies
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004), and because of the correlation of default decisions and
diversification home-bias discussed in the previous section.
The intuition behind the feedback from default decisions to risk-sharing behavior
is also related to a recent literature on occupational choice and entrepreneurial risk-
taking. In particular, Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina (2009) study a dynamic occupa-
tional choice model and show that discrete occupational choices can lead to risk-taking
behavior by a risk-averse entrepreneur. In their setting, one can view entrepreneurial
risk-taking as the reflection of the option value of future occupational choices. For-
mally, the discrete labor choice induces non-concavities in the continuation value func-
tion, and risk-taking smoothes over these non-concavities leading to utility gains. In
a similar manner, the discrete choice over ex-post policy regimes in the current set-up
induces non-concavities in the continuation value function in terms of the debt to cap-
ital ratio. Risk-taking represents a way to randomize over default regimes and thereby
“fills-in” the non-concavity. The intuition and mechanism is therefore similar, although
the application to an international finance setting does lead to substantive difference. In
particular, in Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina (2009) entrepreneurs choose both the re-
7Recent examples of drastic policy responses to bad output shocks include the East Asian economies,
where recession in 1997-1998 was accompanied by substantial debt restructuring and nationalization of
financial institutions; Russia, where severe economic crisis in 1998 was followed by devaluation, default
on domestic debts and a moratorium on payments to foreign creditors; and Argentina, where the recession
of 1998-2000 was followed in 2001 by a default on external debts and severe capital controls.
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turn in low and high payoff states, and the likelihood of a high payoff state (subject to
a constraint on the mean return). This allows them to convexify the decision problem
entirely. In the current set-up, the probability distribution on productivity shocks is ex-
ogenous and risk-sharing influences only the payoffs in different states. As a result, the
continuation value function remains non-concave even when there is no risk-sharing at
all. As a result, the method of analysis in this paper is, by necessity, quite different from
the approach in Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina (2009).
2.2 Model
In this section, I present a two-period model of a small open economy with a single
representative agent, and study efficient allocations as the solution to a planner’s prob-
lem. The basic set-up of the model is simple in order to highlight the key interaction
between consumption risk-sharing and the value of default options. I consider a number
of extensions in Section 3.
Technologies and Productivity Shocks:
All technologies are linear.8 In period 1 the country has a given capital stock K¯ > 0
which it can use to produce in a traditional sector with productivity A > 0. There is full
capital depreciation.9 The output of production can be used for consumption in period
1 (denoted c1), or accumulated as capital for the period 2 production process (denoted
K1).
8The assumption of linear technologies implies that investments abroad are advantageous only for
risk-sharing purposes. With decreasing returns to scale, international diversification could also be used
to equate marginal rates of returns in countries with different capital stocks. This would complicate the
analysis considerably and detract from the central argument.
9Full capital depreciation saves on notation. The results of the paper extend to any depreciation rate
in [0, 1], but including a depreciation rate adds to notation without any additional insights.
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In period 1 the planner also chooses how much capital to invest at home and how
much to invest abroad. Investment abroad is only valuable as a way to diversify risks
from productivity shocks in period 2. I assume that in period 2 the country is able to
produce in a modern sector. Output from the modern sector is used in trade and is more
valuable than output from the traditional sector, but productivity in the modern sector
is subject to a shock.10 Specifically, there are two equally likely states of the world
s ∈ {H, L}.11 In state H the country has productivity a¯ in the modern sector, and in
state L the country has productivity a in the modern sector. I assume that productivity is
higher in state H than state L, and that the modern sector dominates the traditional sector
so that a¯ > a > A. Essentially, this assumption captures in reduced-form, a stylized fea-
ture of emerging economies. As trade barriers are reduced, emerging economies have
been able to specialize production for foreign markets, leading to productivity gains but
also greater volatility. Production gains are generally attributed to increased specializa-
tion, while greater volatility has been attributed to the effects of foreign preference and
technology shocks on the domestic consumption value of output from exports.12
International diversification:
The potential for risk-sharing is modeled by allowing the country to invest a fraction
10The shock could be interpreted directly as a productivity shock, but could also be viewed as a shock
to the domestic consumption value of domestic output coming from shocks to foreign demand for exports
or exchange rate volatility.
11The important parts of the distributional assumption on shocks are symmetry and a compact support.
The assumption that there are two equally likely states of the world is otherwise not critical to the analysis.
It is possible, for example, to extend the model by allowing for a continuous and uniformly distributed
shock, but at considerable cost in terms of notation and complexity of the solution. With a continuous
distribution, threshold values appear as endogenous limits on an integral, and it is easier therefore to
gain clear insights from the model with a discrete distribution. The symmetry assumption has substantive
content as well. Shocks that are not symmetric around their mean imply that either the foreign or domestic
economy is inherently more productive and would therefore induce an incentive for cross-border capital
flows that is not related to risk-sharing.
12The advantage of specialization in sectors where a country has comparative advantages goes back
to the classical Ricardo and Hecksher-Ohlin-Mundell trade models (see, e.g., Dornbusch et al., 1977).
The trade-off between the productivity gains from specialization and the increased vulnerability to ex-
ternal shocks is established theoretically in Easterly et al. (2000), and verified empirically for emerging
economies in Kose et al. (2005).
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of its accumulated capital abroad, prior to the realization of productivity shock in the
modern sector. Capital outflows are invested in a foreign, modern sector with perfectly
negatively correlated productivity shocks. This means that the country can, in principle,
fully diversify against the productivity shock as ∈ {a, a¯} in the modern sector through
international diversification of capital. Denote the fraction of capital invested at home
by θ1 ∈ [0, 1], and the fraction invested in the foreign sector by (1 − θ1).13
Two implications of the assumptions on technologies at home and abroad are worth
re-emphasizing:
1. Since production shocks in the modern sector at home and abroad are perfectly
negatively correlated, the country can perfectly diversify production risks by
choosing θ1 = 1/2. Hence, when the representative agent is risk-averse, there
are maximal insurance gains from risk-sharing.
2. Since technologies have constant returns to scale in all sectors (home and abroad)
and both states are equally likely, there are no benefits from investment in the
foreign sector other than for risk-sharing purposes. A risk neutral agent would be
indifferent between investments in either sector. Hence, the focus of the analysis
is purely on foreign investments for the purpose of risk-sharing.
Ex-post Capital Allocation:
Unlike the ex-ante allocation decision between domestic and foreign capital investments
(θ), the allocation of capital between the domestic modern and domestic traditional sec-
tors is made ex-post to the realization of shocks. Hence, only domestically held capital
13In reality, investments in the foreign sector might generally be accompanied by a counterflow of
investments into the domestic, modern sector from abroad. It is notationally simpler and without loss of
generality to suppress these counterflows since they do not have welfare implications for the domestic
consumer. It is important only to highlight that foreign investment into the domestic economy are not
subject to default or repossession, at least not to the advantage of the domestic consumers.
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is allocated between the modern and traditional sectors in period 2. Denote the domes-
tic capital allocated to the modern sector by KM2 = (K
MH
2 ,K
ML
2 ) and the domestic capital
allocated to the traditional sector by KT2 = (K
T H
2 ,K
T L
2 ).
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Borrowing:
As well as the direct (or equity) investments abroad captured by θ, the open economy
is connected to international capital markets through access to international borrowing
and lending. In particular, I assume that the domestic economy is small and can borrow
or lend capital in international capital markets at a given rate of interest r > 0 in period
1. The borrowing (or lending) decision is denoted by D1. Borrowing is subject to an
exogenous collateral constraint that ensures that countries are able to repay debts in
period 2:
D1 ≤ ω¯K1 , (2.1)
where ω¯ is the collateral constraint which is restricted to lie in the range [0, a/(1 + r)].
Note that the restriction on ω¯ implies that default – when it occurs – is always voluntary
since net output (after paying debt obligations) in period 2 is always at least equal to
aK1 − (1 + r)ω¯K1 = K1(a − (1 + r)ω¯) ≥ 0⇔ ω¯ ≤ a/(1 + r) . (2.2)
Default Decisions:
The novel feature of the model is to introduce the possibility of default in period 2 (after
the realization of shocks). The default decision is denoted λ2 ∈ {0, 1}2, where λs2 = 1
means that the country services its debts in state s, while λs2 = 0 means that it defaults.
Hence, if the open economy has a debt stock of D1 from period 1 and chooses λs2 = 1 it
must repay (1+ r)D1 in state s. If the country chooses λs2 = 0 it defaults on (1+ r)D1 and
14KMH2 and K
ML
2 denote capital allocated domestically in the modern sector in state H and state L,
respectively. KT H2 and K
T L
2 denote capital allocated domestically in the traditional sector in state H and
state L, respectively.
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faces default penalties. In much of the existing literature, exclusion from future borrow-
ing is the primary default punishment (e.g., Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005; Bai and Zhang,
2012; Cuadra and Sapriza, 2006, 2008; Lizarazo, 2009; Yue, 2010). However, exclusion
from future borrowing is not a suitable punishment in a two period model. Moreover,
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) argue that exclusions from future borrowing is in general not
sufficient to prevent default and therefore not sufficient to provide access to international
capital for emerging economies. Empirical evidence also suggests that exclusion either
does not occur or is only very short-term (see, e.g., Beers and Bhatia, 1999). Bulow
and Rogoff (1989) suggest that other direct punishment mechanisms are required: “Our
analysis establishes rather general conditions under which small countries cannot estab-
lish a reputation for repayment. If these conditions are met empirically, then loans to
LDCs (less developed countries) are possible only if creditors have either political rights
which enable them to threaten the debtor’s interests outside its borrowing relationship,
or legal rights. Legal rights might include the ability to impede a country’s trade, or to
seize it financial assets abroad.” I capture both of the direct mechanisms suggested by
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) by assuming that there are two punishments for default.
First of all, if the country defaults all capital invested abroad is repossessed (i.e.,
returns on that capital do not accrue to the defaulting country). This seizure of finan-
cial assets abroad represents a simple way for debtors to recover some of the value of
loans that have been defaulted on. However, if the country does not invest much capital
abroad, repossession of foreign assets is not a strong deterrent to default. I therefore
also allow for a country that defaults on debts to be punished in terms of trade sanctions.
Specifically, I assume that in period 2 the country retains the option to produce in the
traditional sector. If the country defaults, trade sanctions are imposed and it is not able
to participate in international trade, and therefore cannot produce in the modern sector.
Hence, a defaulting country is forced to produce using the traditional sector. This im-
22
pediment to trade represents a default punishment because, by assumption, productivity
in the modern sector dominates productivity in the traditional sector in both states of the
world. It also captures, in a stylized way, the empirical observation that productivity –
especially in exporting sectors – usually falls dramatically after defaults events.15
Hence, the borrower country faces the following trade-off: If it defaults it saves on
the payment of debts and therefore retains a higher quantity of capital to use in domestic
production. However, default also leads to repossession of foreign assets, and to trade
restrictions which reduce the marginal return per unit of capital employed domestically.
Timeline:
Figure 2.3 gives a timeline summarizing the decision problem of the planner. Recall that
in period 1 the planner makes a borrowing/lending decision (D1), a capital accumulation
decision (K1), and an ex-ante capital allocation decision between the home and foreign
sectors (θ1). In period 2 the planner then makes a decision regarding default (λ2) and an
ex-post capital allocation decision between the modern and traditional sectors (KM2 and
KT2 ). The exogenous parameters of the model are the productivity parameters A, a, a¯,
the interest rate r, the initial capital stock K¯ and the collateral constraint ω¯.
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Figure 2.3: Timeline Risk Sharing with Collateral Constraint and Default
15Martinez and Sandleris (2011) presents empirical evidence that sovereign defaults are associated with
a decline in trade and productivity.
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2.2.1 Efficient Allocations
In order to define an efficient allocation, it is useful to present the decision problem of
the planner recursively.
Period 2 problem:
In period 2 the planner makes decisions regarding the allocation of capital between
modern and traditional sectors in each state of the world. The period 2 decision problem
in each state s ∈ {H, L} therefore depends on the borrowing/lending decision (D1), the
capital accumulation decision (K1) and the capital allocation decision (θ1) from period
1. The period 2 decision problem is described by the following optimization problem:
vs2(K1, θ1,D1) = max{(cs2,KT s2 ,KMs2 )≥0,λs2∈{0,1}}
u(cs2) (2.3)
s.t. cs2 ≤
[
λs2asK
Ms
2 + AK
T s
2
]
+ λs2(2µ − as)(1 − θ1)K1 − λs2(1 + r)D1 (2.4)
KMs2 + K
T s
2 ≤ θ1K1 , (2.5)
where µ = 12 a¯+
1
2a denotes the expected value of a
s
2 and u : R+ → R∪{−∞} is the felicity
function describing instantaneous utility. I assume throughout that u is continuous on
R+, twice continuously differentiable on R++, and that temporaneous marginal utility is
of the form u′(x) = x−γ for some γ > 0.16
Period 1 problem:
Given the period 2 value functions vs2 for s ∈ {L,H}, the period 1 decision problem is
described by the following value function which depends on period 1 capital stocks (K¯)
and the collateral constraint (ω¯):
16As is well known, the assumption on temporaneous marginal utilities implies that u is of the form
u(x) = x1−γ/(1 − γ) when γ , 1 and u(x) = log x when γ = 1. The restriction γ > 0 implies that the
representative agent is (strictly) risk-averse.
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v1(K¯, ω¯) = max{(c1,K1)≥0,D1,θ1∈[0,1]}
u(c1) +
β
2
[
vH2 (K1, θ1,D1) + v
L
2(K1, θ1,D1)
]
(2.6)
s.t. c1 ≤ AK¯ + D1 − K1 (2.7)
D1 ≤ ω¯K1 (2.8)
where β ∈ (0, 1] is a discount factor and vs2 is the period 2 value function in state s ∈
{H, L} (defined above).
Efficient allocations:
I look for efficient allocations as the solution to a planner’s problem for the small open
economy, introducing a simple tie-breaker rule in favor of non-default in order to sim-
plify exposition.
Definition 1 (Strongly Efficient Allocation) Given parameter values for (K¯, ω¯, A, a¯,
a, r, β), an allocation (c1, c2, K1, θ1, D1, λ2, KM2 , K
T
2 ) is feasible if (c1, c2, K1, K
M
2 , K
T
2 )
≥ 0, θ1 ∈ [0, 1], λ2 ∈ {0, 1}2 and D1 ≤ ω¯K1. The allocation is efficient if it is feasible
and (KMs2 , K
T s
2 , λ
s
2) solves v
s
2(K1,D1, θ1) for s ∈ {H, L}, and (K1, D1, θ1) solves v1(K¯, ω¯).
The allocation is strongly efficient if it is efficient and in each state s ∈ {H, L} either (1)
λs2 = 1 or (2) λ
s
2 = 0 and there does not exist another efficient allocation with λ
s
2 = 1.
The definitions of feasibility and efficiency are standard. The restriction to strongly
efficient allocations involves a simple tie-breaker rule in favor of non-default when there
are multiple efficient allocations. I focus on strongly efficient allocations only for greater
expositional clarity, since non-uniqueness of efficient allocations arises only when there
is indifference between different default regimes. This occurs on a measure zero set of
parameters.
Assumptions on productivity parameters:
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In general, no restrictions are imposed on lending and borrowing beyond the collateral
constraint in equation (2.1). However, to capture the interaction between the ex-ante
risk-sharing decision (θ) and the ex-post default decision (λ), an additional assumption
is required on the productivity parameters in the model to ensure that economy will be
a borrower country.
Assumption 1 Denote the standard deviation of the random variable x by std(x). The
following relationships exist between the productivity parameters in the modern sector,
traditional sector and the interest rate.
(A1.1) A < a < a¯.
(A1.2) a < (1 + r) < µ.
(A1.3) std
(
as2
)
< A/2.
The first inequality, (A1.1), states that the modern sector dominates the traditional
sector. With a weak inequality this assumption is without loss of generality since the
capital allocation decision between modern and foreign sectors is made ex-post, and if
A > a the economy could simply utilize the traditional sector in state L (in which case A
essentially replaces a). The assumption of a strict inequality is only required to ensure
uniqueness of results and is otherwise not essential. As such, the first inequality is an
innocuous assumption.
The second inequality, (A1.2), states that the expected productivity of capital in the
emerging economy is higher than the international cost of capital, which is in turn higher
than the productivity in the low state of the world. The fact that there has traditionally
been a considerably greater flow of capital into emerging economies as a group than out
of emerging economies, suggests that the first part is empirically relevant. The second
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also seems innocuous given the interpretation of the low state of the world. However,
unlike (A1.1), the condition (1 + r) < µ is of considerable importance for the analysis.
It implies that the collateral constraint on borrowing binds in period 1, which allows
me to separate the debt to capital ratio from period 1 (D1/K1) from the diversification
(θ1) and default (λ2) decisions. I assume a strict inequality only for simplicity, and
because empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggests that expected returns to capital in
emerging economies do exceed the expected return in industrialized countries.
Finally, the last inequality, (A1.3), puts an upper bound on the variance of the tech-
nology shock relative to the productivity in the traditional sector. The recent economic
history of emerging economies has numerous examples of external debt defaults (or sub-
stantial restructuring or renegotiation of debts) which, almost without exception, were
precipitated by large negative output shocks. In the context of the model, A should be
interpreted as the productivity in the open economy following this type of default event.
The inequality std(a) = (a¯ − a)/2 < A/2 puts a bound on how large the variation in
productivity in the modern sector can be, relative to the output in a default event. For
example, in the limiting case where a = A, the bound states that the drop in output per
unit of capital from best state to worst state, should not be greater than 50%. Note that
this still represents an enourmous output shock and empirically such output shocks are
anomolies.17 In the main Proposition of this Section, the assumption will be needed to
ensure that the threshold values identified for risk-sharing and risk-taking in terms of
the debt to capital ratio lie in the range [0, a/(1 + r)].
17For example, during the massive downturn in Argentina around the end of 2001, output fell by 15 %
in one year and by just over 20 % from its previous peak amidst sovereign default and devaluation. Even
in Russia during the early 1990’s, the cumulative fall in GDP is estimated to have been less than 40%.
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2.2.2 Gains from risk-sharing without default options
To establish a benchmark for the potential gains from international risk-sharing, first
suppose that there is no international sector (θ1 = 1) and no option to default (λ2 =
(1, 1)). The following Proposition illustrates that an efficient allocation exists in this
case, that the country borrows on the international market (although the collateral con-
straint does not necessarily bind in this case), and that consumption and domestic pro-
duction are volatile. To formalize volatility, note that ex-ante to the realization of period
2 productivity shocks, output and consumption in period 2 are random variables for any
given allocation of (K1,D1, θ1,KM2 ,K
T
2 ), since they depend on the realization of the pro-
ductivity shock as2. It therefore makes sense to consider both their variance (volatility)
and their correlations (a common measure of consumption risk-sharing). The following
proposition establishes that without risk-sharing opportunities, both domestic output and
domestic consumption in Period 2 are higher in state H than in state L.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1 and the constraints θ1 = 1 and λ2 = (1, 1), a unique
efficient allocation exists. Moreover, for all values of K¯ > 0 and ω¯ ∈ [0, a/(1 + r)], if
(c∗1, c
∗
2, K
M∗
2 , K
T∗
2 , K
∗
1 , D
∗
1, θ
∗
1 = 1) is efficient, then K
∗
1 > 0, D
∗
1 > 0, K
T∗
2 = 0, y
H
2 > y
L
2
and output and consumption in period 2 are perfectly correlated.
Proof. The only non-trivial part of the proof is to show that D∗1 > 0. The argument for
this is analogous to the argument in the proof of Proposition 2. The remaining steps are
standard and therefore omitted.
Proposition 1 illustrates that in the simplest benchmark case, output and consump-
tion are volatile and perfectly correlated. A risk-averse representative agent would
clearly prefer mean consumption to this volatile consumption. Diversification (through
θ1) allows the country to achieve exactly this type of insurance against the productivity
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shock, and therefore leads to consumption risk-sharing. The following proposition es-
tablishes that the country will make full use of international risk-sharing when there is no
option to default (λ2 = (1, 1)), and thereby demonstrates how international risk-sharing
leads to strict welfare gains.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1 and the constraint λ2 = (1, 1), a unique efficient
allocation exists. Moreover, for all values of K¯ > 0 and ω¯ ∈ [0, a/(1 + r)], if (c∗1, K∗1 , D∗1,
θ∗1, c
∗
2, K
M∗
2 , K
T∗
2 , λ
∗
2 = (1, 1)) is efficient, then D
∗
1 = ω¯K
∗
1 , K
T∗
2 = 0, θ
∗
1 = (1/2), domestic
output in state H is higher than in state L but cH2 = c
L
2 . Hence, at an efficient allocation,
period 2 output and consumption are independent.
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix A.
Proposition 2 illustrates that when the country is able to share risks, it will fully di-
versify income and thereby fully insure against output shocks. To see that the country
achieves full diversification, note that the Proposition establishes that the country pro-
duces only in the modern sector in period 2, and that in period 1 it allocates one half
of its capital each to the home and foreign sectors. As a result, while domestic output
remains volatile (subject to the shock in the modern sector), domestic consumption is
constant. Since allowing θ1 to take values between [0, 1] relaxes the constraints on an
efficient allocation (relative to the constraints in Proposition 1), it is clear that welfare is
improved through international risk-sharing. Moreover, the uniqueness of the efficient
allocations establishes that the introduction of international risk-sharing opportunities
leads to a strict ex-ante welfare gain.
In fact, a comparison of the outcomes in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 illustrates
two potential benefits of risk-sharing. First of all, without the possibility of international
risk-sharing (θ1 = 1), Proposition 1 establishes that output and consumption in period 2
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are perfectly correlated and both volatile, while with international risk-sharing Proposi-
tion 2 establishes that output is volatile and consumption is constant (hence independent
of output). International risk-sharing therefore has insurance benefits because it decou-
ples consumption from output. Since consumption is relevant for welfare, this leads to
strict welfare gains. However, there is also a potential indirect benefit of international
risk sharing. Under Assumption 1, a country with the constraint θ1 = 1 will not nec-
essarily borrow up to the collateral constraint. The reason is that borrowing is risky
when r > a − 1, and a risk averse agent may therefore not always borrow as much as
the collateral constraint allows. With international risk sharing, on the other hand, there
is a risk-free return on capital µ − 1 and under Assumption 1 the country will there-
fore exhaust the collateral constraint. By providing insurance, international risk-sharing
therefore also potentially increases investment.
Finally, note that both the direct and indirect benefits from international risk-sharing
are due solely to risk-aversion. If the representative agent is risk neutral (felicity function
u(x) = x), there are no advantages of international risk-sharing at all. The constant
returns to scale assumption in production ensures this, and therefore places the focus
of the analysis purely on the risk-sharing benefits from international diversification of
capital.
2.2.3 Trade-off between risk-sharing and default
I now allow for the country to make a discrete decision in period 2 about whether to
service or default on its debt obligations. For now, I continue to assume that there is
an exogenous collateral constraint on borrowing in period 1 and that the interest rate
r is given. These assumptions are relaxed in Section 3 of the paper. I also maintain
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Assumption 1. Recall that the default decisions are denoted by λ2 = (λH2 , λ
L
2) ∈ {0, 1}2,
where λs2 = 1 means that the country services debts in state s in period 2, and λ
s
2 = 0
means that the country defaults in state s in period 2.
The country now faces a trade-off. Risk-sharing reduces exposure to productivity
shocks but increases the penalties of default (due to the potential repossession of for-
eign assets). The intrinsic value of default is determined by productivity in the tradi-
tional sector A and the default saving (1 + r)D1. But as long as there is some exposure to
the productivity shock, default also has an option value. In the high state of the world,
the country can service debt payments and obtain a high marginal rate of return on capi-
tal a¯. In the low state of the world, the country can default and obtain the default saving
(1 + r)D1. The ability to make the default decision ex-post to the realization of the pro-
ductivity shock therefore has an option value, but only if the country does not diversify
away its exposure to the productivity shock. The trade-off determines the optimal choice
of θ1 (the fraction of capital invested domestically). A country using ex-ante risk sharing
reduces volatility of consumption relative to output, while a country using ex-post de-
fault decisions will experience higher consumption volatility but retains a more valuable
default option. Efficient allocations are determined by the interaction between optimal
ex-ante decisions (regarding capital accumulation and risk-sharing) and optimal ex-post
decisions regarding default. The result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1, a unique strongly efficient allocation exists for all
(K¯, ω¯). Moreover, there exist ω1, ω2 ∈ (0, 1), depending on (a¯, a, A, r, γ), with 0 < ω1 <
ω2 < a/(1 + r), such that for all values of K¯ > 0 if (c∗1, c
∗
2, K
M∗
2 , K
T∗
2 , K
∗
1 , D
∗
1, θ
∗
1, λ
∗
2) is
strongly efficient, then D∗1 = ω¯K
∗
1 and the following hold:
1. If ω¯ > ω2 then KM∗2 = (0, 0), K
T∗
2 = (K
∗
1 ,K
∗
1), θ
∗
1 = 1, λ
∗
2 = (0, 0), y
H∗
2 = y
L∗
2 and
cH∗2 = c
L∗
2 .
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2. If ω¯ ≤ ω1 then KM∗2 = (1/2)(K∗1 ,K∗1), KT∗2 = (0, 0), θ∗1 = (1/2), λ∗2 = (1, 1),
yH∗2 > y
L∗
2 and c
H∗
2 = c
L∗
2 .
3. If ω¯ ∈ (ω1, ω2] then KM∗2 = (K∗1 , 0), KT∗2 = (0,K∗1), θ∗1 = 1, λ∗2 = (1, 0), yH∗2 > yL∗2
and cH∗2 > c
L∗
2 .
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix A.
Proposition 3 first establishes that an efficient allocation always exists, and that the
collateral constraint binds. It also demonstrates that optimal plan has threshold effects
in terms of the collateral constraint (ω¯). The thresholds depend only on the productivity
parameters (A, a¯, a), the interest rate r, and the coefficient of relative risk-aversion γ.18
The threshold effect divides the optimal plan into three regions.
(1) A country with a high collateral constraint invests only domestically, defaults on
debts and produces using the traditional sector in period 2. This plan leads to low
consumption volatility because output from the traditional sector is not volatile.
The country defaults in both states when the collateral constraint is sufficiently
high because the default saving (1 + r)ω¯K1 is higher than the loss in marginal
productivity of capital from default punishment even in the high state of the world.
In corporate finance terminology, the default is “in-the-money” in both states. In
this case, there is no benefit from risk-sharing since it exposes foreign assets to
repossession, and domestic production must anyway use the traditional sector.
(2) A country with a low collateral constraint fully utilize international risk-sharing
opportunities, service debts in both states and produces using the modern sector.
The country therefore experiences high domestic output volatility, but interna-
18If the model is extended to allow for depreciation, the thresholds do not depend on the depreciation
rate. It is therefore not particularly interesting to include an additional parameter for depreciation in the
model.
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tional risk-sharing is used to decouple consumption from the output volatility.
Since the collateral constraint is low, the default saving (1 + r)ω¯K1 is lower than
the loss in the marginal return of capital (µ) in both states of the world. Default is
“out-of-the-money”, and risk-sharing is therefore optimal.
(3) A country with an intermediate collateral constraint invests only domestically and
switches between two regimes ex-post. In the high state of the world default is
“out-of-the-money” and it produces in the modern sector and services debts. In
the low output state default is “in-the-money” and it produces in the traditional
sector and defaults on debts. It is therefore the option to default ex-post depending
on the state that makes risk-taking optimal when there is an intermediate level of
debt to capital.
The interesting region identified in Proposition 3 is ω¯ ∈ (ω1, ω2]. For high levels
of the debt to capital ratio, countries avoid risks by using the traditional sector which
is not subject to shocks. For low levels of the debt to capital ratio, countries avoid
risks through international risk-sharing arrangements that decouple consumption from
productivity shocks. But for intermediate levels of the debt to capital ratio, it is optimal
to take risk even though the representative agent is risk-averse and full diversification
of production risks is possible in the dominant modern sector. Proposition 3 therefore
illustrates that the default option can be sufficiently valuable to induce risk-taking. The
advantage of taking risks is that the country retains a more valuable default option.
Formally, Proposition 3 can also be related to the structure of the dynamic problem
facing the country. In particular, the discrete nature of the default option induces non-
concavities in the agent’s value of the period 2 problem. Limited risk-sharing can be
welfare improving when it represents a randomization over the non-concavities over
the period 2 value function. It is efficient for countries with intermediate levels of
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debt/capital to make limited use of international capital ownership because the implicit
risk-taking randomizes over the default and non-default regimes. This is illustrated in
Figure 2.4, which shows how efficient allocations change for ω¯ ∈ [0, a/(1 + r)] when
the coefficient of risk-aversion γ = 0.1. Figure 2.4.1 depicts the objective function for
both periods with a fixed K1 > 0 and different values of λ2. For each λ2, the figure also
depicts the corresponding optimal value of θ1. The figure depicts the critical values,
ω1 and ω2, at which an economy transitions between different risk sharing and default
regimes. Figure 2.4.2 depicts the value function for different values of ω¯ (K¯ > 0 is
fixed). The optimal capital accumulation decision in period 1 depends on the default de-
cisions in period 2 and the value function is therefore defined piecewise for ω¯ ∈ [0, ω1],
ω¯ ∈ (ω1, ω2] and ω¯ ∈ (ω2, a/(1 + r)]. The actual period 1 value function is therefore
the upper envelope of the three value functions depicted in Figure 2.4.2. The figure
illustrates the sense in which default options provide a randomization over default and
non-default regimes, and the values of ω¯ for which risk-taking is welfare improving.19
2.3 Risk-Sharing with a Risk Premium
The preceding model illustrates that countries may choose not to diversify against risks
when they have a default option. The default option becomes valuable as the debt to
capital ratio increases and therefore depends on the collateral constraint. However, the
model implicitly assumes that the small open economy can borrow in period 1 at a fixed
rate of interest r, up to an exogenously given collateral constraint ω¯, independently of
its default behavior in period 2. The model thereby helps to provide intuition about the
19The value function for any given risk-sharing/risk-taking plan is generally convex in ω¯ (Figure 2.4.2).
But the discrete default decision introduces a second source on non-concavity in the value function. This
is apparent by looking at the objective function (Figure 2.4.1), which is concave within any given risk-
sharing/risk-taking plan, but is not concave overall given the choice between plans because of the discrete
default decision.
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Figure 2.4: Objective and Value functions
trade-off between ex-ante risk-sharing and the value of ex-post default options. But it
is clear that if international lenders had rational expectations regarding the default deci-
sions of the borrower country, they would accept default risk only if they are rewarded
with an appropriate risk-premium.
In this section, I therefore augment the basic model to allow for a risk-premium to be
paid to international investors in the presence of a default option. I study an alternative
model in which the country borrows by selling bonds to international investors and
impose a no arbitrage condition on the price of bonds to account for the possibility of
default. I then look for an allocation, a bond price and a collateral constraint such that
(1) the open economy makes optimal choices given the collateral constraint and bond
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price, and (2) given the default decisions of the borrower country, international investors
are indifferent between the purchase of bonds or the use of international capital markets
at the given rate of interest r (the no-arbitrage condition). In the second part of this
Section, I then study a more complete model of the interaction between international
lenders and the borrower country to illustrate how concerns over default can lead to an
endogenous collateral constraint.
Productivity assumptions:
The basic assumptions on preferences and technologies are maintained throughout, but
in order to simplify the analysis of the extensions in this Section, I make a stronger
assumption on the relation between the return on capital in the modern and traditional
sector, and the international cost of capital.
Assumption 2 Denote the standard deviation of the random variable x by std(x). The
following relationships exist between the productivity parameters in the modern sector,
traditional sector and the interest rate.
(A2.1) A < a < a¯.
(A2.2) 2a < 2(1 + r) < a¯.
(A2.3) std(as2) < A.
Qualitatively, Assumption 2 is analogous to Assumption 1. In particular, it again
imposes that the international cost of capital lies between the return on capital in the
modern sector in the high and low states; that the expected return on capital in the mod-
ern sector exceeds the international cost of capital; and bounds the variance of the return
on capital in the modern sector. As with Assumption 1, these qualitative features match
stylized observations on emerging market economies well. However, quantitatively, As-
sumption 2 is stronger than its counterpart in Assumption 1.
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In particular, the inequality 2(1 + r) < a¯ in (A2.2) is substantially stronger than the
counterpart from Assumption 1 (A1.2). The condition that gross returns on capital in
the high state are twice as high as the international cost of capital seems empirically im-
plausible. However, it is important to note that the quantitative requirement comes from
the assumption that the probability of a low state is 0.5 (and even then it is sufficient but
not necessary to ensure that the country will borrow when it must pay a risk-premium
for default). Since, in the analysis, the probability of a low state corresponds to the
probability of default, the high requirement on the rate of return in the open economy
relative to the world at large is dictated by the high probability of default. This high de-
fault probability is maintained for simplicity and greater clarity of the analysis, because
it helps to remove investment incentives from the ex-ante capital allocation decision and
thereby helps to focus the analysis on risk-sharing. The assumption is not essential to the
intuition behind the trade-off between risk-sharing and default options in general. With
the stronger condition (A2.2), the model in this section simply illustrates that if the re-
turn on capital is sufficiently high for emerging economies to borrow despite credit-risk
premia, the trade-off between risk-sharing and default remains. Qualitatively, this does
not require any change in the structure of the model, and the quantitative requirement
(what constitutes a “sufficiently” high rate of return in the high state) is dictated here by
other assumptions that simplify the analysis and interpretation but are not germane to
the central argument. Since emerging markets have witnessed large inflows of debt over
the past 20-30 years despite paying substantial credit-risk premiums, the key motivation
for the assumption lies in its implications for borrowing behavior and these clearly find
considerable empirical support. The inequality in (A2.3) is, however, weaker than the
corresponding condition (A1.3) in Assumption 1, because the restriction on the variance
of the shock is not as important under the stricter condition (A2.2).
It is straightforward to re-examine Proposition 3 under Assumption 2. The main
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difference is that the threshold value ω2 would then lie outside the range [0, a/(1 + r)],
so that there are no longer any parameter values (consistent with the new Assumption
2 on parameters) for which a country will default in both states of the world. This is
actually a more sensible implication. In a world where countries pay a risk-premium
for the probability of default, it is clear that default in all states can never be optimal.
If the country intended to default in all states, the risk-premium would be infinite and
there would be no value to borrowing. In the extension of the model in this Section,
that can lead to problems with existence and is therefore ruled out by Assumption 2. I
studied the basic model in Section 2.2 under the (generally) weaker Assumption 1 only
because allowing for default in all states is useful for the intuition about the option value
of default, not because of the economic plausibility of such behavior. It is worth noting
also that even with Assumption 2 it would still be the case that ω1 < a/(1 + r), so an
adapted version of Proposition 3 would still identify risk-taking behavior. It would just
not be as clear where the incentive for risk-taking comes from once the possibility of
default in all states has been obscured.
2.3.1 A model with bonds and a no-arbitrage condition
I now assume that the small open economy borrows in period 1 by issuing bonds. It
sells the bonds to international investors at price P. To allow for simpler comparison
to the previous model, each bond is a promise to repay (1 + r) units of consumption
in period 2 (where r is the risk-free rate of interest in the international capital market).
The payoff from bonds is state contingent only insofar as it depends on the country’s
decision regarding default.
Period 2 problem:
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The period 2 decision problem of the country is therefore unchanged, and is described
by the following value function for each state s ∈ {H, L}.
v¯s2(K1, θ1,D1) = max{(cs2,KT s2 ,KMs2 )≥0,λs2∈{0,1}}
u(cs2) (2.9)
s.t. cs2 ≤
[
λs2asK
Ms
2 + AK
T s
2
]
+ λs2(2µ − as)(1 − θ1)K1 − λs2(1 + r)D1 (2.10)
KMs2 + K
T s
2 ≤ θ1K1 , (2.11)
Period 1 problem:
It is the period 1 problem that changes for the open economy. Given an initial capital
stock K¯ > 0, a bond price P ≥ 0 and a collateral constraint ω¯ ∈ [0, a/(1 + r)] the planner
now faces the following optimization problem in period 1.
v¯1(K¯, ω¯, P) = max{(c1,K1)≥0,D1,θ1∈[0,1]}
u(c1) +
β
2
[
v¯H2 (K1, θ1,D1) + v¯
L
2(K1, θ1,D1)
]
(2.12)
s.t. c1 ≤ AK¯ + PD1 − K1 (2.13)
D1 ≤ ω¯K1 (2.14)
No-Arbitrage-Condition:
I assume that the number of international investors is large relative to the the size of the
open economy, and that international investors are well diversified so that they behave
risk-neutral in their lending decisions. Lenders can either buy bonds from the open
economy at a price P, or invest money in the international capital markets and obtain a
risk-free rate of interest r. International lenders can condition their choices on the price
of bonds issued by the small open economy, the initial capital stock K¯, as well as the
collateral constraint ω¯. Note that the collateral constraint and the initial capital stock
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Lender’s Options Invest Return
Lend on the international market P P(1 + r)
Lend to country that never defaults P (1 + r)
Lend to country that defaults in one state only P 12 (1 + r) +
1
20 =
1
2 (1 + r)
Lend to a country that always defaults P 0
Table 2.1: No Arbitrage Condition
are both observable at the time the country issues bonds, so the basic assumption here
is one of common knowledge regarding basic economic primitives. A risk-adjusted
equilibrium is an allocation such that (1) the open economy acts optimally given its
initial capital stock K¯, the collateral constraint ω¯ and the bond price P, and (2) bond
prices satisfy the following no-arbitrage condition given the default decisions of the
open economy
P(1 + r) =
1
2
(1 + r)λH2 +
1
2
(1 + r)λL2 (2.15)
The no-arbitrage condition therefore determines an equilibrium price of bonds in the
sense that (1) the borrower country acts optimally given the price, and (2) international
investors are indifferent between the purchase of bonds (at the given price) and invest-
ments in the international capital market.
To motivate the no-arbitrage condition further, suppose that the price of a bond is-
sued by the borrower country is P. An international investor then has two choices in
period 1: (1) The investor can lend P units of period 1 capital to the international mar-
ket, for which (s)he will obtain a return of P(1 + r) in period 2. Alternatively, (2) the
lender can buy 1 bond from the open economy and obtain a return of (1+ r) in each state
in which the country services debts, and 0 in each state in which the borrower country
defaults. Hence, the lender’s returns depend on the borrower country’s default decisions.
The possible outcomes for a risk-neutral international lender are summarized as in the
table 2.1.
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Since the initial capital stock K¯ > 0 and the collateral constraint ω¯ are known,
international investors can correctly predict the default behavior of the open economy.
A risk-adjusted equilibrium therefore requires that for any collateral constraint and bond
price P, the optimal default decision of the open economy equates the return identified in
the corresponding row from Table (2.1) with the risk-free return in international markets
P(1 + r). So, for example, if the collateral constraint and bond price leads the country
to assume a level of debt to capital at which it will default in neither state, then in a
risk-adjusted equilibrium it must be that the price of the bond solves
P(1 + r) = (1 + r) (2.16)
⇒ P = 1 . (2.17)
If the collateral constraint and price of the bond lead the country to default in exactly
one state of the world, then in a risk-adjusted equilibrium it must be that the bond price
solves
P(1 + r) =
1
2
(1 + r) (2.18)
⇒ P = 1
2
(2.19)
Finally, it is clear that there can be no risk-adjusted equilibrium in which the country
defaults on bonds that have a strictly positive value in both states of the world (since if
the country defaults in both states of the world, the no-arbitrage condition implies that
price of bonds will be zero). Hence, with a large number of investors, the no arbitrage
condition is required to ensure that supply for bonds equals the demand for bonds. If
investors preferred bonds to investments in the capital market, demand would be infinite
and therefore exceed supply. If investors preferred investments in the capital market to
the purchase of bonds, demand would be zero and any positive bond issue would lead
to excess supply. Although, I do not model the dynamics of price adjustment implicitly,
the no arbitrage condition should therefore simply be interpreted as a market clearing
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condition that determines the bond price given rational expectations about default be-
havior.
Timeline:
A timeline summarizing the order in which decisions are made is given in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Timeline Risk Adjusted Equilibrium
Risk-adjusted equilibrium
The following definition formalizes the preceding discussion of a risk-adjusted equilib-
rium.
Definition 2 (Risk-adjusted equilibrium) For a given set of parameters (a¯, a, A, r, β, K¯),
a collateral constraint ω¯ ∈ [0, a/(1 + r)], an allocation (K1,D1, θ1, λ2,KM2 ,KT2 ), and a
bond price P constitute a Risk-adjusted equilibrium (RAE) relative to K¯ > 0 if
1. (λs2, K
Ms
2 , K
T s
2 ) solves v¯
s
2(K1,D1, θ1) for s ∈ {H, L}.
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2. For both s ∈ {H, L} either (1) λs2 = 1 or (2) λs2 = 0 and there does not exist
(λˆs2, Kˆ
Ms
2 , Kˆ
T s
2 ) that solves v¯
s
2(K1,D1, θ1) with λ
s
2 = 1.
3. (K1, D1, θ1) solves v¯1(K¯, ω¯, P).
4. The following no-arbitrage condition is satisfied:
P(1 + r) =
1
2
(1 + r)λH2 +
1
2
(1 + r)λL2 (2.20)
The second part of the above definition formalizes the same tie-breaker rule used in
the definition of a strongly efficient allocation in the previous Section. The tie-breaker
rule is included to allow for a simpler statement of results because non-uniqueness oc-
curs only for the (measure zero) set of primitives at which there is an indifference be-
tween two different default regimes. The tie-breaker rule favors non-default in such
cases.
Risk-Sharing Behavior in a Risk-Adjusted Equilibrium
The following proposition provides sufficient conditions for the existence of RAE with
risk-sharing and risk-taking behavior by the open economy.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumption 2 is satisfied. Let ω1 be the cut-off value from
proposition 3.20 Then ω1 ∈ (0, a1+r ) and the following hold:
1. For any K¯ > 0 and any ω¯ ∈ [0, ω1] there exists a unique risk-adjusted equi-
librium with an allocation K∗1 > 0, D
∗
1 = ω¯K¯1
∗, θ∗1 = 1/2, λ
∗
2 = (1, 1),
KM∗2 = ((1/2)K
∗
1 , (1/2)K
∗
1), K
T∗
2 = (0, 0) and a price P = 1. Call these Type I
equilibria.
20Recall that ω1 depends on (a¯, a, A, r, γ)
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2. For any K¯ > 0 and any ω¯ ∈ (ω1, a1+r ] there exists a unique risk adjusted equilib-
rium with an allocation K∗1 > 0, D
∗
1 = ω¯K
∗
1 , θ
∗
1 = 1, λ
∗
2 = (1, 0), K
M∗
2 = (K
∗
1 , 0),
KT∗2 = (0,K
∗
1) and a price P = 1/2. Call these Type II equilibria.
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix A.
The Type I equilibrium identified in Proposition 4 involves full risk-sharing, lim-
ited borrowing and no default. However, Proposition 4 also demonstrates that when the
collateral constraint is weaker, there exists a different RAE in which the country bor-
rows more (relative to its period 2 capital stock), services debts in the high state of the
world and defaults in the low state of the world. Moreover, the open economy does
not participate in risk-sharing. Hence, there is a trade-off between risk-sharing through
diversification of capital ownership (which dominates in a Type I equilibrium) and the
default option (which dominates in a Type II equilibrium). The optimal decision is de-
termined by the exogenous collateral constraint.
The welfare comparison between Type I and Type II equilibrium is subtle. It is pos-
sible that the representative agent in the small open economy would strictly prefer the
equilibrium of Type I (with risk-sharing) over the equilibrium of Type II (with default).
However, from an international capital allocation perspective, the equilibrium of Type II
(with risk-taking and default) is more efficient. This follows because, under Assumption
2, capital invested in the modern sector of the open economy is (in expectation) more
productive than the alternative uses to which international capital can be put. The equi-
librium with default involves a greater allocation of capital to the open economy, and
it is therefore inefficient to restrict the allocation of capital to the borrowing country.
Restrictions on lending are necessary only because the country may decide to default on
debt obligations otherwise. The existence of different types of RAE, therefore identifies
the potential for a trade-off between the welfare of the open economy and the efficient
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allocation of international capital. Under the right assumptions on parameter values,
the representative agent in the open economy would prefer the equilibrium with greater
risk-sharing, while from an international capital allocation perspective the equilibrium
with risk-taking is desirable because it allocates more capital to the country where it will
be used most productively. This trade-off comes primarily from the assumption that the
representative agent is risk-averse, while international investors are risk-neutral.
On the other hand, there also exist parameter values under which the open economy
strictly prefers the equilibrium in which it pays a premium to borrow capital from in-
ternational investors, does not share risks, exercises its default option in the bad state of
the world and therefore faces volatile consumption (from an ex-ante perspective). Since
the risk-sharing regime in a Type I equilibrium involves a stronger collateral constraint,
Type II equilibrium implies higher welfare when higher borrowing and a greater value
of default dominates the advantages of paying a lower premium for credit and sharing
risk through international diversification. The following Section exploits the tension
between welfare in Type I and Type II equilibria to study a model of risk-sharing and
default without an exogenous collateral constraint. In doing so, I also provide sufficient
conditions under which Type II equilibrium implies higher welfare for the borrower
country than Type I equilibrium.
2.3.2 A model with endogenous collateral constraints
In a Risk-Adjusted Equilibrium (RAE) the initial capital stock (K¯) and the collateral
constraint (ω¯) are given, and are known by both the planner in the open economy and
international investors. Given knowledge of K¯ and ω¯, each can then correctly predict
the behavior of the other and plan the optimal sale/purchase of bonds conditional on any
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price P. A RAE price P simply equates the supply and demand for bonds. However, the
model does not address where the collateral constraint ω¯ comes from. In this Section, I
look at an alternative model of the interaction between lenders and borrowers in which
the collateral constraint emerges endogenously. I assume that the open economy first
makes its capital accumulation and borrowing decisions, and international investors then
choose at which price they are willing to purchase the bonds. There is no exogenous
collateral constraint but international investors can condition their investment decisions
on the observed capital and borrowing decisions of the open economy. As a result,
the interaction has an explicit dynamic structure in which the open economy has a first
mover advantage.21
I model the interaction between the open economy and international investors as
follows. There is a large (infinite) number of international investors who are risk neutral
in their lending behavior. They can invest or borrow unconstrained on an international
capital market at a fixed risk-free rate of interest r. A bond issued by the open economy
is a promise to repay (1 + r) units of capital in period 2 (after the productivity shock is
realized). Bonds are state-contingent only insofar as they depend on the default decision
of the country in period 2. For simplicity, I assume again that the open economy can
either service debt obligations or default on the whole debt and suffer the same default
penalties as in the benchmark model (exclusion from trade in the modern sector and
repossession of foreign assets).
Timing:
At the time when international investors make their investment decisions, the capital
accumulation (K1), capital allocation (θ1) and borrowing (D1) decisions of the open
economy are known. For any bond price P, I therefore denote the aggregate demand for
21In contrast, the interaction between the open economy and international lenders in a RAE is simulta-
neous and based on common knowledge of the primitives (i.e., the collateral constraint and initial capital
stock).
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bonds by international investors by d1(K1, θ1,D1, P) 7→ R+∪{∞}. Given the fixed supply
of bonds D1, the capital accumulation and allocation decisions (K1, θ1), and the demand
for bonds d1(K1, θ1,D1, P) by international investors, the price of bonds is determined to
equate supply and demand. After the price of bonds is determined, period 1 consumption
and utility in the open economy are realized. Period 2 then starts with the realization
of the productivity shock in the modern sector and the open economy makes its period
2 capital allocation (KM2 and K
T
2 ) and default (λ2) decisions. The following timeline
summarizes the order in which decisions are made.
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                                                    Market Clears 
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Figure 2.6: Timeline Risk Adjusted with Endogenous Collateral constraint
1. The open economy makes capital accumulation (K1) and capital allocation (θ1)
decisions, and decides how many bonds to issue (D1).
2. The price of bonds P is determined to equate the fixed supply (D1) with the de-
mand for bonds by international investors (d1).
3. Period 1 consumption occurs and period 1 utility is realized.
4. The period 2 productivity shock is realized.
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5. Period 2 capital allocation (KM2 and K
T
2 ) and default (λ2) decisions are made by
the open economy.
6. Period 2 utility and payoff function are realized.
Strategies:
Given the interaction between the open economy and international investors describe
above, we can define strategies for all parties. For any initial capital stock K¯ > 0,
a strategy for the open economy is a choice of (c1,K1, θ1,D1) in period 1 and a
choice of KM2 (K1, θ1,D1) 7→ R2+, KT2 (K1, θ1,D1) 7→ R2+, λ2(K1, θ1,D1) 7→ {0, 1}2, and
c2(K1, θ1,D1) 7→ R2+ in period 2. The strategy of international investors is described by
the aggregate demand for bonds conditional on any capital and borrowing decisions by
the open economy in period 1 and any price for bonds P, d1(K1, θ1,D1, P) 7→ R+ ∪ {∞}.
Period 2 problem:
Given this definition of strategies, the constraints on strategy choices and payoffs can
be defined. The payoff in period 2 for the open economy are defined by the following
(usual) value function:
v˜s2(K1, θ1,D1) = max{(cs2,KT s2 ,KMs2 )≥0,λs2∈{0,1}}
u(cs2) (2.21)
s.t. cs2 ≤
[
λs2asK
Ms
2 + AK
T s
2
]
+ λs2(2µ − as)(1 − θ1)K1 − λs2(1 + r)D1 (2.22)
KMs2 + K
T s
2 ≤ θ1K1 , (2.23)
Demand for bonds:
For a bond price P, define the payoff function for international investors, denoted by pi1,
as the net-payoff from purchasing bonds vs. investing in the international capital market
at the risk-free rate of interest r. Given any aggregate demand function for bonds, d1,
the payoff for international investors therefore depends on the realized price of bonds,
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P, as well as on the default decisions of the open economy. In turn, the default decisions
of the open economy depend on the capital and borrowing decisions in period 1. Hence,
the payoff function for international investors is the following.
pi1(K1,D1, θ1, P) = p˜i1
(
d1(K1,D1, θ1, P), λ2(K1,D1, θ1)
)
(2.24)
= d1(K1,D1, θ1, P)
[ (1
2
λH2 (K1,D1, θ1)(1 + r) +
1
2
λH2 (K1,D1, θ1)(1 + r)
)
−P(1 + r)] (2.25)
Price of bonds:
Given an aggregate demand for bonds d1(K1, θ1,D1, P) and a supply of bonds, the price
of bonds is determined in order to equate supply and demand:22
d1(K1, θ1,D1, P) = D1 (2.26)
For any given (K1, θ1,D1), define P(K1,D1, θ1) as the price that solves Equation 2.26.
Given an aggregate demand function d1, I call P(K1,D1, θ1) a bond pricing function.
Then the period 1 payoff of the open economy depends on the initial capital stock (K¯)
and the bond pricing function P(K1,D1, θ1).
Period 1 problem:
The period 1 payoff is described by the following value function:
v˜1(K¯) = max{(c1,K1)≥0,D1,θ1∈[0,1]}
u(c1) +
β
2
[
v˜H2 (K1, θ1,D1) + v˜
L
2(K1, θ1,D1)
]
(2.27)
s.t. c1 ≤ AK¯ + P(K1, θ1,D1)D1 − K1 (2.28)
22As before, I do not explicitly model the dynamic process by which prices equating supply and
demand are determined. However, the relation to a subgame perfect equilibrium is clear. As-
sume that the pricing function P represents the strategy of an auctioneer whose payoff is 1 if sup-
ply equals demand (Equation 2.26 is satisfied), and 0 otherwise. Then an Endogenous Collateral
Equilibrium (Definition 3) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extensive form game between
the open economy, an infinite number of international investors and the auctioneer. In the exten-
sive form game, the open economy first chooses (c1,K1, θ1,D1), international investors then demand
bonds d1(K1, θ1,D1, P), the auctioneer sets the price P(K1, θ1,D1) and the open economy then chooses
(c2(K1, θ1,D1),KM2 (K1, θ1,D1),K
T
2 (K1, θ1,D1), λ2(K1, θ1,D1)).
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Endogenous Collateral Equilibrium
We can now define an Endogenous Collateral Equilibrium (ECE) as a strategy profile
in which each agent acts optimally at each stage, given best responses of other agents
in latter stages and a pricing function, and the pricing functions ensures that price for
bonds always clears the market for bonds. An ECE also features the same tie-breaker
rule in favor of non-default introduced in the definition of a strongly efficient allocation
and a RAE, with the same motivation. Formally:
Definition 3 (Endogenous Collateral Equilibrium) Given an initial capital stock K¯ >
0, an endogenous collateral equilibrium (ECE) is a strategy of the open economy in
period 1, (c1,K1,D1, θ1), strategy of the open economy in period 2, (c2,KM2 ,K
T
2 , λ2), an
aggregate demand function, d1, and a bond pricing function P, such that
1. The period 2 strategy (c2,KM2 ,K
T
2 , λ2) solves v˜
s
2(K1, θ1,D1) for all (K1, θ1,D1) ∈
R+ × [0, 1] × R and for s ∈ {H, L}.
2. In the period 2 strategy for both states s ∈ {H, L} either (1) λs2 = 1, or (2) λs2 = 0
and there does not exist an alternative strategy that solves v˜s2(K1, θ1,D1) but has
λs2 = 1.
3. The aggregate demand correspondence d1 maximizes pi1(K1, θ1,D1, P) for all
(K1, θ1,D1, P) ∈ R+ × [0, 1] × R × R+.
4. The bond pricing function P solves Equation (2.26) for all (K1, θ1,D1) ∈ R+ ×
[0, 1] × R.
5. The period 1 strategy (c1,K1, θ1,D1) solves v˜1(K¯).
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Risk-sharing behavior in an Endogenous Collateral Equilibrium
The following proposition first establishes existence of an ECE and gives general con-
ditions under which the open economy will take risks in an ECE. These depend on a
complex interaction between the parameters of the model, as well as the risk-aversion
of the representative consumer (embodied in the general felicity function u.).
Proposition 5 Suppose that Assumption 2 is satisfied and let ω1 and ω2 be the cut-off
values identified in Proposition 3. Then:
1. An ECE exists for all K¯ > 0.
2. In an ECE θ1 = 1 for some K¯ > 0 if and only if the welfare of the representative
consumer in a Type II equilibrium for ω¯ = ω2 in Proposition 4 is greater than
the welfare of the representative consumer in a Type I equilibrium for ω¯ = ω1 in
Proposition 4 (i.e. v¯(K¯, ω2, 1/2) > v¯(K¯, ω1, 1)). Otherwise θ1 = 1/2.
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix A.
The condition describing risk-taking in an ECE has an intuitive connection to the
results in Proposition 4. In an ECE, the open economy has a first-mover advantage.
International investors correctly predict default behavior given any choice of K1 and D1,
and the price of bonds therefore adjusts endogenously to the country’s capital and bor-
rowing decisions. However, it is as if the borrower country can essentially choose its
desired collateral constraint in a risk-adjusted equilibrium, and the bond price adjusts
accordingly. This ability to set the collateral constraint comes from the first-mover ad-
vantage. The country will choose to take risks if the largest collateral constraint it can
choose given a bond price of 1/2 makes it better off than the largest collateral constraint
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it can choose given a bond price of 1. This is exactly the welfare comparison between
Type I and Type II risk-adjusted equilibrium indicated in the Proposition.
The trade-off between risk-sharing and the value of a default option was also a fea-
ture of the model in Section 2.2, but there is a subtle change in emphasis identified in
Proposition 5. In the model without risk-premia, the value of the default option is deter-
mined by the exogenous collateral constraint. Under a restrictive collateral constraint,
default is not optimal in either state of the world, so the default option is never exercised
and risk-sharing is optimal. However, if the country is able to borrow more relative
to its stock of period 2 capital, the default option becomes more valuable and, as a re-
sult, risk-sharing becomes less valuable because it reduces randomization and exposes
assets to repossession in the event of default. Although the ex-post default and ex-
ante risk-sharing decisions are interrelated, the emphasis of the causality is determined
by the backward induction nature of the optimization problem: The value of default
(determined exogenously through the collateral constraint) determines the value of risk-
sharing. However, in a model without an exogenous collateral constraint, there is a more
subtle equilibrium relation between the ex-ante and ex-post decision problems. Suppose
that a country fully shares risks so that productivity is no longer state-contingent. Then
default is either optimal in both states of the world, or suboptimal in both states of the
world. If the former, then international lenders will charge an infinite risk-premium and
borrowing becomes impossible; hence the default option looses all value. If the lat-
ter, the default option is never exercised and therefore clearly has no value. Hence, the
equilibrium condition of the interaction with international lenders introduces an indirect
channel by which the risk-sharing decision of the borrower country effects the value
of the default option. This subtle change in emphasis is captured in the endogenous
collateral constraint that emerges in an ECE.
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It remains to show that reasonable conditions on the parameters of the model are
sufficient to ensure that an ECE will feature risk taking behavior by the open economy.
I do this by fixing the risk-aversion of the representative consumer in the open economy
by assuming log-utility preferences, and then give sufficient conditions for risk-taking
in an ECE.23
Proposition 6 Suppose preferences are of the log-utility form (felicity function u(x) =
log(x) for all x > 0). Suppose also that Assumption 2 is satisfied. Then an ECE exists
for all K¯ > 0. Moreover, if |a − A| is sufficiently small, θ1 = 1 in the ECE (and the open
economy therefore does not participate in risk-sharing).
Proof. The proof is given in the Appendix A.
Proposition 6 provides sufficient conditions for risk-taking behavior by the open
economy in an ECE. The value of risk-sharing is not directly related to A because a
country that shares risks never uses the traditional sector. However, the value of the
default option is directly related to A, because if the default option is ever exercised,
the traditional sector must be used due to the trade sanction default penalty. Proposition
6 therefore confirms that if the loss from using the traditional sector is not too great
(relative to the use of the modern sector in the low state of the world), then the value of
the default option exceeds the value of risk-sharing even when this directly affects the
price that can be obtained for bonds.
Figure 2.7 is useful for illustrating the content of Proposition 6, and its relation to
previous results. Each panel in the figure depicts the period 1 value function v1 from
Section 2.2 (K¯ constant and ω¯ varying on the horizontal axis), with the following sub-
stantive changes. Parameters (a¯, a, A, r) satisfy Assumption 2 (a stricter condition than
23Note that log-utility is a special case of the CRRA preferences used in the preceding analysis.
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Assumption 1), and the representative agent has log-utility (u(x) = log(x)). The thresh-
old values ω1 and ω2 are calculated as in Proposition 3.24 The collateral constraint
always binds, and the appropriate optimal choice of K1 is used in each part of the graph.
Moreover,
• For ω¯ ≤ ω1, full risk-sharing (θ1 = 1/2) is optimal, along with full service of debts
in period 2. The price of borrowing remains constant at 1 (because the optimal
ex-post decision is always to service debt payments). Increasing ω¯ therefore only
relaxes the borrowing constraint. As a result, the value function is increasing on
[0, ω1].
• For ω¯ ∈ (ω1, ω2], risk-taking (θ1 = 1) is optimal, along with a randomization over
default regimes (λH2 = 1, λ
L
2 = 0). The bond price also remains constant over
this range (because the optimal ex-post decision remains constant), but at a lower
bond price of 1/2. Increasing ω¯ on the range (ω1, ω2] therefore only relaxes a
constraint, explaining the increase in the value of the optimal plan on this range.
• For ω¯ > ω2, default becomes optimal in both states and the bond price therefore
falls to zero. In turn this means there is no value to borrowing at all. This is never
optimal and the Figure 2.7 therefore only covers the range ω¯ ∈ [0, ω2].
The change in the bond price at ω1 explains the discontinuity in the value function at
this point. If the bond price did not change, ω1 would represent exactly the point of
indifference between the risk-sharing and risk-taking plans described above. However,
since the bond price falls, borrowing beyond ω1 is more expensive, and this leads to the
discontinuity.
24For details of how the thresholds ω1 and ω2 are found under log-utility, see the proof of Proposition
6 in the Appendix C.
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Figure 2.7: ECE: Risk Taking Behavior
Now suppose that the planner for the open economy could choose the collateral
constraint ω¯ to maximize welfare. It is clear from the description and the diagram that
only one of two choices could ever be optimal: ω1 or ω2. Proposition 4 shows that, in an
ECE, the problem facing the planner is exactly this choice between ω1 and ω2. At ω1 the
price of borrowing is lower, but the constraint on borrowing is more restrictive. Atω2 the
price of borrowing is higher, but the constraint on borrowing is less restrictive. Which is
better depends on how the benefits of risk-sharing (which matter at ω1) compare to the
value of the default option (which matters at ω2).
The four panels of Figure 2.7 show how this comparison is affected by changing |a−
A|, holding all other parameters constant. Proposition 6 states that if |a−A| is sufficiently
small, the default option is sufficiently valuable to induce risk-taking in equilibrium.
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This is seen in the top-left panel, where a = A. |a − A| then increases as we move
to the top-right and bottom-left panels. Note that as the default option loses value, the
primary change is thatω1 increases. The reason is that, as default becomes less valuable,
risk-sharing is optimal over a larger range of collateral constraints. Eventually, in the
bottom-right panel, ω1 is sufficiently large so that risk-sharing becomes optimal. The
four panels of the figure therefore help to illustrate one of the key insights of the model.
There is a trade-off between risk-sharing and default. As the penalties for default in
terms of lost productivity increase (|a − A| increases), the incentives for risk-sharing
increase as well. This is a direct link between risk-sharing and default that is consistent
with the empirical correlation between consumption risk-sharing and external credit-risk
discussed in the introduction.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper has studied a simple 2 period model of an open economy that has ex-ante
opportunities to share consumption risks with a foreign sector, and an ex-post policy de-
cision about default on external debts. The model highlights a general trade-off between
risk-sharing and the option value of default. This trade-off can lead to endogenous risk-
taking: Even if the country is risk-averse and full insurance against productivity shocks
is possible, the optimal plan may keep consumption volatile because the exposure to
shocks is crucial to the option value of default.
The model relates the trade-off between risk-sharing and default options to the ex-
ternal debt to capital ratio, and identifies a source of threshold effects that enters into
consumption risk-sharing incentives through the credit-risk on external debt. The model
therefore has quantifiable implications that can be be used to guide and organize empir-
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ical analysis on two well-documented puzzles regarding emerging economies: (1) the
apparent lack of international consumption risk-sharing in the wake of financial integra-
tion, and (2) the history of “serial default” on sovereign and external debt obligations.
Establishing an empirical connection between these puzzles would require a more de-
tailed analysis than I have provided here, but casual observation of the data suggests that
some relationship exists and that it is consistent with the implications of the model. The
analysis of this paper therefore provides one way to understand theoretically why there
may be a direct link between the diverse risk-sharing and default behaviors of different
emerging economies.
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CHAPTER 3
CONSUMPTION RISK-SHARING AND THRESHOLDS OF CAPITAL
MARKET INTEGRATION BY EMERGING ECONOMIES
3.1 Introduction
While there has been a large increase in capital inflows resulting in higher levels of
cumulated capital stocks in emerging economies over the past three decades, it is not
yet entirely clear what the consequences of capital market integration have been. It was
hoped, for example, that integration into international capital markets would promote
consumption risk-sharing in emerging economies, reducing volatility of consumption
growth rates relative to output growth rates. The potential welfare gains from reduced
consumption volatility are particularly high in emerging economies, where volatility has
traditionally been significantly greater.1 However, on balance, the empirical evidence
seems to suggest that consumption risk-sharing has not improved much in emerging
economies, despite the wave of financial globalization, and there is some evidence that
consumption volatility has actually increased in emerging markets (Kose et al., 2003,
2007; Bai and Zhang, 2012).
Risk-sharing in industrialized economies is also imperfect (Backus et al., 1992;
Canova and Ravn, 1996; Pakko, 1998; Ambler et al., 2004), but has improved signif-
icantly with greater integration of financial markets (Obstfeld, 1994b; Pakko, 1998; De-
myanyk et al., 2008).2 The surprising finding for emerging economies is not just that
1For example, Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2000) estimate that eliminating idiosyncratic consump-
tion uncertainty (relative to world average riskiness) would have the same benefit as a 6.6% permanent
increase in the level of per capita consumption of a typical emerging economy.
2Backus et al. (1992); Canova and Ravn (1996); Ambler et al. (2004) all study cross-country con-
sumption correlations in industrialized countries and reach the conclusion that risk-sharing remains low
relative to the predictions of a standard Arrow-Debreu contingent claims economy. Obstfeld (1994b)
uses a sample of G-7 countries for the period 1950-1988 and concludes that for both cross-country con-
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risk-sharing remains small, but that it has not improved with de jure or de facto measures
of financial integration.3 For example, Kose et al. (2007) study patterns of consumption
risk-sharing in industrialized and emerging economies and document evidence that in-
creased capital flows improved consumption risk-sharing in industrialized economies
but not in emerging economies.4
In this paper, I explore whether the lack of response of consumption risk-sharing in
emerging economies to changes in cross-border capital stocks may be due to the pres-
ence of threshold effects. The previous literature studying consumption risk-sharing
is based largely on linear specifications of the relationship between capital flows and
stocks and measures of consumption risk-sharing, but numerous authors have suggested
that their results are indicative of the presence of threshold effects (e.g., Kose et al.,
2003). The empirical analysis in this paper confirms the pre-existing intuition of the
presence of threshold effects. Quantitative results differ across asset classes, but I doc-
ument a common and pervasive qualitative feature of the data. Whether the focus is on
debt, FDI or total capital stocks, there are in general three regimes. The first, when the
measure of integration is low, involves minimal risk-sharing. The third, when measures
sumption growth correlations and the correlation between domestic consumption growth and the world
component of consumption (output) growth, these economies are unable to accrue perfect risk sharing but
that risk-sharing has improved significantly. Pakko (1998) also compares the correlation between domes-
tic consumption growth and output growth with the correlation between domestic consumption growth
and world output growth, and reaches the same conclusion. Demyanyk et al. (2008) document significant
improvements in risk-sharing across EU economies, and significant positive effects of intra EU capital
flows on risk-sharing.
3De jure measures of financial integration (openness) attempt to capture the legal restrictions on cross-
border capital flows. Measures have been proposed by Edwards (2001), Chinn and Ito (2008), Quinn
(1997) and Edison et al. (2002). De facto measures are based on actual cross-border capital flows or
cumulated measure of inflows, and include the positive sum of items in the capital account (often viewed
relative to GDP).
4(Kose et al., 2003, 2007) employ a variety of measures of consumption risk sharing for 72 economies
for the sample period of 1960-2004. They divide the full sample of these countries into three sub-groups
of countries: industrial countries (21), emerging markets (22) and other developing countries (33). They
conclude that advanced economies have accrued better risk sharing during the sample period. Similarly,
Bai and Zhang (2012) found that the coefficient estimated by regressing domestic consumption growth on
domestic output growth is lower and the coefficient of domestic consumption growth on world consump-
tion growth is higher for the industrialized countries than for emerging economies, suggesting greater
risk-sharing in the developed economies.
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of integration are high, involves imperfect but significant (both statistically and eco-
nomically) risk-sharing. However, intermediate to these thresholds is a regime in which
risk-sharing is lowest and in many cases negative. Moreover, a significant number of
emerging economies fall in the intermediate range for the sample period 1985 – 2007,
while most industrialized economies are consistently in the high regime. Only for FPI li-
abilities is the logic of regimes reversed (with an intermediate regime where risk-sharing
is greatest), but this affects very few emerging economies. The results are therefore sug-
gestive of the idea that emerging economies may not yet have reaped the gains of greater
consumption risk-sharing because their economies need to integrate further, in order to
cross threshold effects in the development stage of capital market integration.
To identify threshold effects, I study a panel data set of emerging and industrialized
economies from 1985 – 2007.5 The baseline empirical model is based on a regression
specification used by Demyanyk et al. (2008) to estimate consumption risk-sharing in
EU and EMU countries. Their specification captures the mechanism of risk-sharing
by estimating whether the country level consumption growth rates are delinked from
country level output growth rates, specifically in a panel controlling for individual (and
possibly time) fixed-effects. Demyanyk et al. (2008) then study linear effects of different
types of foreign assets on consumption risk-sharing through interaction terms. Instead,
I augment the baseline specification to estimate possible threshold effects arising from
levels of external debt, FDI, FPI or total foreign liabilities (all relative to GDP). The
estimation of threshold effects employs a novel method for threshold regressions devel-
oped for non-dynamic panels with individual specific fixed effects by Hansen (1999).
The key feature of the approach is that threshold effects are determined endogenously
based on an iterative bootstrap method, rather than being imposed exogenously on the
data.
5The methodology employed for identification of threshold effects is appropriate only for balanced
panels, and lack of data availability therefore hinder a study of a larger sample period.
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Following Kose et al. (2007), I focus on threshold effects in terms of different types
of capital liabilities: Debt, FDI, FPI, and total liabilities (all relative to domestic GDP).6
Most classes of stocks of capital liabilities exhibit the same three regimes: Low risk-
sharing initially, an intermediate high volatility regime, and significant risk-sharing be-
yond an upper threshold value. FPI inflows on the other hand exhibit a risk sharing
regime in the intermediate range of threshold effects. Confidence regions for threshold
values are generally quite small, and results remain significant across the confidence
regions, at least on a sub-sample restricted to emerging economies. The advantage of
the endogenous threshold estimation is that the identification of the three regimes does
not come from a prior assumption of their existence, but is identified from standard
empirical optimization from the data.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses related literature. Sec-
tion 3.3 outlines the data used, with detailed descriptions given in the Appendix B.
Section 3.4 gives details of the empirical methodology. Section 3.5 presents the results,
Section 3.6 compares these results with common alternative non-threshold specifications
and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
There is a large literature on consumption risk-sharing in industrialized economies (Ob-
stfeld, 1994b; Olivei, 2000; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2003; Demyanyk et al., 2008; Melitz
and Zumer, 1999; Asdrubali et al., 1996; Bengui et al., 2012). The consensus from
this literature is that consumption risk-sharing is small, relative to the benchmark model
predictions derived from a complete markets Arrow-Debreu contingent claims economy.
6I also consider capital assets but – perhaps because these are smaller in magnitude for emerging
economies – threshold effects in terms of foreign assets are less significant.
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However, consumption risk-sharing has increased over the past 20-30 years, and higher
de facto capital market integration has increased the consumption risk-sharing across
industrialized economies. For example, (Obstfeld, 1994b) document the later with fo-
cus on G7 economies, while (Demyanyk et al., 2008) document similar findings for EU
economies.
More recently, there has also been a focus on consumption risk-sharing in emerging
economies. Kose and Prasad (2010) and Bai and Zhang (2012) show that, relative to
industrialized countries, consumption risk-sharing in emerging economies is (1) small,
(2) appears much less responsive to an increase in financial market integration. For the
latter, de jure measures of capital market integration, as well as de facto measures such
as FDI, FPI or external debt liabilities relative to GDP are considered. Of the various
asset types, external debt, Kose:2010 find that external debt is the least conducive to
risk-sharing, but the risk-sharing benefits of increased FDI and FPI inflows are also
negligible. For a summary of predictions, methodologies and results on consumption
risk-sharing in industrialized and emerging economies see, e.g., Kose and Prasad (2010)
or Islamaj (2008).
While the empirical findings on consumption risk-sharing may be viewed as casting
capital market integration in a negative light, e.g., Kose et al. (2007) instead suggest that
they may indicate that the process of integration in emerging economies has not gone far
enough to realize potential gains of consumption risk-sharing. This view is supported
by findings in Kose et al. (2007), who use quadratic interaction terms and find that the
benefits of financial integration in terms of international risk sharing are accrued only
after a certain thresholds of financial openness is reached. Similarly, Kose et al. (2011)
identify threshold effects of financial depth and institutional quality for the effects of
capital market integration on output growth rates using parametric and non-parametric
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approach. A synthesis of this empirical literature therefore already indicates the poten-
tial for threshold effects of capital market integration on welfare relevant measures such
as output growth and international consumption risk-sharing. However, all of the exist-
ing literature uses exogenous specifications of threshold effects to in turn demonstrate
the existence of threshold effects. The primary contribution of the present paper can
therefore be seen in identifying threshold effects endogenously based on a systematic
methodology developed by Hansen (1999) to identify threshold effects from the data.
3.3 Data
The analysis in this paper studies international consumption risk-sharing using a bal-
anced panel dataset for industrialized and emerging economies from 1985 – 2007. A
detailed description of the variables in the dataset along with their sources is provided
in Table 3.1. The basic datasets are merged from the World Bank’s Development In-
dicators and Updated and Extended “External Wealth of Nations” Dataset.7. Per capita
real GDP, per capita real GNI and per capita final consumption which is the sum of
government and private consumption are from the former dataset, while stocks of fi-
nancial liabilities (Debt Liability, Foreign direct investments (FDI Liability), Foreign
portfolio investment (FPI Liability) and Total liabilities)and assets (Debt, Foreign direct
investments (FDI Assets), Foreign portfolio investment (FPI Assets) and Total assets)
are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Financial variables are all normalized by the
GDP measured in current US dollars in the analysis, while an alternative set of analysis
also uses normalization with respective total liabilities or total assets.
The data set has annual data over the period 1985-2007 for 20 industrialized
7See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) for detailed description and collection methodology employed
for “External Wealth of Nations” Dataset
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economies and 25 emerging economies. The list of countries is provided in Table B.1
in the Data Appendix B.8 Table B.2 gives summary statistics for the variables, includ-
ing mean, median, upper and lower quartiles for each type of capital inflow (average
over all years) in the sample. The analysis in this paper requires a balanced dataset
therefore the size of the data set is based on the availability of the data for maximum
number of countries. The main idea of the paper is to capture the threshold effects in
terms of financial inflows on consumption risk-sharing. The next Section, provides the
underlying methodology employed for identifying the threshold effects in international
consumption risk sharing.
Table 3.1: Data Sources
Variable Source
Stock of External Liabilities EWN II
Stock of External Assets EWN II
Stock of FDI liabilities EWN II
Stock of Equity Liabilities EWN II
Stock of External Debt Liabilities World Bank
Stock of FDI Assets EWN II
Stock of Equity Assets EWN II
Stock of External Debt Assets EWN II
GDP WDI-WB
GDP per capita WDI-WB
GNI per capita WDI-WB
Consumption per capita WDI-WB
Notes: WDI-WB: World Development Indicators-World Bank ;
EWNII: Updated External Wealth of Nations ;
All data from EWN II and WDI is in current price US dollar.
8Categorization of countries as emerging economies is based on income limits however, these calcu-
lation can change from year to year which may result into a given country qualifying under the legislative
and administrative criteria one year as emerging economy but not the next year. Therefore, The World
Bank has not established a fixed list of emerging market countries. Therefore, this paper uses the list
of emerging economies based on the availability of the data as well as the country being categorized as
emerging market in either one of the following indexes: Columbia University EMGP List; FTSE list;
MSCI list; S&P list; Dow Jones list; Frontier Strategy Group (F10) list; BBVA Research and Emerging
Markets Index.
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3.4 Methodology
I first describe a benchmark empirical specification for estimating international
consumption-risk sharing based on Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003); Demyanyk et al.
(2008). I then describe a methodology for identifying and estimating threshold effects
in panel data sets introduced in Hansen (1999). Finally, I outline a synthesis of these
two methodologies that can be employed to identify and estimate threshold effects of
capital market integration on international consumption risk-sharing.
3.4.1 International Consumption Risk Sharing
The most commonly used measures of consumption risk-sharing in the literature (e.g.,
Kose et al., 2003, 2011; Bai and Zhang, 2012; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2003; Demyanyk
et al., 2008), capture the average co-movement of country specific consumption per
capita growth rate with country specific GDP per capita growth rate. In the following,
i denotes the country index and t the time index for a balanced panel of observations
on I countries over T time periods. Per capita consumption (government and private) is
denoted by cit, and aggregate consumption of the total countries in the sample is denoted
by ct :=
∑
i cit for all t ∈ T . The country specific consumption growth rate is therefore
given by:
[log(cit) − log(ci(t−1)] − [log(ct) − log(ct−1)] := ∆log(cit) − ∆log(ct) . (3.1)
The analysis uses country specific growth rates because aggregate shocks cannot be
eliminated from risk-sharing, therefore the aggregate component of consumption growth
rate is deducted from the country specific growth rate.
In a similar manner, country i’s year t, per capita GDP is denoted by GDPit, and
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aggregate GDP of the total countries in the sample is denoted by GDPt :=
∑
i GDPit for
all t ∈ T . The country specific GDP per capita growth rate is captured by the following
expression:
[log(GDPit) − log(GDPi(t−1)] − [log(GDPt) − log(GDPt−1)] := ∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt) .(3.2)
Again, the aggregate component of GDP per capita growth rates are deducted from
the country specific GDP growth rates. International consumption risk-sharing is then
measured using the correlation between these two measures of country specific growth
rates of consumption and output. In the event of perfect risk-sharing the correlation
between these growth rates should be zero and a correlation of unity is interpreted as
no risk-sharing within the sample. The main specification for consumption risk sharing
with country specific fixed effects can therefore be written as:
∆log(cit) − ∆log(ct) = µi + βgdp(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt)) + it , (3.3)
where µi, is a country specific fixed effect and it is an error term, assumed to be condi-
tionally i.i.d normally distributed across (i, t) ∈ I × T .
Demyanyk et al. (2008) extended the benchmark specification outlined above to
study whether consumption and income risk-sharing has increased due to the recent
increase in foreign equities and portfolios in the member states of the EU. This extended
version follows Melitz and Zumer (1999) to incorporate risk-sharing through foreign
financial assets and liabilities resulting into a specification as follows:
∆log(cit) − ∆log(ct) = µi + β(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt)) + it , (3.4)
where they impose structure on the coefficient β, allowing it to vary over time, countries
and through foreign asset holdings:
β = βgdp + βtt + βFL(FLit − F¯L) . (3.5)
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In (3.5), FAit denotes the capital account entry for a generic class of foreign assets or
liabilities in country i ∈ I at time t ∈ T ; and F¯A is the average across countries and
years. The structure includes a time trend in order to guard against any trend in assets
and liabilities so that the analysis does not capture the changing trend of risk-sharing that
may be result of any other developments in the national economies. The substitution of
β in the final specification 3.4 therefore yields:
∆log(cit) − ∆log(ct) = µi + βgdp(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt))
+ βtt(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt))
+ βFL(FLit − F¯L)(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt)) + it . (3.6)
The estimated value of (1 − βgdp) captures the average amount of consumption risk-
sharing within the group of countries; βt captures time trends; while βFL captures the
effect of changes in foreign liability or asset position on consumption risk-sharing.
1 − βgdp − βtt − βFL(FLit − F¯L) then measures the amount of consumption risk-sharing
obtained in period t by country i.
Similar to the above methodology, the analysis in this paper is also based on fixed
effects model and uses the specification (3.6) but with threshold effects of liability (or
asset) positions in lieu of the linear-interaction specification of foreign asset effects in
(3.6).9 At a basic level, this simply involves placing a different structure on the coef-
ficient β in (3.4). But how should the threshold levels be determined? Much of the
literature on threshold effects uses mean, median or quantile values for thresholds, and
while this may often be a convenient approximation, it is ad hoc and does not take into
account the optimization on the part of economic agents. I, therefore follow an alterna-
9In considering a sub-sample of emerging economies alone, means of consumption and GDP are
taken for the whole sample. This means that consumption risk-sharing is viewed relative to the whole
set of countries include industrialized ones, which both seems economically more relevant and is more
appropriate when a large share of the capital inflows originate from the industrialized economies into
emerging economies.
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tive method for identification of endogenous threshold effects based on the methodology
introduced in Hansen (1999).
3.4.2 Threshold Effects in Non-Dynamic Panels
Hansen (1999) develops econometric techniques for regression functions that are not
identical across all observations in a sample and differ depending on the discrete classes
they fall into. The technique is developed for balanced panel data sets with country
fixed effects based on least square estimation. Thresholds are identified via an iterative
bootstrap method, which also constructs consistent confidence intervals for the thresh-
old parameters based on the asymptotic distribution of the error term. The statistical
significance of threshold parameters is assessed on the basis of the bootstrap method.
Application of other threshold models in the literature is either based on an exogenous
threshold variables or endogenous thresholds. The former might not be justified when
the threshold is clearly a decision variable for the agent while the later may bias the
results. Therefore, this method allows estimation of parameters from the sample which
also has clear and tractable relevance for policy related issues.
The structural equation of interest is of the following form:
yit = µi + β1
′
q xitI(qit ≤ γ) + β2′q xitI(qit > γ) + it (3.7)
where I(.) is the indicator function, the subscript i ∈ I indexes the individual and the
subscript t ∈ T indexes time. In the first iteration, the observations are divided into two
regimes depending on the threshold variable, qit. The division of the regimes is a result
of first stage minimization of the sum of squared errors that estimates the first threshold
indicated as γ1. The corresponding regimes can be identified based on the regression
slopes which are denoted by β1q and β
2
q. The basic identification assumption is that xit
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and qit are not time-invariant.10 Fixing the first stage threshold γ1, the second iteration
again minimizes the sum of squared errors to estimate the second threshold denoted by
γ2, and tries to further divide the sample, continuing iterations until no further thresholds
are identified. The method tests for the existence of threshold and further determines the
number of thresholds which are estimated by least squares. The slope coefficients are
estimated along with conventional OLS standard errors and white-corrected standard
errors to test the significance of these slope coefficients.
In the above specification 3.7, the analysis sequentially tests for zero, one, two or
three thresholds. The F-test statistics and the likelihood ratio along with bootstrap p
values indicate significance of the threshold parameters. If the corresponding bootstrap
p value is below the desired critical value, the null hypothesis of no threshold, one
threshold, two threshold or three thresholds is rejected. Furthermore, the asymptotic
confidence intervals for the threshold are then used to ascertain the certainty about the
nature of the division based on the threshold parameters. Lastly, conventional OLS
errors along with White corrected standard errors are used for the significance of the
estimates.
The above methodology is flexible enough to extend the analysis to more than three
threshold parameters. The analysis in this paper is based on the extended version of
the threshold model. The next subsection presents the synthesis of the consumption
risk-sharing methodology described in Section 3.4.1 and threshold effects in the non-
dynamic panel data described in Section 3.4.2.
10For computational and econometric issues relating least square estimation and the non-standard
asymptotic theory of inference refer to Hansen (1999).
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3.4.3 Consumption Risk Sharing and Threshold Effects
The underlying specification for this paper is to test whether there exist any threshold
effects based on foreign assets and liabilities for international consumption risk shar-
ing. Demyanyk et al. (2008) use an interaction term of foreign assets/liabilities with
the country specific output growth. This paper, instead of using interaction term, uses
the approach of Hansen (1999) where foreign assets/liabilities are treated as threshold
variables to test how the coefficient of the risk-sharing measure, captured by (1− βFL) is
affected by different regimes of levels of foreign assets and liabilities. Formally,
∆log(cit) − ∆log(ct) = µi + βtt(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt))
+ β1FL(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt))(FLit ≤ γ1)
+ β2FL(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt))(γ1 < FLit ≤ γ2)
+ β3FL(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt))(γ2 < FLit ≤ γ3)
+ β4FL(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt))(γ3 < FLit) + it ,(3.8)
where γ1 < γ2 < γ3. Note that the basic specification simply places a different structure
on β in (3.4), based on threshold effects instead of linear interaction effects. The spec-
ification also captures time trends as suggested by Demyanyk et al. (2008) to control
for changing trend of risk-sharing that may be result of any other developments in the
national economies. The estimation of threshold effects and confidence regions is then
based on Hansen’s iterative bootstrap procedure, which produces robust and consistent
estimates of threshold values. The interpretation of the parameters for consumption
risk-sharing via financial liabilities are calculated as (1 − βFL), where respective β’s dif-
fer on the basis of various regimes that are based on financial assets or liabilities. As
mentioned in Section 3.3, the consumption and output are per capita variables whilst
financial variables are normalized by nominal GDP expressed as current US dollars.
70
More formally, under this specification, unlike (Demyanyk et al., 2008), the av-
erage consumption risk sharing, which is generically measured as 1 − βtt − β jFL(FL)
where j represents the corresponding regime dependent coefficients, varies on the basis
of regimes. However, this paper explores whether consumption risk sharing has im-
proved by financial integration in emerging economies and therefore, the remainder of
the analysis specifically focuses on regime dependent estimates and their implication of
consumption risk sharing.
The approach in this paper uses different types of financial variables as threshold ef-
fects: External Debt, Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) , Foreign Portfolio Investments
(FPI) and reserves represented by FL in equation 3.8. The objective of the analysis is
therefore to identify regimes for consumption risk-sharing based on the different asset
classes, and estimate the amount of consumption risk-sharing achieved by a country
in each regime. The next section presents the results of empirical estimation of (3.8)
based on a panel data of emerging and industrialized economies from 1985-2007, and
for various different asset classes. The first subsection provides results based on total li-
abilities for the full sample of industrialized and non-industrialized countries along with
separate results for industrialized and emerging economies. The following subsections
follow the same exposition with different threshold variables that are presented in the
following order: Debt liabilities, FDI liabilities, FPI liabilities and lastly foreign assets.
Corresponding regression tables and test statistics are provided in the Appendix B.
3.5 Results
I use the basic specification (3.8), looking at total liabilities (relative to GDP) as well
as separate classes of liabilities, external Debt, FDI, and FPI. I also report estimation of
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(3.8) for financial assets, but here there is no evidence of threshold effects largely be-
cause emerging economies have until recently not accumulated much in terms of foreign
assets. The results reported are based on (1) the full sample of industrialized economies
and emerging economies for the period 1985 – 2007, and (2) the sub-sample of emerging
economies for the period 1985 – 2007.
The summary of results is presented in Table 3.2. Each column gives results for a
different specification, which are discussed in detail below. A complete breakdown of
the results of 4 iterations is then presented in Table B.3 in the Appendix B. The fourth
iteration does not generate new thresholds in all cases, and so further iterations are not
reported.
Table 3.2: Summary of Results
Sample Full Emerging Full Emerging Full Emerging Full Emerging
Liabilities Total Total Debt Debt FDI FDI FPI FPI
Threshold 1 1.058066 1.058066 0.832957 0.9174 0.413596 0.423 0.035209 0.013589
CI min 1.011161 0.904716 0.79367 0.838934 0.311886 0.308665 0.012347 0.008575
CI max 1.627313 1.099032 1.496052 1.043659 0.422333 0.423 0.035765 0.017391
Threshold 2 1.927312 1.868297 0.9174 1.412609 0.528463 0.528463 0.064819 0.065085
CI min 1.819795 1.868297 0.898123 1.190079 0.055132 0.655604 0.054797 0.054797
CI max 1.927313 1.950202 1.043391 1.614858 0.809554 0.812568 0.069974 0.071572
Threshold 3 X X X X X X X X
CI min X X X X X X X X
CI max X X X X X X X X
F 45.676992 30.082647 23.638476 29.038687 21.537517 12.709697 31.953343 33.823233
Bootstrap P 0.003333 0.01 0.006667 0.083333 0.016667 0.063333 0.003333 0.01
βo −0.004966∗ −0.005768∗ −0.000145∗ −0.00126∗ −0.000963∗ −0.002799∗ −0.001903∗ −0.000641∗
OLS SE 0.004139 0.006065 0.00122 0.00194 0.001323 0.002056 0.004034 0.004929
HET SE 0.00513 0.007078 0.00196 0.002553 0.002133 0.002749 0.005242 0.005328
βc1 1.028881 1.025681 1.023256 1.024563 1.035204
∗ 1.056025∗ 1.095262∗∗ 1.130204∗∗∗
OLS SE 0.030345 0.042494 0.015397 0.0244802 0.014873 0.023657 0.032327 0.041544
HET SE 0.042092 0.056508 0.022705 0.029675 0.026455 0.034858 0.046152 0.041994
βc2 1.176755
∗∗∗ 1.197422∗∗∗ 0.861046∗∗∗ 1.159799∗∗∗ 1.158254∗∗∗ 1.220955∗∗∗ 0.885002∗∗ 0.934577∗
OLS SE 0.034819 0.048848 0.033926 0.036497 0.033314 0.050127 0.03259 0.037008
HET SE 0.045045 0.05903 0.049841 0.054071 0.040973 0.054683 0.049475 0.042797
βc3 0.946235 0.94776
∗ 1.086396∗∗ 1.046918 0.900305∗∗ 0.850547∗∗ 1.077082∗∗ 1.10035∗∗
OLS SE 0.034575 0.046733 0.019293 0.03199 0.045691 0.09875 0.030307 0.037475
HET SE 0.034505 0.039325 0.03717 0.055607 0.058823 0.089957 0.045951 0.047307
βc4 X X X X X X X X
OLS SE X X X X X X X X
HET SE X X X X X X X X
Observations 1035 575 1035 575 1035 575 1035 575
* indicates coefficent is significantly different from 1 at 90% confidence interval.
** indicates coefficent is significantly different from 1 at 95% confidence interval.
*** indicates coefficent is significantly different from 1 at 99% confidence interval.
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3.5.1 Total Liabilities
Full sample of countries
To read the results, start by looking at the estimation results for the full sample (first
column of Table 3.2). Here, two statistically significantly different threshold values
of the total liability to GDP ratio are identified from the complete Table B.3 in the
Appendix B:
• Threshold 1 with a point estimate of ≈ 1.058 and a 99% confidence interval of
≈ [1.011, 1.627].
• Threshold 2 with a point estimate of ≈ 1.927 and a 99% confidence interval of
≈ [1.820, 1.927].
The F-test for a single threshold and double threshold for a full sample are highly sig-
nificant with bootstrap P-value of 0.05 and 0.00, respectively presented in Table B.3.
The complete summary Table B.3 in the Appendix B also reports a third threshold value
of “Threshold 3” with a point estimate of ≈ 0.973 and a 99% confidence interval of
≈ (0.341, 0.973). However, the bootstrap P-value for the triple threshold regression is
not significant at the 10% level, and so I indicate this with a X in the summary Table
3.2. Only up to three thresholds are reported in the Appendix B becasue in all cases the
third threshold is insignificant at the 10% level, and fourth thresholds were insignificant
at the 25% level.
Although the confidence interval for Threshold 1 is quite large, it does not overlap
with the 99% confidence inteval of Threshold 2, and so the estimation indicates the
existence of 3 robust regimes, with different coefficients of risk-sharing (summarized
also in Table 3.2):
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• REGIME 1: Below Threshold 1, the estimate for risk-sharing is (1−β1) ≈ −0.030,
which (with a White-error of ≈ 0.042) is statistically but not economically differ-
ent from 0, suggesting some negative risk-sharing (consumption volatility exceeds
output volatility) but not in an economically significant way.11
• REGIME 2: Between Threshold 1 and Threshold 2, the estimate for risk-sharing is
(1 − β2) ≈ −0.177, which is both statistically and economically negative, because
it indicates that the output growth rates are close to 20% more correlated than
consumption growth rates. This suggests that there is significant excess volatility
in the consumption growth rate for economies in REGIME 2.
• REGIME 3: Above Threshold 2, the estimate for the risk-sharing coefficient is
(1 − β3) ≈ 0.054, which is statistically significantly greater than 0 (though sta-
tistically significantly smaller than 1). In REGIME 3, countries therefore achieve
some limited risk-sharing. Although it is far from perfect risk-sharing, countries in
REGIME 3 have consumption growth rates that are approximately 5% more cor-
related than output growth rates, indicating a small but not insignificant amount
of risk-sharing.
Finally, Table 3.3 indicates the number of countries in each regime at each date, and
Table B.4- B.5 in the Appendix B indicates for each country in the sample, in which
years it fell into each of the regimes identified for each specification. It is apparent
that a significant number of emerging economies fall into REGIME 2 for significant
length of times, and that only a small number of emerging economies have successfully
transitioned into REGIME 3 (e.g., Singapore, Ecuador, Jordan). Industrialized countries
fell into REGIME 3 overwhelmingly for the whole sample period.
11A ∗ on the β coefficient estimate in Table 3.2 indicates statistic significantly different from 1 at the
95% level.
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Table 3.3: Distribution of Emerging and Advanced Economies for Total Liabilities
country 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Emerging
Regime 1 19 19 19 20 20 22 21 22 21 22 22 22 23 19 17 19 19 18 18 17 20 20 20 459
Regime 2 6 6 6 5 5 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 1 4 7 5 5 5 5 6 2 3 3 95
Regime 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 21
Advanced
Regime 1 16 16 16 16 14 14 14 15 13 13 14 13 11 9 7 6 5 2 2 2 2 2 1 223
Regime 2 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 6 7 8 9 12 9 7 8 6 6 135
Regime 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 3 4 4 5 6 6 6 6 9 11 10 12 13 102
Total
Regime 1 35 35 35 36 34 36 35 37 34 35 36 35 34 28 24 25 24 20 20 19 22 22 21 682
Regime2 10 10 10 9 10 7 8 8 9 8 6 6 6 10 14 13 14 17 14 13 10 9 9 230
Regime 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 2 2 3 4 5 7 7 7 7 8 11 13 13 14 15 123
Total 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 1035
Emerging economies
To check whether threshold identification is overly affected by the presence of industri-
alized economies in REGIME 3, column 2 of Table 3.2 also reports estimation results
for the sub-sample of emerging economies (again with total liabilities as the threshold
variable). For this sub-sample, Threshold 1 remains unaffected (because more recently
there are almost no industrialized countries falling into REGIME 1), while the second
threshold value decreases marginally to ≈ 1.868. 99% confidence intervals are also
much tighter (≈ [0.905, 1.099] for Threshold 1, and ≈ [1.868, 1.950] for Threshold 2).
The estimate of the risk-sharing coefficient in each regime is also very similar to the
estimate on the full sample, with the only noticable change being a small increase in
consumption volatility in REGIME 2.
Together, the result of the previous two specifications are indicative of the pres-
ence of strong threshold effects that lead to the presence of three different regimes For
emerging economies with low total capital inflows (REGIME 1), there is little evidence
of consumption risk-sharing. Emerging economies with sufficiently high total capital
inflows (REGIME 3) achieve some limited but economically significant risk-sharing,
reducing the volatility of consumption growth relative to output growth viz-a-viz the re-
spective aggregates by just over 5 percentage points. However, there is an intermediate
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regime (REGIME 2), in which consumption risk-sharing is actually negative, suggesting
that in the transition towards capital market integration there is phase in which countries
experience substantial excess consumption volatility arising from capital inflows. The
remaining subsections look at how this relates to the pattern of capital inflows, and there-
fore gives results for each of the different general asset classes (external debt, FDI and
FPI).
3.5.2 External Debt Liabilities
Full sample of countries
Results for external debt liabilities on the full sample are given in the third column of
Table 3.2. Again, two statistically significantly different threshold values of the total
liability to GDP ratio are identified:
• Threshold 1 with a point estimate of ≈ 0.833 and a 99% confidence interval of
≈ [0.794, 1.496].
• Threshold 2 with a point estimate of ≈ 0.917 and a 99% confidence interval of
≈ [0.898, 1.043].
The F-test for a single threshold and double threshold for a full sample are highly sig-
nificant with bootstrap P-value of 0.03 and 0.00, respectively, presented in Table B.3.
Identification of clear regimes in this case is problematic because of the substantial over-
lap between the confidence intervals of the threshold values. Using the point estimates
the same three qualitative regimes emerge, but separation can not be made with suffi-
cient confidence on the full sample. As a result, I again therefore look at the sub-sample
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of emerging economies where threshold values can be identified with tighter confidence
intervals.
Table 3.4: Distribution of Emerging and Advanced Economies for Debt Liabilities
country 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Emerging
Regime 1 18 17 18 20 18 22 22 23 23 24 24 24 23 20 20 20 21 21 21 21 22 23 23 488
Regime 2 2 3 2 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 23
Regime 3 5 5 5 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 4 2 2 3 4 4 2 2 2 64
Advanced
Regime 1 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 16 13 14 15 15 14 12 12 9 8 4 4 4 4 4 2 255
Regime 2 0 2 0 3 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 22
Regime 3 5 3 5 2 5 5 4 3 5 4 4 4 5 7 7 10 11 15 16 16 15 16 16 183
Total
Regime 1 33 32 33 35 33 37 37 39 36 38 39 39 37 32 32 29 29 25 25 25 26 27 25 743
Regime 2 2 5 2 4 3 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 3 2 4 3 2 0 0 2 0 2 45
Regime 3 10 8 10 6 9 7 6 5 7 5 5 5 7 10 11 12 13 18 20 20 17 18 18 247
Total 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 1035
Emerging economies
Column 4 of Table 3.2 reports estimation results for the sub-sample of emerging
economies using external debt liabilities as the threshold variable. For this sub-
sample, the Threshold 1 point estimate is ≈ 0.917 with a 99% confidence interval of
≈ [0.839, 1.044], and the Threshold 2 point estimate is ≈ 1.413 with a 99% confidence
interval of ≈ [1.190, 1.615]. The double iteration is significant at the 10% level with
an F-statitic of ≈ 29.039. Since the two confidence intervals for estimates on the sub-
sample do not overlap at all (and are also quite tight), it is possible to identify again
three robust regimes, with different coefficients of risk-sharing (summarized also in Ta-
ble 3.2):
• REGIME 1: Below Threshold 1, the estimate for risk-sharing is (1−β1) ≈ −0.025,
which (with a White-error of ≈ 0.030) is statistically but not economically differ-
ent from 0, suggesting some negative risk-sharing (consumption volatility exceeds
output volatility) but not in an economically significant way.
• REGIME 2: Between Threshold 1 and Threshold 2, the estimate for risk-sharing
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is (1−β2) ≈ −0.160, which is both statistically and economically negative, because
it indicates that the output growth rates are more than 15% more correlated than
consumption growth rates. This suggests that there is significant excess volatility
in the consumption growth rate for economies in REGIME 2.
• REGIME 3: Above Threshold 2, the estimate for the risk-sharing coefficient is
(1 − β3) ≈ −0.047, which is statistically significantly greater than 0. In REGIME
3, countries therefore also experience some excess volatility, reflecting in part the
fact that emerging economies in general tend to have negative risk-sharing and
that debt seems the least conducive form of capital inflows to reduce consumption
volatility (Kose et al., 2007, see, e.g., the discussion in).
As with total assets, the threshold regression with external debt therefore identifies
three regimes (at least in the sub-sample of emerging economies). While in general,
external debt does not seem very conducive to risk-sharing, countries in the interme-
diate regime achieve the worst risk-sharing outcomes. Malik (2011) outlines a simple
theoretical mechanism that can explain theses finding based on the interaction between
external debt levels and incentives for cross-border diversification in the presence of
default risks.
3.5.3 FDI liabilities
Full sample of countries
Results for FDI liabilities on the full sample are given in the fifth column of Table 3.2.
Again, two statistically significantly different threshold values of the total liability to
GDP ratio are identified:
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• Threshold 1 with a point estimate of ≈ 0.414 and a 99% confidence interval of
≈ [0.312, 0.422].
• Threshold 2 with a point estimate of ≈ 0.528 and a 99% confidence interval of
≈ [0.055, 0.810].
The F-test for a double threshold for a full sample is highly significant with bootstrap P-
value of 0.04. Identification of clear regimes in this case is also problematic because of
the substantial overlap between the confidence intervals of the threshold values. Using
the point estimates the same three qualitative regimes emerge, but separation can not be
made with sufficient confidence on the full sample. As a result, I again therefore look
at the sub-sample of emerging economies where threshold values can be identified with
tighter confidence intervals.
Table 3.5: Distribution of Emerging and Advanced Economies for FDI Liabilities
country 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Emerging
Regime 1 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 23 23 23 24 22 22 21 22 20 21 21 21 19 19 517
Regime 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 1 3 0 22
Regime 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 6 36
Advanced
Regime 1 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 18 19 18 18 18 17 16 16 14 12 12 13 11 9 388
Regime 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 3 4 3 4 2 3 32
Regime 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 3 3 4 5 3 7 8 40
Total
Regime 1 43 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 42 41 42 41 42 40 39 37 38 34 33 33 34 30 28 905
Regime 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 6 6 4 5 5 3 54
Regime 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 4 5 5 5 6 8 6 10 14 76
Total 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 1035
Emerging economies
Column 6 of Table 3.2 reports estimation results for the sub-sample of emerg-
ing economies using FDI liabilities as the threshold variable. For this sub-sample,
the Threshold 1 point estimate is ≈ 0.423 with a 99% confidence interval of ≈
[0.309, 0.424], and the Threshold 2 point estimate is ≈ 0.528 with a 99% confidence
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interval of ≈ [0.465, 0.813]. Since the two confidence intervals for estimates on the sub-
sample do not overlap at all, it is possible to identify again three robust regimes, with
different coefficients of risk-sharing (summarized also in Table 3.2):
• REGIME 1: Below Threshold 1, the estimate for risk-sharing is (1−β1) ≈ −0.056,
which (with a White-error of ≈ 0.035) is statistically but not economically differ-
ent from 0, suggesting some negative risk-sharing (consumption volatility exceeds
output volatility) but not in an economically significant way.
• REGIME 2: Between Threshold 1 and Threshold 2, the estimate for risk-sharing
is (1−β2) ≈ −0.22, which is both statistically and economically negative, because
it indicates that the output growth rates are more than 20% more correlated than
consumption growth rates. This suggests that there is significant excess volatility
in the consumption growth rate for economies in REGIME 2.
• REGIME 3: Above Threshold 2, the estimate for the risk-sharing coefficient is
(1 − β3) ≈ 0.141, which is statistically significantly greater than 0. In REGIME
3, countries therefore achieve considerable consumption risk-sharing (though still
clearly less than perfect consumption risk-sharing). Countries in REGIME 3 have
consumption growth rates that are almost 15% more correlated than output growth
rates, indicating a considerable amount of risk-sharing and reduced volatility.
The estimation results for FDI liabilities on the sub-sample of emerging economies
therefore confirm some intuition from the existing literature (Kose et al., 2003, 2007,
e.g.,). FDI seems to be the most conducive form of capital inflows to consumption
risk-sharing for countries that receive a high enough inflow of FDI. However, the in-
termediate regime for FDI also involves the largest consumption volatility (relative to
output volatility). Since only a select few countries have “crossed” into REGIME 3,
and a significant number are in REGIME 2 at dates in the sample period, full benefits
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of capital market integration in terms of the increase that can be hoped for in terms of
consumption risk-sharing have not yet been realized.
3.5.4 FPI liabilities
Full sample of countries
Results for FPI liabilities on the full sample are given in the seventh column of Table
3.2. Again, two statistically significantly different threshold values of the total liability
to GDP ratio are identified:
• Threshold 1 with a point estimate of ≈ 0.035 and a 99% confidence interval of
≈ [0.012, 0.036].
• Threshold 2 with a point estimate of ≈ 0.065 and a 99% confidence interval of
≈ [0.055, 0.069].
The F-test for a single threshold and double threshold for a full sample are highly sig-
nificant with bootstrap P-value of 0.01 and 0.00, respectively.
Since the 99% confidence intervals for Threshold 1 and Threshold 2 are quite tight
and do not overlap, the estimation indicates the existence of 3 robust regimes, with
different coefficients of risk-sharing (summarized also in Table 3.2). However, FPI lia-
bilities seem to affect risk-sharing quite differently than other types of liabilities:
• REGIME 1: Below Threshold 1, the estimate for risk-sharing is (1−β1) ≈ −0.095,
which (with a White-error of ≈ 0.046) is statistically different from 0 and econom-
ically somewhat significant, suggesting some negative risk-sharing (consumption
volatility exceeds output volatility).
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• REGIME 2: Between Threshold 1 and Threshold 2, the estimate for risk-sharing
is (1 − β2) ≈ 0.115, which is both statistically and economically positive, because
it indicates that the consumption growth rates are more than 10% more correlated
than consumption growth rates. This suggests that there is significant consump-
tion risk-sharing for intermediate FPI inflows.
• REGIME 3: Above Threshold 2, the estimate for the risk-sharing coefficient is
(1 − β3) ≈ −0.078, which is statistically significantly greater than 0, though eco-
nomically small. In REGIME 3, countries therefore also achieve negative risk-
sharing.
While for total liabilities, external debt and FDI three regimes could be summarized
as no risk-sharing, negative risk-sharing and positive risk-sharing, the logic for FPI li-
abilities is reversed. Countries with both low and high FPI achieve less consumption
risk-sharing, while it is countries with intermediate levels of FPI liabilities that achieve
positive consumption risk-sharing gains. Column 8 of Table 3.2 shows that the same
regime types are also identified on the sub-sample of emerging economies alone.
Table 3.6: Distribution of Emerging and Advanced Economies for FPI Liabilities
country 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Emerging
Regime 1 23 22 24 22 22 22 19 19 15 12 15 11 12 10 10 10 10 13 9 8 7 6 5 326
Regime 2 2 3 1 3 1 1 4 2 4 6 3 5 3 5 3 5 5 3 5 6 4 4 4 82
Regime 3 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 6 7 7 9 10 10 12 10 10 9 11 11 14 15 16 167
Advanced
Regime 1 13 12 14 11 10 9 7 10 5 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 107
Regime 2 4 4 2 5 5 7 8 6 6 6 6 5 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 71
Regime 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 9 10 11 13 17 19 18 18 18 18 19 19 20 20 20 282
Total
Regime 1 36 34 38 33 32 31 26 29 20 16 18 13 13 11 11 11 11 14 10 8 7 6 5 433
Regime 2 6 7 3 8 6 8 12 8 10 12 9 10 5 5 4 6 6 4 5 7 4 4 4 153
Regime 3 3 4 4 4 7 6 7 8 15 17 18 22 27 29 30 28 28 27 30 30 34 35 36 449
Total 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 1035
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Emerging economies
Column 8 of Table 3.2 reports estimation results for the sub-sample of emerg-
ing economies using FPI liabilities as the threshold variable. For this sub-sample,
the Threshold 1 point estimate is ≈ 0.014 with a 99% confidence interval of ≈
[0.009, 0.017], and the Threshold 2 point estimate is ≈ 0.065 with a 99% confidence
interval of ≈ [0.054, 0.072]. Since the two confidence intervals for estimates on the sub-
sample do not overlap at all, it is possible to identify again three robust regimes, with
different coefficients of risk-sharing (summarized also in Table 3.2):
• REGIME 1: Below Threshold 1, the estimate for risk-sharing is (1−β1) ≈ −0.130,
which (with a White-error of ≈ 0.042) is statistically and economically different
from 0, suggesting some negative risk-sharing (consumption volatility exceeds
output volatility) but not in an economically significant way.
• REGIME 2: Between Threshold 1 and Threshold 2, the estimate for risk-sharing
is (1 − β2) ≈ 0.065, which is both statistically and economically positive (though
quite small). This suggests that there is at least some consumption risk-sharing
achieved by economies in REGIME 2.
• REGIME 3: Above Threshold 2, the estimate for the risk-sharing coefficient is
(1 − β3) ≈ 0.100, which is statistically significantly greater than 0 and economi-
cally somewhat significant. In REGIME 3, countries therefore have considerable
negative consumption risk-sharing.
While the logic of the regimes for FPI is opposite to other asset classes, it is im-
portant to note that few emerging economies actually fall in REGIME 3 at all, and in
fact most fall in REGIME 1. While the difference between FPI and other asset types is
83
-
20
-
15
-
10
-
5
0
5
R
is
k 
Sh
ar
in
g 
(P
erc
en
tag
e)
0 1 2 3
Threshold : Total Liabilities (Percentage of GDP) 
Risk Sharing : Full Sample Risk Sharing : Emerging Sample
3.1.1: Total Liabilities
-
20
-
10
0
10
20
R
is
k 
Sh
ar
in
g 
(P
erc
en
tag
e)
0 .5 1 1.5
Threshold : Debt Liabilities (Percentage of GDP)
Risk Sharing : Full Sample Risk Sharing : Emerging Sample
3.1.2: Debt Liabilities
-
20
-
10
0
10
20
R
is
k 
Sh
ar
in
g 
(P
erc
en
tag
e)
0 .5 1 1.5
Threshold : FDI Liabilities (Percentage of GDP)
Risk Sharing : Full Sample Risk Sharing : Emerging Sample
3.1.3: FDI Liabilities
-
15
-
10
-
5
0
5
10
R
is
k 
Sh
ar
in
g 
(P
erc
en
tag
e)
0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Threshold : FPI Liabilities (Percentage of GDP)
Risk Sharing : Full Sample Risk Sharing : Emerging Sample
3.1.4: FPI Liabilities
Figure 3.1: Thresholds and Regimes
therefore of some interest, it is difficult to say with how much confidence these estimates
should be treated given the small number of observations that fall in REGIME 2 and 3.
The demarcation of regimes associated to the threshold estimates for each class of
foreign liabilities and the total liabilities are summarized in the diagram 3.1. The bold
line indicates the regime dependent extent of risk sharing by the Full sample (indus-
trial and emerging economies) whereas the dotted line represents the regime dependent
degree of risk sharing in emerging economies alone.
3.5.5 Foreign Assets
Finally, for completeness, Table 3.7 gives estimation results using foreign assets rather
than liabilities as threshold variables. Again, results are reported for the full sample and
the sub-sample of emerging economies. Results are also reported for total foreign assets
and a division of assets into debt assets, foreign exchange reserves, foreign direct invest-
ments and foreign portfolio investments. Unlike for liabilities, however, in general no
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significant threshold affects are identified here. Using Bootstrap P values and the tight-
ness of confidence intervals suggest that threshold effects of capital market integration
seem to operate primarily through the liabilities side of the capital account.
3.6 Comparative Analysis
I conclude by providing some benchmark estimation results to allow for a comparison
with the threshold specification in Section 5. I consider the following specifications:
• Specification 1:
∆log(cit) − ∆log(ct) = µi + βgdp(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt)) . (3.9)
Where µi indicates that country fixed effects is employed.
• Specification 2 - 5:
∆log(cit) − ∆log(ct) = µi + βgdp(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt))
+ βtt(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt))
+ βFL(FLit − F¯L)(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt)) + it.(3.10)
where µi indicates fixed effects and FL represents different classes of foreign
liabilities. Specification 2 - 5 follow the same exposition as specification 1
with two additional interaction terms with country specific output growth rates,
βgdp(∆log(GDPit) − ∆log(GDPt)): (1) Time and (2) Different financial openness
variables that are presented in the following order: Total liabilities, Debt liabili-
ties, FDI liabilities and FPI liabilities.
The above specifications are based on country fixed effects model. The analysis
is based on the same dataset of 25 emerging economies used in the previous analysis
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Table 3.7: Assets: Threshold Regression Results
Sample Full Emerging Full Emerging Full Emerging Full Emerging Full Emerging
Single Threshold Total Total Debt Debt FDI FDI FPI FPI FX FX
Threshold 1 1.041208 1.041208 0.874821 0.894824 0.108493 0.067318 0.254263 0.008084 0.104611 0.103552
CI min 0.948885 0.951111 0.010301 0.008851 0.004871 0.002621 0.000174 0.000115 0.102896 0.01914
CI max 1.057048 1.06222 1.617812 0.894825 0.256187 0.212718 1.408247 1.277858 0.394279 0.417043
F 22.851309 22.404291 10.008132 10.555731 11.751508 9.42926 8.427642 8.130547 17.054216 13.048244
Bootstrap P 0.06 0.043333 0.193333 0.076667 0.166667 0.22 0.313333 0.233333 0.086667 0.07
βt -0.001668 -0.003507 -0.000416 -0.002317 0.001784 -0.00295 0.003149 -0.004946 0.002312 0.002178
OLS SE 0.00421 0.006217 0.001327 0.002083 0.00124 0.002204 0.004128 0.005652 0.001256 0.001966
HET SE 0.005847 0.008124 0.002141 0.002825 0.002422 -0.00295 0.007 0.006814 0.00218 0.002641
βc1 1.018523 1.027544 1.028675 1.051972
∗ 1.023816 1.051681∗ 1.024384 1.037128 1.029829 1.044664∗
OLS SE 0.028421 0.040113 0.014992 0.023991 0.014804 0.024059 0.028857 0.0361 0.014897 0.023515
HET SE 0.048826 0.063032 0.026632 0.035306 0.02685 0.036267 0.055111 0.055189 0.026947 0.034673
βc2 1.138641
∗∗∗ 1.188074∗∗∗ 1.10863∗∗ 1.179394∗∗∗ 0.945536∗ 1.144077∗∗∗ 0.882039∗ 1.114281∗∗∗ 0.963372 0.959625
OLS SE 0.039407 0.057452 0.031979 0.051154 0.027065 0.043211 0.058129 0.045953 0.020599 0.031847
HET SE 0.05658 0.076909 0.049104 0.052833 0.040859 0.058476 0.075049 0.056523 0.034447 0.041107
Double Threshold Total Total Debt Debt FDI FDI FPI FPI FX FX
Threshold 1 1.041208 1.041208 0.874821 0.009656 0.104518 0.067318 0.087412 0.002167 0.104611 0.021425
Threshold 2 1.20039 1.132144 1.204214 0.894824 0.108493 0.071528 0.254263 0.008084 0.11197 0.103552
CI min 0.826476 0.826476 0.010301 0.008851 0.087822 0.000285 0.000174 0.000115 0.017717 0.01672
CI max 1.89118 1.174827 1.667224 2.080467 0.104519 0.92771 1.277859 1.277859 0.114088 0.417043
F 18.682958 14.815591 14.798391 5.328721 16.630234 6.096589 9.709044 11.258414 14.986711 11.572362
Bootstrap P 0.09 0.153333 0.076667 0.613333 0.033333 0.463333 0.226667 0.193333 0.106667 0.156667
βt -0.003515 -0.001711 -0.000962 -0.003011 -0.000242 -0.002861 -0.00066 -0.004368 0.002196 0.000661
OLS SE 0.004175 0.00613 0.001325 0.002097 0.001332 0.002194 0.004296 0.00558 0.001247 0.002
HET SE 0.005906 0.007909 0.002161 0.002808 0.002142 0.003053 0.006008 0.00652 0.002183 0.002517
βc1 1.029336 1.015235 1.033804 0.842919
∗∗ 1.032895 1.051105∗ 1.030865 1.106034∗∗ 1.03084 0.94095∗
OLS SE 0.028141 0.039563 0.014947 0.096187 0.014861 0.023946 0.028734 0.041694 0.06619 0.025232
HET SE 0.049411 0.061483 0.026717 0.080948 0.026218 0.036254 0.05207 0.061358 0.034534 0.039306
βc2 1.196808
∗∗∗ 1.539332∗∗∗ 1.158474∗∗∗ 1.06229∗∗ 1.146574∗∗∗ 1.428465∗∗∗ 1.11265∗∗ 0.985272 0.726073∗∗∗ 1.076814∗∗
OLS SE 0.04135 0.111598 0.034425 0.024333 0.034225 0.126059 0.041354 0.039176 0.06619 0.025232
HET SE 0.0598 0.077655 0.04036 0.03492 0.038213 0.161181 0.053416 0.056904 0.06405 0.035502
βc3 0.966023 1.138982
∗∗ 0.9408 1.191838∗∗∗ 0.971504 1.131401∗∗ 0.906977∗ 1.110033∗∗ 0.975178 0.979658
OLS SE 0.05724 0.05804 0.054913 0.051248 0.02763 0.043328 0.058325 0.045363 0.020688 0.03211
HET SE 0.067998 0.065195 0.061875 0.052513 0.03838 0.059123 0.070779 0.054539 0.034536 0.039308
Triple Threshold Total Total Debt Debt FDI FDI FPI FPI FX FX
Threshold 1 0.835212 0.161609 0.010301 0.009656 0.020631 0.005058 0.019399 0.001444 0.021359 0.021425
Threshold 2 1.041208 1.012243 0.874821 0.370319 0.104518 0.065698 0.087412 0.002167 0.10667 0.109167
Threshold 3 1.20039 1.132144 1.204214 0.894824 0.108493 0.071528 0.090787 0.008084 0.11197 0.393554
CI min 0.823322 0.084955 0.010301 0.030843 0.001962 0.000285 0.000174 0.001444 0.009628 0.043624
CI max 0.907848 5.168669 2.418443 0.553935 1.010433 0.92771 1.408247 1.277858 0.438477 0.429646
F 16.530629 6.119402 8.20545 2.798267 10.760488 5.122871 8.75568 9.85155 9.615913 9.197658
Bootstrap P 0.113333 0.303333 0.2 0.84 0.206667 0.333333 0.343333 0.283333 0.143333 0.21
βt -0.000967 -0.002747 -0.001587 -0.00331 0.001473 -0.000376 0.000527 -0.00857 0.001478 0.000518
OLS SE 0.004175 0.006296 0.001339 0.002102 0.00143 0.002435 0.00428 0.005517 0.001255 0.001979
HET SE 0.005876 0.008018 0.00217 0.002794 0.001889 0.002602 0.005879 0.007188 0.002139 0.002498
βc1 1.02483 1.166377
∗∗∗ 0.892959∗∗ 0.843574∗∗ 1.037241∗ 1.071267∗∗ 1.034924 1.087089∗ 0.958581∗∗ 0.941224∗∗
OLS SE 0.027814 0.072187 0.052673 0.096029 0.014848 0.025757 0.028494 0.042311 0.02836 0.038763
HET SE 0.049205 0.063524 0.045743 0.080637 0.026006 0.038701 0.05429 0.057514 0.025676 0.024987
βc2 0.834373
∗∗ 1.015944 1.043359∗ 1.074242∗∗ 0.975406 1.006628 0.925963∗ 1.29913∗∗∗ 1.046598∗ 1.077954
OLS SE 0.057661 0.04053 0.015281 0.025382 0.0233 0.031063 0.046986 0.073194 0.015516 0.025061
HET SE 0.077037 0.062741 0.026707 0.036522 0.028729 0.030894 0.047782 0.109642 0.028534 0.035404
βc3 1.179518
∗∗∗ 1.250946 1.169644∗∗∗ 1.023767 1.116946∗∗∗ 1.327249∗∗ 1.137257∗∗∗ 0.918559∗ 0.694538∗∗∗ 0.99067
OLS SE 0.041079 0.095194 0.034529 0.03395 0.035292 0.123851 0.043708 0.043142 0.07064 0.031955
HET SE 0.061046 0.230603 0.04055 0.03406 0.033704 0.169201 0.047569 0.055512 0.058463 0.03945
βc4 0.950117 1.149734
∗∗ 0.94905 1.196601∗∗∗ 0.949624∗ 1.090437∗∗ 0.959051 1.128767∗∗ 0.984519 0.677384∗∗∗
OLS SE 0.056675 0.05941 0.054787 0.051248 0.028331 0.046691 0.045589 0.042678 0.020725 0.107637
HET SE 0.067478 0.066137 0.061991 0.052411 0.035264 0.051826 0.052347 0.057839 0.033832 0.10923
Observations 1035 575 1035 575 1035 575 1035 575 1035 575
* indicates coefficent is significantly different from 1 at 90% confidence interval.
** indicates coefficent is significantly different from 1 at 95% confidence interval.
*** indicates coefficent is significantly different from 1 at 99% confidence interval.
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to make the comparison apparent. The following subsections report results based on
each specification as stipulated in Equations (3.9) and (3.10). βt corresponds to the
the coefficient associated with the time trend, 1 − βgdp is the coefficient of risk sharing
and the estimate of −βFL measures how much a unit change in the de facto measure
of financial integration increases the amount of consumption risk sharing. Therefore,
(1−βtt−βgdp−βFL(FLit−F¯L)) captures the amount of consumption risk sharing obtained
by country i in period t. The coefficient associated with risk sharing attained through
financial openness, if negative, would result in a better consumption risk sharing while
the coefficient capturing time trend is only to guard against any trend of financial liabil-
ities capturing the trend in consumption risk sharing in the sampled countries that may
be due to other national developments.
Table 3.8: Liabilities: Threshold Regression Results
Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5
Coefficients Without FA Total Liabilities Debt FDI FPI
βt X -0.00277 -0.00226 -0.00364 -0.00199
OLS SE X 0.005184 0.005184 0.004656 0.005134
βgdp 1.040071* 1.030684* 1.031471* 1.043565* 1.059866*
OLS SE .0232916 0.048196 0.049786 0.041344 0.043241
βFO X 0.023883 0.028765 0.070834 -0.12863
OLS SE X 0.046745 0.06637 0.101728 0.271611
R squared 0.9427 0.9429 0.9429 0.9429 0.9428
Total Observations 575 575 575 575 575
* indicates statistical significance at 99%.
FA indicates financial liabilities normalized to GDP.
X indicates specification without these coefficients.
3.6.1 Specification 1:
This is a baseline specification that uses a simple mechanism for capturing risk shar-
ing through the correlation between country specific consumption with country specific
output growth rates. The results are reported in the first column of Table 3.8. As this
specification does not include any time trend or financial openness measures, the first
column indicates the unrelated coefficients with X. The results from this specification
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show that (1 − βgdp) is less than zero. It indicates almost no risk sharing for the time
period 1985-2007 for the sample of emerging economies. Under this specification, the
results reached will be very different than the results provided under the methodology
that takes into account threshold effects of financial openness. One conclusion that is
reached under this specification is that risk sharing has not improved for the sample pe-
riod 1985 – 2007, however, under the threshold specification, with an exception of FPI,
this results is only valid for the initial regime for emerging economies. Specification 1
therefore, is unable to show the full picture for risk sharing in emerging economies.
3.6.2 Specification 2-5:
However, Specification 1 does not capture any effect of the financial openness that has
been in the process for the past two decades. In order to answer questions like whether
consumption risk sharing has improved in the wake of globalization due to deepening
of financial integration, the previous specification must be augmented to capture the risk
sharing due to the integration of financial openness. As opposed to the methodology
of threshold effects as used in this paper, I use a simple linear methodology to capture
the consumption risk sharing through financial openness via an interaction terms of de
facto measure of financial openness and growth rate of country specific output. This
methodology s largely followed in the existing literature, (See for e.g., Demyanyk et al.,
2008) and repeated here with the present data set to facilitate comparison.
The first column corresponds to specification 2 that uses total liabilities normalized
to GDP as the de facto measure of financial integration. The next four columns uses
the same specification as specification 2 except for using different classes of financial
liabilities that include: (1) Debt liabilities (2) FDI liabilities and (3) FPI liabilities all
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normalized to GDP as the de facto financial openness measure respectively. The main
results from these specifications show that after controlling for time trend, the consump-
tion risk sharing seems to be negligible and an increase in financial liabilities worsens the
consumption risk sharing since all the coefficients corresponding to financial openness
measure except for FPI liabilities are positive. These measures are statistically insignif-
icant, but the positive coefficient can easily lead to conclude that financial openness has
no benefit in terms of improved consumption risk sharing.
Contrasting results from the specifications in this section and the threshold speci-
fication used in the previous section are very evident. If there are threshold effects of
capital market integration on consumption risk sharing, then the linear specification is
incorrect and the conclusion that increased integration does not improve consumption
risk sharing is also incorrect. Unlike, the linear specification, the results from the last
section show that threshold effects are present in terms of financial openness for con-
sumption risk sharing and there is a clear demarcation of three regimes with distinctive
extent of consumption risk sharing. The first regime has almost no risk sharing, the
second regime shows negative risk sharing while the last regime has better risk sharing
capacity. With the exception of FPI, these results hold for all types of liabilities. FPI
liabilities in the linear specification also showed some deviant behavior as compared to
other forms of liabilities. In the linear specification, FPI seems to improve consumption
risk sharing just by the negative sign its coefficient holds (although the estimates are
statistically insignificant).
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper has outlined an empirical strategy for identifying threshold effects of capi-
tal market integration on consumption risk-sharing, based on the endogenous threshold
identification method in Hansen (1999). Applied to a panel data set of emerging and
industrialized economies from 1985 – 2007, a robust qualitative feature of the data is
identified. In general, for total capital inflows, FDI inflows and external debt inflows,
emerging economies exhibit three regimes. For low levels of integration, consumption
risk-sharing is negligible. For high levels of integration, consumption risk-sharing re-
mains imperfect but is statistically and economically significant. However, for interme-
diate levels of capital inflows, consumption risk-sharing is statistically and economically
negative. The reason may be that for countries at intermediate levels of integration,
capital inflows are pro-cyclical based on investment incentives that are not related to
risk-sharing, and this outweigh consumption risk-sharing motives for capital flows. The
result appears to be an increase in the volatility of relative consumption growth com-
pared to relative output growth for countries at an intermediate stage of capital market
integration.
The general qualitative results of the empirical analysis complement the intuition
from the existing literature based on linear specifications (e.g., Kose et al., 2007)or ex-
ogenous threshold levels (e.g., Kose et al., 2003). Moreover, the results also suggest
that emerging economies may have achieved limited consumption risk-sharing – de-
spite large reductions in capital market barriers – because they have not yet achieved
enough capital market integration (see also, Kose et al., 2011). The results are starkest
for FDI, which seem both the most conducive to consumption risk-sharing beyond an
upper critical threshold value, and for which in the intermediate regime consumption
risk-sharing is most adversely affected by capital inflows.
90
CHAPTER 4
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN ASSET ACCUMULATION IN
EMERGING ECONOMIES
4.1 Introduction
Starting in the 1980’s many emerging economies started on a program of financial mar-
ket reforms to open up domestic capital markets to international capital flows. In the
resulting years, emerging market economies have seen a surge in capital inflows due
to the higher return opportunities offered in capital scarce economies. This surge of
capital has been accompanied by a substantial empirical literature studying factors that
affect the level and composition of the liabilities side of the capital account in emerging
economies (Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1996; Taylor and Sarno, 1997; Chuhan et al.,
1998a; Felices and Orskaug, 2008). A noticeable, general trend is that, prior to financial
liberalization, capital inflows to emerging markets were mostly in the form of short-term
foreign currency-denominated external debt, however after globalization the composi-
tion of inflows shifted towards other forms of capital such as FDI and portfolio equity.
There is also by now, a substantial empirical literature that studies the implications of
the dramatic changes in the liabilities side of the capital accounts, which indicates that
the composition of capital inflows has important implications for growth rates, con-
sumption risk-sharing and credit crunch in emerging economies (Haveman et al., 2001;
Albuquerque, 2003; Alfaro et al., 2006; Tong and Wei, 2009).
Much less research has focused on the asset side of the capital account in emerging
economies. There is a large literature on capital flight (Kant, 1996; Buiter and Szegvari,
2002; Eaton, 1987), i.e., foreign investments motivated primarily by a desire to place
assets beyond the control of domestic authorities (Dooley, 1996). But there is a dearth of
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research on foreign investments originating in emerging economies and motivated more
by standard portfolio considerations. In part this is because foreign investment from
emerging economies were both in absolute and relative terms small prior to around the
mid 1990s, and also because at first they responded much less to the wave of financial
globalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But over the past 10-15 years this has
started to change as some emerging economies have accumulated substantial foreign
asset positions (Bracke et al., 2008).
The most noticeable change has been the large accumulation of foreign exchange
(FX) reserves in countries like China, Russia and Venezuela, with big trade surpluses.
But there has also been a considerable increase in both foreign direct investment (FDI)
and foreign portfolio investments (FPI) from emerging economies. For example, the
flow of outward FDI alone for the 37 largest emerging economies reached $133 bil-
lion in 2005, which accounted for 17% of world outward flow of FDI, and the estimated
value of the stock of FDI investments originating from emerging economies was approx-
imately $1.4 trillion in 2005 (Khan and Khan, 2007). This is a large increase over 1990,
when only six of these emerging economies had any non-negligible FDI and the total
stock of FDI originating from emerging economies was estimated to be little more than
$5 billion (Khan and Khan, 2007). Figure 4.1 illustrates the difference between 1970
and 2007 for the total stocks of FDI, FPI and FX reserves on the asset side of the capital
account in 37 emerging economies (numbers reported as % of domestic GDP)1. The fig-
ure illustrates that the largest change has been in terms of FX reserves, but that FDI and
FPI have also increased dramatically over the past 30 years. These numbers are likely
to increase as with industrialized countries facing lower growth rates and dealing with
1Emerging economies in the sample include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rus-
sia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay,
Venezuela
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budget crisis, the relative importance of capital flows originating in emerging economies
is only expected to increase over the next decade. As a result, it is perhaps surprising
that there has been relatively little empirical research on factors that determine the level
and composition of foreign investments from emerging economies.
4.17602            FX/GDP (2007)
1.53549            EQ/GDP (2007)
2.53822            FDI/GDP (2007)
0.551989          FX/GDP (1970)
0.029215          EQ/GDP (1970)
0.025905          FDI/GDP (1970)
0 1 2 3 4
Foreign assets % of GDP
Data source: Updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
Emerging Economies: Foreign assets by types 1970 and 2007
Figure 4.1: Outward capital stocks
In this paper I study empirically some potential determinants of both cross-sectional
and time series variation in the levels and composition of foreign asset holdings in
emerging economies, by looking at macroeconomic, institutional, financial and trade
variables in a panel data set that covers 37 emerging economies from 1970 to 2007. The
total stock of foreign assets held by governments and residents of emerging economies
has increased dramatically over this period, in particular over the past 10-15 years. But
this general trend disguises considerable heterogeneity, both in terms of the size of the
foreign asset position in different emerging economies, as well as the composition of
foreign asset holdings in terms of FX reserves, FDI and FPI over time (see, e.g., Figure
4.2 and Figure 4.3). For example, while Chile and Uruguay have similar GDP/capita
and on average and have similar trade surpluses, Chile’s total stock of foreign assets
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is worth approximately 60% of its domestic GDP, while Uruguay’s is worth only 20%.
South Africa and Turkey have similar GDP/capita and according to most commonly
used de jure measures are equally open to capital flows, but South Africa’s foreign as-
sets were worth almost 40% of domestic GDP in 2004, while Turkey’s were worth less
than 10% (See Figure 4.4). The Czech Republic and Estonia both held foreign assets
worth approximately 30% of domestic GDP in 2005, but in the Czech Republic almost
3/4 of foreign assets were FX reserves, while in Estonia nearly 75% were foreign direct
investments or foreign equity holdings. Of course, each of these examples is not a com-
parison of like for like. Chile, Uruguay, South Africa, Turkey, the Czech Republic and
Estonia differ in many dimensions.
8.24973           Total Assets/GDP (2007)
0.547669           Total Assets/GDP (1970)
0 2 4 6 8
Total Foreign Assets % of GDP
Data source: Updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
Emerging Economies: Total Foreign Assets 1970 and 2007
Figure 4.2: Outward capital stocks
The objective of this paper is therefore to identify potential institutional, macroeco-
nomic or financial differences between emerging economies that can account for differ-
ences in the level and compositions of foreign asset positions in emerging economies
over time. While an empirical study of determinants of the foreign asset position of
emerging economies seems timely and important, any empirical approach faces chal-
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Jordan Korea Latvia Lithuania Malaysia Mexico Morocco
Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Romania Russia
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Ukraine Uruguay Venezuela, Rep. Bol.
FDI/GDP EQ/GDP FX/GDP
Data source: Updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
Types of Assets
Figure 4.3: Outward capital stocks
lenges. Data quality is a concern for many emerging economies, particularly going back
as far as 1970, and endogeneity and missing variables are always problematic when
studying relationships between large, macroeconomic or institutional variables (espe-
cially for transition economies where macroeconomic outcomes are even more likely
to feedback into policy decisions). It is not the intention, therefore, to conduct causal
inferences based on the empirical results reported here, but rather to establish some styl-
ized facts – via reduced-form estimation – that can motivate and help to organize further
research. The advantage of establishing these results in a panel data analysis is that
it allows me to control for latent country-specific fixed effects, that may be difficult to
identify explicitly but are likely to be of considerable importance (including, for exam-
ple, geographic location, natural resources and stable, long-term institutional factors).
Of course, there is a large number of variables that may be identified as influencing
foreign asset accumulation in emerging economies, and I purposefully take an eclectic
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Figure 4.4: Outward capital stocks
approach in this paper by studying a wide range of potential determinants. The variation
in foreign asset positions across emerging economies in the panel is rich, and the empir-
ical results in this paper point to a number of significant correlations with variations in
key macroeconomic, institutional and financial variables that seem robust and account
for a substantial share of the total variation in foreign asset holdings.
Previewing the empirical results, I find that de facto trade openness is statistically
and economically the most important factor in explaining panel variation in foreign as-
set accumulation. Since FX reserves are the largest share of foreign assets, this finding
is perhaps not surprising, but trade openness affects FDI and FPI even more than it af-
fects FX which is less expected. External debt to GDP ratios are negatively correlated
with all classes of foreign asset holdings, but much more significantly for FPI after 1990
– reflecting in part, perhaps, a change from equity outflows motivated by capital flight
towards more stable portfolio considerations in the underlying trend towards increased
FPI. Measures of financial depth also correlate positively with all asset classes, but most
significantly for FX reserves (complementing earlier findings in Obstfeld et al. (2010)
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and Lane and Burke (2001)). Other factors considered have different effects for differ-
ent asset types. Exchange rate volatility is negatively correlated with FX holdings but
positively correlated with FPI (again, suggesting a portfolio incentive for foreign equity
investments). Coefficients on indexes of corruption and other fundamental institutional
variables are generally insignificant, except in regressions for FX alone (and are then
negative but economically small), and crisis events (currency/financial/debt crisis) are
also insignificant except in the case of FX reserves. This affirms the received wisdom
that FX reserves are accumulated in part to act as a buffer against crises events, and
indicates why determinant of FX reserves perhaps differ from determinants for FDI and
FPI more generally. De jure measure of capital openness are, perhaps surprisingly, in-
significant for FX holdings but has positive significant effect on FDI and total assets
while negative effect for FPI. Exchange rate regime is only significant for FDI assets. I
provide more detailed discussions of these findings and possible interpretations, as well
as details about other control variables included in regressions, in Section 4.2.3 of the
paper.
4.1.1 Related literature
The directly related literature is small. Until recently, the empirical literature on inter-
national finance with respect to emerging economies can be described as a confluence
of debates surrounding the benefits and costs associated with financial liabilities and
their structure, as well as the negative impact of capital flight or sudden capital stops in
emerging economies. The empirical literature that looks at long-term trends in the asset
side of the capital account in emerging economies is, by comparison, sparse. Whatever
little is available is generally focused on the very large increase in FX reserves in emerg-
ing economies over the past decade, or based on certain country case studies, with a few
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notable exceptions.
Of the papers looking at determinants of FX reserves, the two that are most closely
related to the present study are Lane and Burke (2001) and Obstfeld et al. (2010). Both
present results of reduced-form estimation for factors that affect FX reserves specifically
in emerging economies. Lane and Burke (2001) include many of the variables I study
in this paper, but with a focus only on FX reserves and looking only at cross-sectional
variation. They use data only for the 14 year time period from 1981-1995 and focus on
cross-sectional variation in order to abstract from cyclical fluctuations in reserves. They
also argue that this is less restrictive than it seems because there is little time variation in
their regressors. However, I include a number of additional regressors, such as external
debt to GDP, for which there is huge variation over time and also want to control for
country fixed affects that seem important when looking at foreign asset positions. I
therefore use both the cross-sectional and time series variation in the panel, and try to
mitigate for potential cyclical affects by viewing a longer time horizon (1970-2007), and
using various techniques to control for crisis events.
Obstfeld et al. (2010) also exploit both cross-sectional and time series variation in
a panel data set covering 1980-2004 to study the determinants of the growing FX re-
serves in emerging economies. They find that the size of domestic financial liabilities
that could potentially be converted into foreign currency (M2), financial openness that
improves the ability to access foreign currency through debt markets, and exchange
rate policy are significant predictors for accumulation of FX reserves. My analysis cor-
roborates these findings when restricted to FX reserves, but also identifies differences
between determinants of the variation in FX reserves and other classes of foreign as-
sets. Moreover, Obstfeld et al. (2010) find that external debt levels have no significant
affect on FX reserves but only report regressions without country fixed effects. Since
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geography, natural resources, language, form of government, etc., are all potentially im-
portant sources of fixed effects, I control for fixed effects in my regressions. Hausman
tests confirm the importance of fixed effects in all regressions. When fixed effects are
omitted, I also find no significant effect of external debt levels on FX reserves in the
larger data set I use, although I do find that external debt is significant for FDI, FPI, and
marginally significant for the total stock of foreign assets. Moreover, when fixed effects
are included external debt significantly effects (both in a statistical and economic sense)
the level of all types of foreign assets. With the exception of including country fixed
effects, my basic methodology is very similar to Obstfeld et al. (2010), but I take in a
larger set of regressors with data covering a larger time horizon, and also study FDI and
FPI stocks as well as the total stock of all foreign assets.
The only other empirical paper of which I am aware studies determinants of FDI or
FPI originating in emerging economies and which is also motivated by portfolio consid-
erations is Giovanni (2005). This paper studies panel data on cross border mergers and
acquisitions to investigate whether macroeconomic and financial factors affect firm’s de-
cisions to make foreign direct investments abroad. Their approach is based on a gravity
model – which is commonly used in the trade literature – and they study how differ-
ent institutional and financial variables affect bilateral M&A activity, including some
emerging economies in their sample. Their main finding is that the depth of domes-
tic financial markets is a significant factor for foreign direct investments. Their data
is uniquely suited to the study of cross-border M&A activity and can not be extended
further to look at other types of foreign asset positions because of current data limita-
tions. The empirical analysis in this paper, is less deep but has substantially wider scope,
taking in a broader time period, set of countries, types of assets, and factors that corre-
late with the level and composition of foreign investments with a focus on emerging
economies.
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Finally, there is some discussion relating capital outflows from emerging economies
in terms of capital flight in the literature. In particular Dooley (1988) and Schneider
(2003) attempt to distinguish between the normal capital outflows and capital flight.
The former study highlights that capital flight is determined by the relative perception
of risks that residents and non-residents in holding claims on the residents of the coun-
tries while the conventional determinants such as yield differential between countries do
not motivate capital flight. The later study highlights that interpreting the capital out-
flows to be motivated by investors reluctance in investing in their domestic economy due
to political or economic instability can be misleading since more recently, with financial
integration, investors behavior in non-industrial countries can also be motivated by other
factors such as diversification or better yield. Collier et al. (1999) also use data for 51
countries to study the heterogeneity amongst countries in terms of the amount of capital
flight, motivated in particular by the stark difference between South Africa’s holdings
of foreign assets, that are worth 39% of the total wealth, and Esat Asia’s holdings of
foreign assets, that are estimated to be 3% of the total wealth. The study highlights
that the difference in the amount of capital flight can be attributed to high indebtedness,
adverse investors risk ratings and exchange rate overvaluation. However, as Schneider
(2003) documents, such analysis starts from the often misleading premise that all capital
outflows are capital flight. The findings in this paper, that external debt/GDP is signifi-
cantly negatively correlated with all classes of foreign assets, suggests that much of the
more recent capital outflow from emerging economies is rather based on more stable
portfolio considerations.
In the next section I discuss the data set and basic empirical methodology. In Section
4.3 I present the results for basic regressions, interpret some of the starker and more
stable findings, and discuss a number of the robustness checks performed. Section 4.4.1
provides an instrument variable approach for the analysis. Section 4.5 concludes. The
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Appendix C contains additional discussion of the data set, summary statistics and results
for some of the robustness checks and Appendix E presents comparison of the results
with advanced economies.
4.2 Data and Methodology
4.2.1 Data description
I use an unbalanced panel covering 37 emerging economies from 1970-2007 compiled
from various sources. The full list of countries covered in the sample and the time cover-
age for each country are listed in Table 4.1. I follow the IMF classification of emerging
markets to include only countries with per capita income above US $1000 and below US
$15,000 in 2010 (at market exchange rates). The list changes only marginally when one
uses purchasing power parity-adjusted exchange rates and an income threshold of about
$18,000 in 2010. With the latter classification only Hungary and Poland would then
be classified as advanced, but I include them in general because it does not change the
quantitative results much. The IMF classifies Hong Kong, Israel, Korea and Singapore
as “more developed emerging economies” (on the verge of industrial economy status). I
include these countries in the primary regressions. Results are robust to their omission.
The data sources for each variable are listed in Table 3.1 in the Appendix C. Descriptive
statistics for all variables are also provided in the Appendix C.
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Table 4.1: Country and Time Period
Country Time Period Country Time Period
Argentina 1970-2007 Brazil 1970-2007
Chile 1970-2007 China 1984-2007
Colombia 1970-2007 Croatia 1996-2007
Czech Republic 1996-2007 Ecuador 1970-2007
Egypt 1970-2007 Estonia 1992-2007
Hungary 1987-2007 India 1970-2007
Indonesia 1979-2007 Israel 1970-2007
Jordan 1970-2007 Korea 1971-2006
Latvia 1993-2007 Lithuania 1994-2007
Malaysia 1970-2007 Mexico 1970-2007
Morocco 1970-2007 Pakistan 1970-2007
Peru 1970-2007 Philippines 1970-2007
Poland 1986-2007 Portugal 1970-2007
Romania 1990-2007 Russia 1993-2007
Serbia 1995-2007 Singapore 1970-2007
Slovak Republic 1993-2007 Slovenia 1992-2007
South Africa 1970-2007 Thailand 1970-2007
Turkey 1970-2007 Ukraine 1994-2007
Uruguay 1970-2007 Venezuela 1970-2007
4.2.2 Methodology
I study the determinants of the variation in different classes of foreign assets control-
ling for country fixed effects and common time trends, and perform robustness checks
including also time fixed effects.2Detrending to remove common time trends and time
fixed effects remove time trends, but since time trends themselves are also of interest, I
report results without detrending or time fixed effects in the Appendix D. Results with
2Common time trend may also lead to spurious conclusions in the preceeding analysis, therefore I use
a simple methodology to detrend the series of the data. In this way, all the variation in the series that can
be explained by time is cotrolled for. I then use predicted values so that the difference between predicted
values of the variable and the actual values of the variable results into a detrended series. Regression
equation for detrending is as follows:
y = α0 + β1(t) (4.1)
Using the estimated coefficients, predicted values of the variable yit, denoted by yˆit are calculated which
is then used to remove the time trend from the series as shown below:
y − yˆ = ˆ (4.2)
This resulting residual series are now independent of time trend.
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time fixed effects are generally qualitatively similar, although the quantitative effects are
smaller. I also run random fixed effects, but Hausman test favors the fixed effect model
and therefore only fixed effect results are provided in the paper. Pooled OLS regressions
are also done for comparison, but this methodology is inadequate mainly because the
countries in the sample are so diverse and the time trends are so strong, that ignoring the
panel structure is highly inefficient. The main regression equations are of the following
form.
log(Yit) = α + βIF
′
it + γMF
′
it + κT F
′
it + χFF
′
it + µi (4.3)
where i = 1, ......, I represent individual countries and t = 1, ........,T represent time
periods.
Regressands
I look at 4 different dependent variables Yit, representing different broad classes of for-
eign asset stocks normalized by domestic GDP, and logged to facilitate interpretation.
The log specification is intended to reduce the role of the countries with very high asset
to GDP ratios. However, levels specification also have very similar qualitative results
with large correlation coefficients.
Yit =

FDIit
GDPit
FPIit
GDPit
FXit
GDPit
(FDIit+FPIit+FXit)
GDPit
,
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Although the classification into FDI, FPI and FX reserves is quite broad, it is well-
defined enough to allow access to reasonable data. There are also important differences
between these asset classes. Viewed as an asset, FX reserves are more passive in the
sense that they have more precautionary saving motives. One motivation posited for the
large accumulation of FX reserves in emerging economies over the past 10-15 years has
been to build a buffer stock to insulate and protect domestic economies against macroe-
conomic crisis. But FDI and FPI are more active, requiring greater risk-management
and allocation considerations. Both FDI and FPI can be motivated by capital flight –
foreign investments to bring savings and investments out of the purview of domestic
authorities – or portfolio considerations – foreign investments to pursue higher returns
or hedge against country-specific shocks and sources of volatility.
Moreover, within the class of active assets, FDI and FPI can be differentiated in
terms of control and liquidity. To be classified as FDI, foreign investments must involve
a considerable stake in a foreign business activity, while FPI generally involve much less
direct control of foreign business activities. FDI also tend to span longer time horizons,
often being much less liquid and therefore involving more stable business partnerships
across international borders. On the other hand, foreign equity holdings are generally
easy to shuﬄe between companies and countries and therefore have more of a “hot
money” characteristic. Foreign equity portfolios can often be re-aligned and adjusted
quickly, and are perhaps more sensitive therefore to short-term sources of volatility and
uncertainty.
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4.2.3 Regressors
In terms of potential regressors that can be related to variation in the level and com-
position of foreign asset holdings, I take an eclectic approach and consider numerous
domestic factors for which there is reasonable data and for which there are strong pri-
ors of possible correlations. It must be noted that the firm theoretical priors are sparse
and therefore, this analysis is intended to be an explanatory exercise. The potential
determinants considered are diverse but for expositional purposes I divide them into 4
broad categories: (1) macroeconomic variables (MFit), (2) institutional variables (IFit
), (3) financial variables (FFit), and (4) trade variables (T Fit). All regressors are also
transformed relative to domestic GDP and logged, so that coefficients can be interpreted
as elasticities (subject to the caveat over making causal inferences based on relation-
ships between large, macroeconomic and institutional variables), with the exception of
dummies and categorical variables. The full list of variables included in regressions is
provided in Table 4.2 below.3
Before presenting the results, I provide some motivation for the choice of regressors
and indicate possible priors over expected signs for correlations.
Institutional factors
Stable institutional factors, such as form of government or legal systems, that in many
cases are largely time-invariant will be controlled for by country fixed effects. However,
there are also institutional factors and government policies that changed dramatically for
some emerging economies over the sample time period. Examples include the degree of
capital market openness, corruption levels, political instability or exchange rate regimes.
3Other controls that were not significant and did not affect qualitative results are omitted in the leading
regressions reported, but are summarized in the Appendix C - Appendix F.
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Table 4.2: Factors
Factors
Institutional Factors Financial Openness
Exchange Rate Regime
Corruption
Macroeconomic Factors General Development
Exchange Rate Volatility
Short term External Debt
Trade Factors Current Account Surplus
Trade Openness
Financial Factors Financial Depth
Capital openness: A reasonable prior would be that greater capital openness pro-
motes foreign asset accumulation, especially FDI and FPI. One general difficulty is
both, to define reasonable measures of capital openness and to distinguish clearly be-
tween measures that prevent inwards vs. outward investment.4 I focus on the measure
of capital openness proposed by Chinn and Ito (Chinn and Ito, 2008), but find similar
results with other common measures from the literature. The Chinn-Ito measure focuses
as much on capital inflows as outflows, but since the sale of domestic assets is also a
source of financing for the purchase of foreign assets, restrictions on inward capital
flows could also potentially be important for the size and composition of foreign asset
holdings.
Exchange rate regime: A central difference between emerging economies and in-
dustrial economies has been in terms of exchange rate regimes. Since the collapse of
4See for example (Edison and Warnock, 2003; Edwards, 2001; Edison et al., 2002) for discussions and
comparisons of various measures on capital restrictions. For extensive reviews on capital controls policy
or financial liberalization refer to (Dooley, 1996; Kose et al., 2006; Henry, 2007). In particular, for capital
controls relating capital inflows and outflows refer to (Edwards, 1999).
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Bretton-Woods, industrialized economies have generally had flexible exchange rates
(the important exception being monetary integration within the EU). In emerging
economies, on the other hand, exchange rate regimes remain largely at least managed in
some way. Managed exchange rates decrease incentives for foreign investment to hedge
against exchange rate risks, but they also potentially decrease volatility of domestic con-
sumption value of returns on foreign assets. A prior it is therefore, not clear what the
correlation between measures of exchange rate rigidity and FDI and FPI investments
should be. In addition, managing exchange rates can both increase incentives for FX
reserve accumulation in order to hold pegs. I study the effects of exchange rate regimes
on foreign assets in emerging economies by including a categorical variable taking val-
ues from 1-4, 1 representing a fixed exchange rate and 4 a flexible exchange rate with
degrees of rigidity captured by 2 and 3. A fine exchange rate indicator taking values
from 1-14 is also considered, but this did not provide any additional insights.
Political Stability: Political stability may also affect incentives for foreign asset ac-
cumulation. On one hand, greater corruption or political instability can reduce capital
inflows due to reappropriation concerns by foreign investors, and this has the potential to
reduce foreign asset accumulation on an income risk-sharing motive. On the other hand,
political instability and corruption may precipitate capital flight, and a positive coeffi-
cient on measures of corruption or political instability could therefore provide some
stylized evidence of continuing fear that bad governance will not be able to provide a
conducive environment for safe savings and profitable investments Alesina and Tabellini
(1989). Measures of the quality of domestic governance, for which there is noticeable
cross-sectional and time series variation, are therefore potentially important factors in
determining foreign asset accumulation and it is not a priori clear what expected sign
should be. In the leading results, I include only a general measure of quality of gover-
nance and anti-corruption efforts provided by the World Bank, because regressions with
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other measures of political instability lead to similar conclusions.
Macroeconomic factors
Several literatures now exist that investigates the relation between macroeconomic vari-
ables and capital inflows.5 However, this paper is a primer for future analysis focusing
on the asset side of the capital account in emerging economies, but I include similar do-
mestic variables as the ones used in the literature on liabilities to facilitate comparison.
Important amongst these are GDP per capita as a measure of general development, total
external debt to GDP ratio as a potential measure of the sustainability of foreign debt
positions, and exchange rate volatility.
GDP per capita: GDP per capita encompasses the overall level of general develop-
ment of a country. Countries that have higher GDP per capita may have less scarcity of
capital and will therefore provide more incentive to pursue foreign investment both be-
cause of higher potential savings and lower return differentials. Including GDP/capita is
therefore a way to control for the general progress of the country and one would expect
that it correlates positively with foreign asset accumulation.
External debt to GDP ratio: Total external debt is the total debt stock of the country
that is denominated in external currency and therefore represents both the principal and
interest on liabilities that must be repaid in foreign currency. The ratio of external debt
to GDP captures the sustainability of the economy’s total debt profile with respect to
foreign lenders. Total external debt to GDP is composed of short term external debt to
GDP and long term external debt to GDP. The fraction of total external debt to GDP
composing of short term external debt to GDP is an indication of whether the country
5Some of the examples of empirical work relating push and pull factors of capital inflows includes
(Montiel and Reinhart, 1999; Reinhart et al., 1993; Chuhan et al., 1998b; Fernandez-Arias and DEC,
1994; Dooley et al., 1994; Bennett et al., 1993; Hernandez and Rudolph, 1994).
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has the ability to repay its debt obligations that are due in near future and is therefore
generally regarded as a good indicator of sovereign default risk.6 In addition, the data
for long-term debt liabilities is too scarce, I focus on short-term external debt for which
data is more widely available.
To understand the motivation behind adding external debt ratios in the analysis, it
is important to revisit the distinction between capital flight and normal capital outflows.
In some sense, it has been argued that the difference between capital flight and normal
capital outflows is same as the difference between bank runs and the normal withdrawals
from the bank (McLeod, 1993). Capital flight are therefore outflow that are often sudden
and matches with the incidence of crisis situations. High external debt/GDP ratios are
viewed as good indicators of potential debt crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011) and may
therefore correlate positively with foreign asset accumulation. On the other hand, as re-
cently argued by Bai and Zhang (2012) and Malik (2011), external debt/GDP can reduce
incentives for foreign investment out of diversification incentives.7 When the primary
motive for foreign investment is basic portfolio considerations, it is quite possible that
external debt/GDP could correlate negatively with foreign asset accumulation. Again,
it is therefore of interest to include debt/GDP ratios to try to determine if any stylized
facts in support of either conclusion emerge.
Exchange rate volatility: Investors not only care about exchange rates per se but also
about volatility associated with exchange rates. Both empirical and theoretical literature
on the implications of exchange rate uncertainty and volatility on foreign investment,
and especially on foreign direct investments, even in better studied industrial economies,
is far from certain. Aizenman (1992) theoretically shows that exchange rate volatility re-
6Short term external debt is external debt that has a maturity of less than 1 year and therefore sustaining
this type of debt is better in capturing sovereign default risk.
7Bai and Zhang (2012) uses (ex-post) borrowing and lending channel for risk sharing while Malik
(2011) uses (ex-ante) foreign asset holdings for diversification purposes. Using two distinct channels for
risk sharing, both papers explain why there exist limited risk sharing in emerging economies.
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sults in decrease in foreign direct investments if the underlying shock is nominal. Darby
et al. (1998) and Sung and Lapan (2000) show the opposite result. Empirically, Froot
and Stein (1991) show that foreign acquisition of US firms increased after exchange rate
depreciation of 1985. Also, Esquivel and Larrain (2002) show two channels through
which exchange rate volatility and FDI can be linked. One of the two channels is that
as long as the expected returns are high enough to cover the currency risk, investors will
find it beneficial investing in foreign countries. Therefore, higher exchange rate volatil-
ity can imply increase in foreign direct investments. Unlike many other literatures that
show no significant effect of exchange rate uncertainty on real activity, Aghion et al.
(2006) show that negative investment effects of domestic credit constraint exacerbate in
the presence of exchange rate uncertainty. Moreover, specifically for FPI, Fidora et al.
(2006) find that greater real exchange rate volatility increases home-bias in bonds and
equities, a finding they attribute to the fact that exchange rate volatility can put addi-
tional risk on holding foreign securities from a domestic (currency) investors’ point of
view. However, this is not necessarily true if foreign local currency real returns and the
real exchange rate are sufficiently negatively correlated. Finally, the affect of exchange
rate volatility on FX reserves is studied in Obstfeld et al. (2010), and they report that
exchange rate volatility does not have significant affect on reserve accumulation. Endo-
geneity is a concern which Obstfeld et al. (2010) also point out, because FX reserves
can decrease the exchange rate volatility with a managed exchange rate so that causal-
ity might not be straight forward. However, they still include exchange rate volatility
in their regressions, and I also include exchange rate volatility here to see if support
emerges for any of the aforementioned theories when attention is restricted to emerging
economies, and also to see whether exchange rate volatility has differential affects on
different types of foreign investments.
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Financial factors
The role of financial development has received considerable attention in the literature on
economic growth, financial stability and international financial integration in industrial-
ized as well as emerging economies in recent years. Over the time period 1970-2007,
there has been considerable variation in emerging economies in terms of financial depth
of domestic capital markets, i.e., the ease of access to capital necessary for households,
firms and governments to undertake investment projects which they might otherwise be
unable to take advantage of. Many theoretical models in the literature have considered
the prominent role played by financial depth which is captured through ratio of broad
money or size to show effects on growth, financial stability, accumulation of domes-
tic foreign assets and international financial integration. Some examples are (Velasco,
1987; Calvo, 1996; Chang and Velasco, 2001). Unlike most literature that focuses on
capital inflows, Giovanni (2005) specifically look at what macroeconomic and financial
factors, especially financial deepening, affect the acquisition of FDIs. Rodrik (2006)
also argues that at least for reserve accumulation, emerging markets that has begun to
embark on financial liberalization starting in the early 1990s, is empirically driven by
the size of the domestic financial sector rather than by real magnitudes such as trade
flows. Obstfeld et al. (2010) and Lane and Burke (2001) also find that financial depth,
measured by M2 over GDP is a significant factor in FX reserve accumulation in both
industrialized and emerging economies. I therefore include M2/GDP as a regressor, to
also study how financial deepening affects capital outflows more generally and to study
how it correlates with panel variation in FDI, FPI and FX reserves. The prior is that
financial depth should be significantly positively correlated with foreign assets.
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Trade factors
On the issue of sequencing, Chinn and Ito (2008) find that trade openness precedes capi-
tal account liberalization while banking system development is a precondition for equity
market development. Similarly, trade balance is one of the major factors of country’s fi-
nancial and economic interaction with the rest of the world. Therefore, as in the existing
literature on financial flows and trade, I also take into account trade openness measures.
There are different alternative ways to do this, but I choose to concentrate on de facto
measures of trade openness, the most commonly used of which is simply the sum of total
exports plus imports normalized by domestic GDP. One general concern that aﬄicts this
measure, as well as others, is that financial flows and trade can have a two way linkage
which poses problems regarding endogeniety (see for eg., (Aizenman and Noy, 2005)).
As result, I lag the trade variable by one period and also consider rolling windows on
past trade. This does reduce correlation between regressors and residuals (which are
anyway not particularly at less than 0.05), but does not seem to affect quantitative esti-
mates of regression coefficients much. It is nevertheless important again to be cautious
about making causal inferences and probably safer to interpret the results as indicative
of stylized correlations subject to controls on other variables. A strong prior would be
that trade should be significantly positively correlated with all classes of foreign assets.
Current account surplus: One reason why trade openness may be important for
foreign asset accumulation, in particular FX reserves, is that current account surpluses
can be the source of financing for foreign asset purchases. Current account surplus
would therefore be another potential regressors to include, with a prior for a significant
positive correlation. However, the de facto measure of trade openness discussed above
and widely used in the literature is highly correlated with the current account surplus and
it is therefore not possible to include both. I therefore run regressions with both possible
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measures of trade outcomes, but report only the results for trade openness. The affect
on other coefficient of using current account is small, but while trade openness is itself
highly significant in nearly all regressions, the current account perhaps surprisingly is
not. However, with regards to other variables the results are exceptionally close.
4.2.4 Estimation method
Including a selection of the aforementioned regressors, I use country fixed effects meth-
ods for estimating coefficients for each class of assets (FDI, FPI and FX reserves), as
well as the total foreign asset position. All regressors reported are robust to heterogene-
ity and first and second order autocorrelation. Including time fixed effects reduces the
magnitude of estimates considerably because it removes important time trends from the
data. I therefore focus on country fixed effects only. However, there is some reason
to believe that there may be important structural changes around the beginning of the
1990s due to the general wave of financial globalization at this time, and the collapse of
the Soviet Union which dramatically altered the economic institutions in particular of
the eastern European states in the sample. As a result, I also report results which include
a post 1990 dummy as well as interaction terms with this dummy.
4.3 Results
In this section, I present results of the regression analysis, first for total foreign asset
holdings, then individually for FX reserves, FDI and FPI. I look at how each asset class
is influenced by the full battery of macroeconomic, institutional, trade and financial
factors discussed in the previous Section 4.2.3 in the full sample period 1970-2007. The
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disintegration into different asset classes helps in analyzing if any specific factor is more
important for a particular type of foreign asset, a feature may be masked by the analysis
based on total asset holdings. I also report some results for regressions on the subsample
from 1990 - 2007, or with regressions on the full sample but with a post 1990 dummy
and interaction terms. The results for the time subsample are similar, but point to some
possible structural changes around 1990, at time around which many financial market
reforms were enacted in emerging economies and also a time of profound change for
the eastern European economies in the sample.
4.3.1 Total Foreign Assets
Table C.4 gives results for the robust regression of detrended total foreign assets on
various macroeconomic, institutional, financial and trade variables for the full sample
period 1970-2007. The coefficients on short-term external debt, exchange rate volatility,
the World Bank anti-corruption measure and a dummy for crisis event dates are signif-
icant and negative; the coefficients on the ratio M2/GDP, which is a commonly used
measure of financial depth, and the de facto measure of trade openness are significant
and positive; and the within R2 of 0.25 indicates that these factors explain almost 25%
of the total within panel variation in total foreign assets in emerging economies.
These results indicate that short-term external debt (external debt with a maturity of
less than 1 year), seems detrimental to the total foreign assets accumulated by emerging
economies. Based on a capital flight scenario, higher debt might serve as a signal for
future tax increases and therefore increase incentives to move capital out of country.
The results suggests that this mechanism is either not at play or dominated by other
forces. One should caution that future tax increases may be just as likely to result from
114
long-term debt obligations for which there is not sufficient data to estimate regression
coefficients. However, there are also reasons to believe that higher external debt posi-
tions can reduce incentives for diversification through foreign investments. Short-term
debt/GDP is a common measure of default risk on external debt obligations, and as I
demonstrate in Malik (2011), there is a general trade-off between the option value that
accrues on default options domestically and the benefits of foreign investment for risk-
sharing purposes. Bai and Zhang (2012) point out a similar relationship between ex-
ternal debt positions and foreign investment, though with a very different mechanisms.
This implies that in emerging economies decisions relating international interactions
have relations to sovereignty and hence default penalties of the country. The results of
Table C.4 therefore lend some stylized support to these two recent theoretical studies of
the relationship between external debt positions and foreign investment from emerging
economies.
The coefficients on exchange rate volatility and anti-corruption both have the ex-
pected signs as discussed in Section 4.2.3. When exchange rate volatility increases,
this implies that emerging economies have less incentives to accumulate assets since
the value of these assets also becomes more volatile. This uncertainty in the value can
deter investors from using foreign assets for higher returns or diversification purposes.
However, economically speaking the results are small, compared to the other regression
coefficients. Whereas, anti-corruption variable reflects the legal system and/or fulfilling
contracts which shows that as anti-corruption increases less of the assets are accumu-
lated. This variable captures any flow out of the country for the reason of bad economic
environment and in a crude sense also controls for capital flight.
The crisis date is important to take into account the sudden changes in the flows of
capital due to crisis in the economy. These crisis dates should capture a reduction in
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assets accumulation since in such times, many economies resort to liquefy their assets
abroad to either oblige their debts or to have more liquidity in the time of need or just
use reserves which are highly liquid to respond to the critical situation as a short term
fix. As a result, the negative coefficient on crisis date should not be unexpected and
likely reflects a run down of assets during financial, currency or default crisis.
The result with regards to financial deepness and trade openness are both signifi-
cantly positively correlated with total foreign asset accumulation. The former is mea-
sure of general development of the financial system that harnesses the better allocation
of capital keeping in mind both higher returns and diversification issues while the later
is often a pre-requirement for the economy to involve in financial asset trade. The single
biggest factor is trade openness. Due to possible concerns over endogeneity this result
should be interpreted with caution, but it is clearly too significant to ignore. Variation
in trade openness alone would already account for almost 40% of the total within panel
variation of total foreign assets. A high correlation between the regressor and residuals
for the regression that includes only country-fixed effects and trade-openess is indicative
of the potential endogeneity problem, but this correlation reduces considerably (from ap-
proximately 0.6 to approximately 0.1) when the other regressors are included suggesting
that missing variables could be part of the problem. Moreover, f -tests reveal that any
collection of regressors in Table C.4 is also significant (under the standard normality
assumptions). However, trade-openess remains even when all regressors are included
economically the single most important determinant of foreign asset accumulation.
The results based on the total foreign assets, mask possible the differences between
key determinants of the variation between different types of assets. In particular, since
foreign exchange reserves are considerably larger overall than FDI and FPI, determi-
nants of FX reserves can overwhelm others. Tables C.5 - C.7 therefore present results
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for separate regressions for each class of foreign assets. The results for FX reserves are
similar to the results found in Obstfeld et al. (2010), with the important exception that
I find a significant negative relationship between FX reserves and external-debt. This
is in part because they do not present results for the relationship between FX reserves
and external debt/GDP for country fixed effects regressions, where there specification
does in fact also indicate a significant negative relationship. In discussing other results,
I focus on regression coefficients that differ between different asset types.
4.3.2 Foreign exchange reserves
The results for foreign exchange reserves are similar (both qualitatively and quantita-
tively) to the results based on the total foreign assets. The main reason for such similar-
ity is that foreign exchange reserves account for most of the assets for some emerging
economies. In general, the results support the received wisdom (see, e.g., (Pineau and
Dorrucci, 2006)) that emerging economies have accumulated foreign exchange reserves
in recent years to use for self-insurance against possibly externally originating crisis.
Noticeably, the crisis date dummy is particularly significant for FX reserves, suggesting
that reserves often serve as a cushion against possible external crisis. Note that for FDI
and FPI, crisis date are both insignificant, and most of the significance in the total for-
eign asset regression from Table C.4 therefore comes from the affect that crisis events
have on FX reserves.
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4.3.3 Foreign direct investments
The results are similar as for total foreign assets but three important differences are ev-
ident. Firstly, FDI are also negatively influenced by short term debt. The associated
sign is negative for all the specifications however, it is only significant for specification
3. However, these results must be interpreted with caution since endogeniety issues or
removing of the trend can plague the results. These results, however, are inline with
both Malik (2011) and Bai and Zhang (2012), which establish a theoretical basis for
the negative correlation between external debt/GDP and foreign assets and are based
on planner’s problems for a small open economy in which foreign investment is moti-
vated by an active risk-sharing incentive. They, therefore speak most strongly to FDI
assets, especially since it is a peculiarity of emerging economies that authorities in most
emerging economies have considerable influence on foreign direct investment through
state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds. The results for the regressions for
FDI therefore indicate that the effect of external debt on foreign assets is strongest where
it would be expected to be strongest, in the asset class where have to deal directly with
the trade-off between sovereign default options and international risk-sharing incentives.
Secondly, unlike total assets, FDI is negatively influenced by capital openness. This
is in contrast to the theoretical predictions which is that financial openness should im-
prove capital mobility and in the case of FDI assets. However, as discussed in the
previous Section 4.2.3, Chinn and Ito (2008) show that trade openness precedes cap-
ital openness. It could therefore be argued that the trade-openness coefficient already
captures most of the influence of capital openness on financial assets.
Third, FDI is positively influenced by the flexibility of the exchange rate regime.
This is in contrast to foreign exchange reserves. As exchange rate regime becomes more
flexible, the asset owned in the form of FDI are positively influenced. Two different
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specification for exchange rate regimes have been used and the results are quantitatively
and qualitatively very similar. The only difference with a fine classification of exchange
rate regime is that the magnitude of exchange rate regime falls. The reason is that fine
classification is spanned between 0-14 while coarse classification is based on 0-4 scale.
The results listed below are based on coarse classification since the changes in regime
do not occur that often in the sample and if some crisis event occurs, the regime change
is much more drastic and hence captured well by the coarse scale. According to the
results listed below, there is a positive correlation. Higher exchange rates regime implies
moving from pegged to the floating regimes. Floating regimes seems to help the building
of such types of foreign assets. One reasoning can be as provided by Ghosh et al. (2003)
which is that there is a strong relation between fixed exchange rates and low inflation.
This is partly due to “a discipline effect” (the political costs of abandoning the peg
induce tighter policies) and a “confidence effect” (greater confidence leads to a greater
willingness to hold domestic currency rather than foreign currencies and assets). This
implies that a floating exchange rate can affect the confidence of the investors and they
might explore other option for investing in foreign economy. However, if everything else
if equal, then FDI abroad can lead to better risk sharing mechanisms for the country.8
4.3.4 Equity portfolio
The results for FPI differ notably from the results for FX reserves and FDI. This in itself
is interesting. Since FPI and FDI represent the two active asset types, a reasonable prior
would have been that they should behave in a similar manner. However, equity portfolio
is, for example, not significantly affected by short term debt which is a statistically and
economically significant variable in terms of the variation in both FX reserves and FDI.
8 Exchange rate regime is robust to another specification that uses current account surplus in place of
trade openness.
119
Moreover, the sign on the coefficient for exchange rate volatility is the opposite com-
pared to FX reserves and FDI. Both results suggest that the more important distinction
than between active and passive assets, is a distinction based on the time horizon. FPI is
an assortment or range of investments in foreign securities, or other types of investment
vehicles, motivated usually to spread risk of possible loss due to below expectation per-
formance of one or few of the investors. The flexibility attached to the equity or portfolio
investment makes it more liquid than other forms of assets. It may be the motivation to
hedge against more short term risks, such as foreign currency risks, that leads to the
different results obtained for FPI than the other asset classes.
Exchange rate volatility also seems to be positively correlated to FPI assets. Again,
these types of assets by conception are accumulated when domestically the exchange
rate volatility poses threat to the stability of the currency. Holding equity in other stable
currency can help lower such risks. Since these types of assets are non-binding to the
system in which they are invested and can be shifted easily between securities, capital
tend to flow out to accumulate this type of assets and such an outflow may have capital
flight issues. The interpretation of exchange rate volatility and equity investments can
become tricky when another facet of explanation is regarded. If we assume that investors
only invest abroad for the purpose of diversification, this would entail that they seek
to make use of returns on foreign assets that are less correlated or ideally negatively
correlated to the return on domestic assets and then the presence of high exchange rate
volatility would provide an incentive to use foreign equity investment as an opportunity.
This line of explanation is based on the assumption that investors undertake foreign
investments to diversify their risk and it is consistent with Fidora et al. (2006).
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4.3.5 After 1990
Finally, I report results in Table C.4-C.7, column 2 for all asset types but restricted to
the sample period 1990-2007, and in Table C.4-C.7, column 3-4 for all asset classes
over the full sample period 1970-2007, but including a time dummy that takes value 1
only after 1990, as well as several interaction terms with this time dummy. The first
set of results is reported primarily to indicate that results for the full sample are not
driven by pre-1990 dynamics, but mostly derive from variation in foreign assets after
the advent of financial globalization. Note that, indeed both qualitative and quantitative
results for the regression restricted to post-1990 are similar to the results for the full
sample period, except that some of the economically less important coefficients are now
also statistically insignificant, a reflection perhaps of the the substantial reduction in the
number of observations.
The results including the time dummy are included to indicate possible structural
changes that could have occurred after the globalization era. The time dummy itself is
sometimes significant and sometimes not, and most interactions with the time dummy
are either not statistically significant or do not seem economically significant. The two
important exceptions are time dummies with external debt/GDP and and the financial
depth measure M2/GDP. Here, the general finding is that interactions are significant but
only for particular asset classes.
For FDI, the coefficient on the interaction term of the time dummy with M2/GDP is
negative and significant, suggesting that the effect of financial depth on FDI is signifi-
cantly greater prior to 1990 than after 1990 (although it remains positive and significant
also after 1990). The structural change may be due in part to globalization which in-
creased access to foreign financing for FDI, reducing the overall importance of domestic
financial depth to finance foreign direct investments.
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For FPI, the coefficient on the interaction term of the time dummy with the short-
term external debt/GDP is negative and significant, suggesting that the effect of external
debt on FPI is significant and negative after 1990, while it was not prior to 1990. In
part this may reflect a changing motivation of FPI over recent years. Prior to 1990 FPI
may have been motivated more substantially by capital flight concerns, enough so to
lead to the overall finding that foreign equity investments prior to 1990 were positively
correlated with external debt (unlike FDI and FX reserves). However, over recent years,
more standard portfolio considerations, such as those explored in Malik (2011) and Bai
and Zhang (2012), may have dominated to lead to the same negative correlation between
external debt/GDP and FPI after 1990.
This result, in itself, is interesting because FPI from emerging economies is likely
to be increasingly important in global financial markets in coming years and it would
be encouraging to conclude, even if based on stylized regressions, that considerations
behind FPI from emerging economies are driven increasingly by more stable portfolio
considerations than they were in the capital flight era.
As mentioned, the above results are based on fixed effect method of estimation but
interpretation of estimated coefficient requires caution due to the issues of endogene-
ity. Endogeniety can plague the results and hence interpreting these results in terms
of causality may be detrimental. This issue can arise from several variables but the
foremost variable with an endogeneity concern is trade openness measure and current
account surplus. The next section uses instrument variable approach to see if and how
results can be affected when bilateral, regional and multilateral trade agreements are
used as an instrument for trade openness and current account surplus.
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4.4 Alternative regression specifications
4.4.1 Endogeniety
With a fixed effects model, the estimators depend on the assumption of strict exogene-
ity i.e, for normally distributed it the assumption Cov(xit, it) = 0. However, this as-
sumption is violated if any of the regressand are not independent of the error term for
example because of simultaneity. In my analysis, there is one potential source of endo-
geniety that can come from variables relating trade: trade openness and trade surplus.
Trade openness, which is measured as the ratio of sum of exports and imports to GDP
can be endogenous for example by the reasoning that financial openness affects activity
in the outflows of foreign assets which can then result into income that can be used to
increase or decrease imports or exports. Similarly, trade surplus which is measured as
the ratio of net exports to GDP, is in equilibrium relation with the purchase of finan-
cial assets through the basic identity relation linking balance of payment and national
income. Hence, there can be a potential endogeneity issue present with trade surplus
variable through simultaneity.
This section deals with these endogeneity issues by using two different specifi-
cations. In the first specification, the analysis substitutes trade variables with trade
agreements data which includes preferential trade agreements, bilateral and multilateral
agreements. Different classes of trade agreements can have different effects on trade
activity and therefore, I also do the analysis with each type of agreements separately.
However, the results are very similar however multilateral agreements are only few in
number and hence data limitation does not allow a separate analysis based on these
agreements. Therefore, the results provided in this paper are based on the total activity
reflected from all types of trade agreements mainly because the results are qualitatively
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and quantitatively very similar.9 The second specification uses the aforementioned trade
agreements variables as an instrument variable for trade openness and trade surplus.
As before, results with current account surplus and trade openness are very similar
except for the respective related coefficients. The results are provided in Table C.8-C.11,
where trade agreements are substituted for trade openness and trade surplus, while Table
C.16- C.19, uses trade agreements as an IV for trade openness alone. The first specifi-
cation compared to the results that used trade openness indicators, show three distinct
variations. The results are very similar qualitatively and quantitatively very similar.
Some of the evident variations include: (1) capital openness is becomes insignificant for
the total assets and (2) GDP per capita becomes significant for FPI.
The later results of IV specification in Table C.16- C.19 are based on the battery of
post estimation tests which includes the endogeniety test and weak-instrument-robust
inference tests using Anderson-Rubin Wald test which are provided in the Table C.12-
C.15. The endogeniety test reveals that trade openness indeed presents problems relat-
ing endogeneity but weak-instrument-robust inference tests show that trade agreements
variable is a strong instrument for trade openness. Nevertheless, it must be noted that
the precision of IV estimates is lower than that of OLS estimates. In the presence of
weak instruments (excluded instruments only weakly correlated with included endoge-
nous regressors) the loss of precision will be severe, and IV estimates may be no im-
provement over OLS. This suggests we need to evaluate whether a particular regressor
must be treated as endogenous. With regards to current account surplus the post esti-
mation results of the first-stage F-stat heteroskedasticity-robust tests indicate that trade
agreements are a weak instrument for current account surplus despite the fact that there
exist endogeniety issue with current account surplus. Therefore, these results are not
9Data on trade agreement is compiled from United Nations Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). Any agreement that is signed, whether in force or under negotiation is
included to capture the activity of trade openness from a dejure point of view.
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presented.
Comparison between Table C.16- C.19 and previous corresponding tables without
IV specification or columns 2 and 4 in the comparison table F.1 - F.4, show that the
results from these two specification are very similar in magnitude and signs, however
there are four main differences that are worth highlighting in this section. These differ-
ences emerge with regards to FDI. The first difference is that financial depth variable
looses significance. The second key difference is that apart from a specification IV that
is based on an interaction between year dummy and financial depth, total assets and FX
loose significance with regards to anti-corruption variable (Table C.16 and Table C.17,
column 4). However, the evidence for the theory that FPI was driven largely by capital
flight prior to 1990, though much less so after 1990, highlighted in the Non-IV specifica-
tion is reinforced by using the alternative IV approach as the significance of interaction
of year and debt variable stays negatively significant (see Table F.4, column 2 and 4).
Whereas, FDI investments loose significance with regards to the interaction variable
between year dummy and short term debt in specification III suggesting the negative in-
fluence of short term debt before and after 1990. This is in contrast to the results of the
Non-IV specification discussed in section 4.3.3. Lastly, capital openness and GDP per
capita that has been insignificant for FDI and FPI are now significant under instrument
variable approach for total assets. As a results of this alternative specification with IV,
the R square for all the specifications have improved.
4.4.2 Common Trends
In this section, I redo the analysis with non-detrended data for comparison with the
aforementioned IV and Non-IV specifications of detrended data. The results corre-
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sponding to the Non-IV regression and the IV regression using the detrended and non-
detrended data are reported in the Table F.1 - F.4 in the Appendix F. First of all, the
results with detrended and un-detrended data are economically as well as statistically,
very similar. However, there are four important obeservations from these results: (1) For
all classes of foreign assets except for FPI, trade openness indicator, both with IV and
Non-IV specifications, have smaller coefficients as compared to the coefficients from
the non-detrended data. The new results still show economic and statistical significance.
However, trade openness seem to have no significant effect on the accumulation of FPI
for detrended data. (2) External debt still negatively affects the accumulation of all types
of assets including FDI where the affect seems to be consistent with all specifications.
However, detrended results show that the effects are still present in the non-linear speci-
fication that includes an interaction between debt variable and time. This shows that the
non-linearity of external debt may be an important avenue for future research.10 There-
fore, capturing these results with a linear specification may not show any effects. With
regards to FPI, the results associated with this variable as well as the interaction term
with year further confirms the theory of FPI investment more recently being driven by
portfolio consideration rather than by capital flight motives. (3) In contrast to detrended
data, non-detrended specification reveals that capital openness seems to be an unimpor-
tant variable for accumulation of all types of assets. (4) Lastly, the R squared from the
detrended data is smaller than the R squared from non-detrended data, as anticipated
given that the explanatory power reduces if time trends has been removed.
This section shows that with some differences highlighted above, the overall effects
of the outlined determinants of foreign asset accumulation remain largely unchanged,
which provides a further robustness check for the previously presented results.
10See for e.g. Malik(2011) for theoretical model that highlights the non-linear effect of external debt
on the accumulation of assets especially FDI.
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In the Appendix E.1, I also provide a counterpart analysis with industrialized
economies which is very close to Milesi-Ferretti and Lane (2003) except that I use ex-
tended data and more explanatory variables to facilitate an easy comparison with emerg-
ing economies analysis provided in this paper. For easy comparison, the results for total
assets and each class of assets are provided in Table F.5-F.8 and the discussion of results
is provided in Appendix E.1, Section E.1.
4.5 Conclusion
Over the past 20 years emerging economies have started to accumulate considerable
foreign assets. Most noticeably there has been a large increase in FX reserves, but also
FDI and FPI investments originating from emerging economies have increased substan-
tially. The general trend, however, masks considerable heterogeneity both in the level
and composition of foreign assets held by different emerging economies. In this paper, I
have studied determinants of the time and cross-country variation in the level and com-
position of international investments originating from emerging economies over the time
period 1970-2007, focusing on a large set of macroeconomic, institutional, financial and
trade variables, and controlling for country-fixed effects.
Predictably, trade openness is easily the most important, especially for FX reserves
which dominate the total foreign assets accumulated by emerging economies. There are
however serious concerns over endogeniety with regards to trade openness measure and
the IV regressions confirm that the effect of trade openness remains quantitatively and
qualitatively significant. There is, however, also some evidence that financial deepening
is associated with an increase in foreign assets, but that for foreign direct investments
this affect has become less important in the wake of financial globalization when access
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to foreign capital increased for emerging economies. In addition, more indebted devel-
oping countries tend to have smaller FX reserve ratios and foreign direct investments.
Prior to 1990, there is no evidence of similar effects of external debt on FPI, which may
be due to a balancing of two different effects: (1) external debt increases the potential
of future tax increases and therefore motivates capital flight, (2) on the other hand, ex-
ternal debt increases default risk and therefore reduces incentives to invest abroad for
risk-sharing purposes (as outlined in Malik (2011) and Bai and Zhang (2012)). Prior
to 1990, these two forces may cancel out with respect to FPI (which is the most liquid
way to achieve capital flight), but after 1990 I find evidence that FPI is also negatively
correlated with external debt suggesting that the more stable diversification channel is
becoming more important than capital flight for FPI.
Except for financial deepening that becomes insignificant for FDI and FPI, all of the
other results are sustained when instrument variable approach is applied. When compar-
ison is made between different groups of countries, total foreign assets and FDI behaves
very similarly to the macroeconomic, institutional, trade and financial variables. How-
ever, stark differences are present in terms of FX and FPI which highlights inherent dif-
ferences between these economies. One of the reason could be that emerging economies
are still at an early stage of learning by doing, when it comes to utilizing FPI for diversi-
fication purposes and therefore, key differences are evident. Another reason can be that
FX reserves due to its liquidity, might be more favorable form of assets for countries that
are vulnerable and can require quick fix to the economy through reserves in the event
of crisis episodes. This is evident from a strong negative relation between FX and crisis
events in emerging economies but it is absent from industrialized economies.
I view the partial correlations generated by the panel study in this paper as a first
step towards further research on determinants of foreign investments from emerging
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economies, that are likely to become increasingly important as emerging economies
grow and account for an ever increasing fraction of world output. The results establish
some stylized facts, that overall provide some support for the theory that foreign invest-
ments from emerging economies are increasingly motivated by many due to standard
portfolio considerations that motivate foreign investments from industrial economies
with a longer history of foreign investment. The empirical correlations can inform the-
oretical work on the modeling of foreign investment behavior in emerging economies,
but it would be desirable to explore estimation of structural models to make further
progress, so that results could be used to provide a more solid normative interpretation
for investment behavior.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX CHAPTER 1
A.1 Preliminaries
To simplify notation I continue to denote the felicity function by u. The proofs utilize
the following well-known property of CRRA utility: For γ > 0 u is multiplicatively
separable in the sense that u(AB) = u(A)u(B), while for γ = 0 u(x) = log(x) satisfies
u(AB) = u(A) + u(B).
Claim 1: Assumption 1 is equivalent to the following set of inequalities: A < a <
(1 + r) < µ < a¯ < a + A.
Proof. Parts (1) and (2) of Assumption 1 are equivalent to A < a < (1 + r) < µ < a¯.
Since S td(a) = (a¯ − a)/2, part (3) of Assumption 1 is equivalent to a¯ < a + A.
Claim 2: Assumption 2 is equivalent to the following set of inequalities: 2A < 2a <
2(1 + r) < a¯ < a + 2A.
Proof. Parts (1) and (2) of Assumption 2 are equivalent to 2A < 2a < 2(1 + r) < a¯.
Since S td(a) = (a¯ − a)/2, part (3) of Assumption 1 is equivalent to a¯ < a + 2A.
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. The unique efficient allocation is found by backward induction.
Fix any (K1,D1, θ1). By the assumption as2 ∈ {a¯, a} > A, period 2 utility from KT2 = (0, 0)
and KM2 = (K1,K1) is always at least as great as the utility from any other period 2
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capital allocation. Moreover, if (K1, θ1) >> 0 the preference is strict. Hence, consider
the following simplified period 2 value function in state s ∈ {H, L}:
vs2(K1, θ1,D1) = u(asθ1K1 + (2µ − as)(1 − θ1)K1 − (1 + r)D1) (A.1)
Now turn to the period 1 problem. Using the simplified period 2 value function in
Eq. (A.1), the period 1 value function is
v1(K¯, ω¯) = max{K1≥0,D1,θ1∈[0,1]}
u(AK¯ + D1 − K1) + β2
[
vH2 (K1, θ1,D1) + v
L
2 (K1, θ1,D1)
]
s.t D1 ≤ ω¯K1
can be written as:
v1(K¯, ω¯) = max{K1≥0,D1,θ1∈[0,1]}
u(AK¯ + D1 − K1)
+
β
2
[
u(a¯θ1K1 + (2µ − a¯)(1 − θ1)K1 − (1 + r)D1)
+ u(aθ1K1 + (2µ − a)(1 − θ1)K1 − (1 + r)D1)] (A.2)
s.t D1 ≤ ω¯K1 (A.3)
We can solve for an optimal θ1 independently of the (K1,D1) decision because of the
concavity of u. Fix any (K1,D1) (feasible) and define
A : = θ1
[
(a¯ − a)K1 + aK1 − (1 + r)D1
]
+ (1 − θ1)
[
aK1 − (1 + r)D1
]
(A.4)
B : = θ1
[
(a − a¯)K1 + a¯K1 − (1 + r)D1
]
+ (1 − θ1) [a¯K1 − (1 + r)D1] (A.5)
For a given (K1,D1) and an arbitrary θ1 ∈ [0, 1] note that period 2 expected utility is
given by (1/2)u(A) + (1/2)u(B), while expected utility for θ = 1/2 is given by u[(A +
B)/2]. Since u is concave
u
(A + B
2
)
≥ 1
2
u(A) +
1
2
u(B) (A.6)
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and the inequality is strict whenever K1 > 0. It therefore remains to show that with
KT2 = (0, 0) and θ1 = 1/2 there exist unique optimal solutions for K1 and D1 in which
K1 > 0 and D1 = ω¯K1. With θ1 = 12 the period 1 value function can be written as:
v1(K¯, ω¯) = max{K1≥0,D1}
u(AK¯ + D1 − K1)
+
β
2
[u(
1
2
a¯K1 +
1
2
(2µ − a¯)K1︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
µK1
−(1 + r)D1)
+ u(
1
2
aK1 +
1
2
(2µ − a)K1︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
µK1
−(1 + r)D1)] (A.7)
s.t D1 ≤ ω¯K1 (A.8)
We now argue that K1 = 0 is always strictly dominated. Suppose K1 = 0 then
by the constraint c2 ≥ 0 this implies D1 ≤ 0. Suppose first that there is any feasible
plan with D1 = 0, then c2 = 0 and for  > 0 and sufficiently small K1 =  is feasible.
Moreover, by the Inada condition on u, for  sufficiently small, K1 =  strictly dominates
K1 = 0. Hence, K1 = 0 and D1 = 0 is strictly dominated by a plan with K1 > 0 and
D1 ≤ 0. Now suppose K1 = 0 and D1 < 0 but feasible, with corresponding c1 ≥ 0.
Then consider the alternative plan (Kˆ1, Dˆ1, cˆ1) = (−D1, 0, c1). This plan is feasible since
(K1,D1, c1) is feasible, and by the assumption 1, it can be noted that µ > (1 + r), this
plan strictly dominates (K1,D1) because it leads to strictly greater c2 in both states, u is
strictly increasing and β > 0.1 Hence, K1 = 0 is always strictly dominated by a plan
with K1 > 0.
Now suppose that K1 > 0, then we argue that D1 < ω¯K1 is strictly dominated by
Dˆ1 = ω¯K1. To see this, suppose that there is a feasible plan with D1 = ω¯K1 −  for some
1To understand how assumption 1 implies µ > (1 + r), consider µ > 2(1 + r) − a and a < 2(1 + r) − a.
These two assumptions together implies µ > 2(1 + r) − a > 2(1 + r) − (1 + r) = (1 + r).
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 > 0 and period 1 consumption of c1 ≥ 0. Then the plan (Kˆ1, Dˆ1, cˆ1) = (K1+,D1+, c1)
is feasible. Since c1 remains unchanged period 1 utility remains unchanged. However,
c2 increases by (µ − (1 + r)) > 0 (by Assumption 1). Hence, for K1 > 0, D1 < ω¯K1 is
strictly dominated by Dˆ1 = ω¯K1.
It therefore remains to show that there exists a unique K1 > 0 that solves the follow-
ing optimization problem:
max
K1>0
u
(
AK¯ − (1 − ω¯)K1
)
+ βu ((µ − ω¯(1 + r))K1) (A.9)
It is straightforward to verify that the objective function is continuously differen-
tiable and strictly concave and so the following first order condition is necessary and
sufficient for a solution to (A.9):
f (K1) := β
(
µ − ω¯(1 + r))u′ ((µ − ω¯(1 + r))K1) − (1 − ω¯)u′ (AK¯ − (1 − ω¯)K1) = 0 (A.10)
Note that
f ′(K1) = β u′′ (µK1 − (1 + r)ω¯K1)︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
<0 by concavity
(µ − (1 + r)ω¯)2︸             ︷︷             ︸
>0
+ (1 − ω¯)2︸   ︷︷   ︸
>0
u′′
(
AK¯ − (1 − ω¯)K1
)
︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
<0 by concavity
< 0 (A.11)
lim
K1→0
f (K1) > 0 (A.12)
lim
K1→ AK¯1−ω¯
f (K1) < 0 (A.13)
Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique K∗1 > 0 that solves
(A.10). It follows that K∗1 > 0, D1 = ω¯K
∗
1 , θ1 = (1/2), K
T
2 = (0, 0) and K
M
2 = (K
∗
1 ,K
∗
1) is
the unique efficient allocation.
Proof of Proposition 3. The strongly efficient solution is again found by backward
induction. In period 2 there are four possible default choices. By the assumption a¯ >
a > A each default choice immediately determines an optimal period 2 capital allocation.
Hence, there are four possible optimal plans in period 2 for any given (K1,D1, θ1): (1)
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λ2 = (1, 1), KM2 = (K1,K1), K
T
2 = (0, 0); (2) λ2 = (0, 0), K
M
2 = (0, 0), K
T
2 = (K1,K1); (3)
λ2 = (1, 0), KM2 = (K1, 0), K
T
2 = (0,K1); and (4) λ2 = (0, 1), K
M
2 = (0,K1), K
T
2 = (K1, 0).
We next study the optimal period 1 decision corresponding to each of the four cases.
Begin with case (1) and observe that by Proposition 2 we have that for any (K¯, ω¯) there
exists a K∗1(1) > 0 such that K
∗
1(1) > 0, D1 = ω¯K
∗
1(1), θ1 = (1/2) are the optimal period
1 choices. Now consider case (2). In this case θ1 = 1 clearly dominates any θ1 < 1,
and dominates strictly if K1 > 0. It follows exactly as in the proof for Proposition 2 that
K1 > 0 strictly dominates K1 = 0. Moreover, using θ1 = 1, the constraint D1 = ω¯K1
clearly binds and it then follows as for case 1 that there exists K∗1(2) > 0 such that
K∗1(2) > 0, D1 = ω¯K
∗
1(2), θ1 = 1 are the optimal period 1 choices. Now consider case
(3). Again, θ1 = 1 clearly dominates any θ1 < 1, and dominates strictly if K1 > 0. It
again follows from the same argument as above that K1 > 0 strictly dominates K1 = 0,
and that therefore the constraint D1 = ω¯K1 must bind. It then follows as for case 1 that
there exists K∗1(3) > 0 such that K
∗
1(3) > 0, D1 = ω¯K
∗
1(3), θ1 = 1 are the optimal period
1 choices. Finally, consider case (4). Fix any θ1 ∈ [0, 1] and observe that by the same
arguments as previously, K1 > 0 and the constraint D1 = ω¯K1 binds. Now observe that
in period 1, for any K1 > 0 and D1 = ω¯K1 the expected period 2 utility under case (4) is
1
2
u
(
[Aθ1]K1
)
+
1
2
u
( (
[aθ1 + a¯(1 − θ1)] − (1 + r)ω¯
)
K1
)
(A.14)
For θ1 = 1, the expected period 2 utility under case (3) is
1
2
u
(
AK1
)
+
1
2
u
(
[a¯ − (1 + r)ω¯]K1) (A.15)
Clearly, for any θ1 ∈ [0, 1] the expected utility in (A.14) dominated by the expected util-
ity in (A.15), and dominated strictly whenever K1 > 0. Hence, case (4) will not affect
period 1 decisions. We are therefore left with three cases, each of which directly deter-
mines an optimal θ1 decision, and in each of which K1 > 0 and the collateral constraint
binds. We next determine which case dominates from a period 1 perspective. For this,
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we use the fact that each case corresponds to a unique optimal choice of θ1 indepen-
dently of K1, and compare the respective expected period 2 utilities. Corresponding to
each of the three remaining cases and for any K1 > 0, these are therefore:
Case 1: u((µ − (1 + r)ω¯)K1) (A.16)
Case 2: u(AK1) (A.17)
Case 3:
1
2
u((a¯ − (1 + r)ω¯)K1) + 12u(AK1) (A.18)
Now observe that CRRA utility is multiplicatively separable and, hence, for com-
parisons between the three cases, only the following part of the expected utilities are
relevant
Case 1: u(µ − (1 + r)ω¯) (A.19)
Case 2: u(A) (A.20)
Case 3:
1
2
u((a¯ − (1 + r)ω¯)) + 1
2
u(A) (A.21)
We now compare these three expected utilities to determine the ω1 and ω2.
• Case 1 < Case 2: By the assumption that u is strictly increasing, this holds if and
only if
A > µ − (1 + r)ω¯ (A.22)
ω¯ >
µ − A
1 + r
=: ω3 (A.23)
• Case 3 < Case 2: By the assumption that u is strictly increasing, this holds if and
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only if
A > (a¯ − (1 + r)ω¯) (A.24)
ω¯ >
a¯ − A
1 + r
=: ω2 (A.25)
• Case 1 > Case 3: It is not possible to get a closed form solution, but we show
that a unique ω1 exist between 0 and ω3 such that Case 1 > Case 3 if and only if
ω¯ < ω1. Define f (ω) as:
f (ω) = u(µ − (1 + r)ω) − 1
2
u(a¯ − (1 + r)ω) − 1
2
u(A) (A.26)
First observe that
∂ f (ω)
∂ω
= −(1 + r)u′(µ − (1 + r)ω¯) − 1
2
(−(1 + r))u′(a¯ − (1 + r)ω¯) (A.27)
= −(1 + r)︸   ︷︷   ︸
<0
[
u′(µ − (1 + r)ω¯) − 1
2
u′(a¯ − (1 + r)ω¯)]︸                                            ︷︷                                            ︸
>0
(A.28)
< 0 (A.29)
Now note that
f (0) = u(µ) − 1
2
u(a¯) − 1
2
u(A) (A.30)
By strict concavity of u,
u(µ) >
1
2
u(a¯) +
1
2
u(a) (A.31)
>
1
2
u(a¯) +
1
2
u(A) (A.32)
Hence, f (0) > 0. Next note that
f (
µ − A
1 + r
) = u(A) − 1
2
u(a¯ − (µ − A)) − 1
2
u(A) (A.33)
=
1
2
[
u(A) − u(A + (a¯ − µ))] (A.34)
Since a¯ > µ and u is strictly increasing, it follows that f ((µ − A)/(1 + r)) < 0.
Hence, by the continuity of u, there exists a uniqueω1 ∈ (0, ω3) such that f (ω) > 0
if and only if ω < ω1 and f (ω) = 0 if and only if ω = ω1.
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• Now observe that we have ω1, ω2, ω3 such that 0 < ω1 < ω3 < ω2, Also, for ω¯ ∈
[0, ω1) Case 1 strictly dominates Case 2 and Case 3; for ω¯ = ω1 Case 1 and Case
3 lead to the same expected utility and both dominate Case 2; for ω¯ ∈ (ω1, ω2)
Case 3 strictly dominates Case 1 and Case 2; for ω¯ = ω2 Case 2 and Case 3 lead
to the same expected utility and both dominate Case 1; and for ω¯ > ω2 Case 2
strictly dominates Case 1 and Case 3. Note also that the values of ω1, ω2, ω3 hold
for all K1 > 0, i.e., do not depend on the K1 actually chosen.
It therefore follows that for all values of ω¯, the planner can first determine the opti-
mal case and then determine, given the optimal case, what will be the optimal K1 > 0.
Uniqueness then follows directly from the the uniqueness of the optimal K∗1 for each
case and the tie breaker rule in a strongly efficient allocation. This therefore completes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. First recall from the proof of Proposition 3 that 0 < ω1 <
(µ − A)/(1 + r). By Assumption 2, a¯ < a + 2A, which implies that µ < a + A and
therefore ω1 < a/(1 + r).
Now start with part (1) of the Proposition. Fix K¯ > 0 and let ω¯ ∈ [0, ω1]. Suppose
that the price P = 1. Then the planning problem facing the open economy is identical
to the problem in Section 2.2. Moreover, Assumption 2 implies that µ > (1 + r) (from
a¯ > 2(1+r)) and it therefore follows from Proposition 3 that there exist a unique K∗1 > 0,
such that (K∗1 ,D
∗
1 = ω¯K
∗
1 , θ
∗
1 = 1/2, λ
∗
2 = (1, 1),K
M∗
2 = ((1/2)K
∗
1 , (1/2)K
∗
1),K
T∗
2 = (0, 0))
is the unique optimal plan for the borrower country. Moreover, given λ∗2 = (1, 1) the no
arbitrage condition implies that P = 1. Hence, this is a Type I risk adjusted equilibrium.
Now note that for any P ≥ 0 the collateral constraint implies that it is never optimal
for the borrower country to default since the period 2 value function is identical to the
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period 2 value function in Section 2.2, and with a debt to capital ratio D1/K1 < ω1 it
follows from the proof of Proposition 3 that default in period 2 is never optimal. As a
result, an optimal plan for the borrower country always involves λ2 = (1, 1). Hence, any
price P , 1 can not occur in a risk adjusted equilibrium. Given the tie breaker rule for
ω¯ = ω1, this proves uniqueness.
Now look at part (2) of the Proposition. First suppose that P = 1/2. To show
that the collateral constraint will bind at an optimal plan, first consider the case when
the default decision in period 2 is λ2 = (1, 0). Suppose for sake of contradiction that
(c1,K1,D1) ≥ 0 is part of a feasible plan in which D1 = ω¯K1 −  for some  > 0 (hence,
the collateral constraint does not bind). Consider an alternative plan in which period 1
choices have changed to (cˆ1, Kˆ1, Dˆ1) = (c1,K1 + (/2),D1 + ). Note that at a price of
P = 1/2 this plan is feasible because the plan (c1,K1,D1) was feasible by assumption.
Under the new plan consumption in period 1 is unchanged and the change in period
2 consumption in state H is (a¯(/2) − (1 + r)). By Assumption 2, a¯ > 2(1 + r) and
therefore the last term is strictly positive. The change in period 2 consumption in state
L is A(/2) > 0. Hence, expected utility under the plan (cˆ1, Kˆ1, Dˆ1) is strictly greater
because u is strictly increasing. By an analogous argument, the collateral constraint
binds when the default decision in period 2 is λ2 = (1, 1). When the default decision
is λ = (0, 0) the collateral constraint necessarily binds, since additional borrowing can
always be used to increase period 1 utility without any decrease in period 2 utility (due
to default). Finally, as in the proof of Proposition 3 it is straightforward to show that the
default decision λ = (0, 1) is dominated (and strictly dominated whenever K1 > 0). The
collateral constraint therefore binds for all relevant (i.e., not always dominated) period
2 default decisions, and the collateral constraint must therefore bind at an optimal plan.
However, since the period 2 value function is identical to the value function in Section
2.2, it follows just as in Proposition 3 that when the collateral constraint binds and
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ω¯ ∈ (ω1, ω2), there exists a unique K∗1 > 0 such that the unique optimal plan of the
borrower country is (K∗1 ,D
∗
1 = ω¯K
∗
1 , θ
∗
1 = 1, λ
∗
2 = (1, 0),K
M∗
2 = (K
∗
1 , 0),K
T∗
2 = (0,K
∗
1)).
Also, given λ∗2 = (1, 0) the no arbitrage condition implies that P = 1/2. Hence, for
ω¯ ∈ (ω1, ω2), this is a Type II risk adjusted equilibrium.
To show uniqueness of the RAE found above for ω¯ ∈ (ω1, ω2), first suppose that
P > 1/2. Then it is clear that at any optimal plan the collateral constraint binds and
therefore λ2 = (1, 0). It follows that P is not consistent with the no arbitrage condition.
Now suppose that P < 1/2. This can be consistent with the no arbitrage condition
only if P = 0 and λ2 = (0, 0). But for ω¯ ≤ ω2 it follows from Proposition 3 that the
representative agent is always at least as well-off not defaulting in the high state. Hence,
P = 1/2 is the unique price at which there exists a risk adjusted equilibrium when
ω¯ ∈ (ω1, ω2).
Finally, note that under Assumption 2, it is not the case that ω2 ≤ a/(1 + r). Since
from Assumption 2, a¯ > 2a > a + A, it follows that ω2 := (a¯−A)/(1 + r) > a/(1 + r). As
a result, for the range of ω¯ considered, ω¯ ∈ a/(1 + r), the two types of RAE equilibria
found above are both mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.
Proof of Proposition 5. For any K1 > 0 and D1 use the notation α1 := D1/K1. Note
that for any given (K1,D1, θ1) from period 1, the period 2 value function is identical to
the value function from Section 2.2. From the proof of Proposition 3 we therefore have
that if K1 > 0 and α1 ∈ [0, ω1] the optimal default decision in period 2 is λ2 = (1, 1)
and so in period 1 the optimal θ1 = 1/2. If α1 ∈ (ω1, ω2] the optimal default decision
in period 2 is λ2 = (1, 0) and in period 1 the optimal θ1 = 1; and if α1 > ω2 the
optimal default decision is λ2 = (0, 0) and in period 1 the optimal θ1 = 1. Given that the
optimal θ1 is determined jointly with the optimal default decision, it is enough to look at
demand conditional on α1. The demand for bonds then follows directly from the linear
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optimization problem faced by international investors:
d(K1,D1, θ1, P) =

∞ if P < 1 and α1 ≤ ω1
P < 12 and α1 ≤ ω2
[0,∞] if P = 1 and α1 ≤ ω1
P = 12 and α1 ∈ (ω1, ω2]
P = 0 and α1 > ω2
0 if P > 1
P > 12 and α1 ∈ (ω1, ω2]
P > 0 and α1 > ω2
(A.35)
Now consider the optimization problem of the borrower country in period 1. If the
country accumulates a strictly positive amount of capital (K1 > 0) and issues a strictly
positive quantity of bonds (D1 > 0) such that α1 ≤ ω1, then the supply of bonds equals
the demand for bonds if and only if P = 1. Hence, we have that P(K1,D1) = 1 if
(K1,D1) > 0 and α1 ≤ ω1. We have from Proposition 3 that subject to the constraint
D1 ≤ ω¯K1 for any ω¯ ∈ [0, ω1] the optimal K1 is strictly positive and the collateral
constraint binds. Hence, any plan with K1 = 0 is strictly dominated. Hence, we focus
only on K1 > 0. Moreover, since the collateral constraint binds for all ω¯ ∈ [0, ω1], we
have that if at an optimal solution α1 ≤ ω1 then this is an equality.
Now suppose the country accumulates capital and issues bonds such that α1 ∈
(ω1, ω2], then the supply of bonds equals the demand for bonds if and only if P = 1/2.
Hence, we have that P(K1,D1) = 1/2 if α1 ∈ (ω1, ω2]. Using a similar argument
to the previous paragraph, we have from Proposition 4 that if at an optimal solution
α1 ∈ (ω1, ω2] then α1 = ω2.
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Finally, suppose that the country accumulates capital and issues bonds such that
α1 > ω2. Then the supply of bonds equals the demand for bonds if and only if P = 0.
Then the optimization problem in period 1 is essentially identical to the optimization
problem for α1 = 0. However, from above we have that if α1 ∈ [0, ω1], the optimal
α1 = ω1 and hence this strictly dominates any α1 > ω2.
With the notation from Proposition 4, now suppose that
v¯(K¯, ω2, 1/2) > v¯(K¯, ω1, 1) . (A.36)
Then it follows from the preceding arguments that the borrower country solves for an
optimal K1 with θ1 = 1 and under the (market imposed) constraint that α1 = ω2. Hence,
it follows from Proposition 4 that there is a unique ECE with K∗1 > 0 such that the
allocation K∗1 , D
∗
1 = ω2K
∗
1 , θ
∗
1 = 1, λ
∗
2 = (1, 0), K
M∗
2 = (K
∗
1 , 0), K
T∗
2 = (0,K
∗
1), and the
price is P = 1/2. For the opposite (weak) inequality, it follows in a similar manner
that there exists a unique K∗1 such that the allocation K
∗
1 , D
∗
1 = ω1K
∗
1 , θ
∗
1 = 1/2, λ
∗
2 =
(1, 1), KM∗2 = ((1/2)K
∗
1 , (1/2)K
∗
1), K
T∗
2 = (0, 0) and the price P = 1 is the unique ECE.
Existence of an ECE therefore follows by construction.
Proof of Proposition 6. For any K1 > 0 and D1 ≥ 0, again use the notation α1 := D1K1 .
First consider the decision problem of the open economy in period 2. Decisions regard-
ing the allocation of capital between the modern and traditional sector are analogous to
the proof of Proposition 3. Recalling the cases compared in the proof of Proposition 3,
the corresponding comparisons between different default regimes under log-utility are
as follows:
Case 1: log(µ − (1 + r)α1) + log(K1) (A.37)
Case 2: log(A) + log(K1) (A.38)
Case 3:
1
2
log(a¯ − (1 + r)α1) + 12 log(A) + log(K1) (A.39)
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The special feature of log-utility is that the problem of solving for the optimal K1 is in-
dependent of the problem of solving for the optimal default decision in period 2 because
of the additive separability.
In order to determine the optimal default decision for period 2, we make pairwise
comparisons between the expected utility given each of the three relevant cases. De-
pending on values of α1 ≥ 0 we can compare the expected utilities under each of the
three cases from an ex-ante perspective.
• First compare the expected utility for case (1) and case (2). It follows immediately
from the fact that log is strictly increasing that case (2) dominates case (1) if and
only if
A ≥ µ − α1(1 + r) (A.40)
⇔ α1 ≥ µ − A1 + r (A.41)
• Next compare the expected utility for case (2) and case (3). It follows immediately
from the fact that log is strictly increasing that case (2) dominates case (3) ex-ante
if and only if
A ≥ a¯ − α1(1 + r) (A.42)
⇔ α1 ≥ a¯ − A1 + r (A.43)
• Now compare the expected utility for case (3) and case (1). Using the quadratic
formula and simple algebra manipulations, it is possible to show that case (3)
dominates case (1) ex-ante if and only if
√
A(a¯ − α1(1 + r)) ≥ µ − α1(1 + r) (A.44)
⇔ α1 ≥ 2µ − A2(1 + r)
−
√
(A)2 + 4A(a¯ − µ)
2(1 + r)
(A.45)
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• Finally, observe that
0 <
2µ − A − √(A)2 + 4A(a¯ − µ)
2(1 + r)
(A.46)
<
µ − A
1 + r
(A.47)
<
a¯ − A
1 + r
(A.48)
(A.49)
Hence, we define
α¯1 =
2µ − A − √(A)2 + 4A(a¯ − µ)
2(1 + r)
and (A.50)
α¯2 =
a¯ − A
1 + r
, (A.51)
Observe that α¯1 < 1 by the following reasoning:
By assumption 2,
2a < 2(1 + r)
⇒ 2a + 2A < 2(1 + r) + 2A (A.52)
Again, by assumption 2,
a¯ < a + 2A
⇒ a¯ + a < 2a + 2A (A.53)
Using A.52 and A.53, it can be shown that:
a¯ + a < 2a + 2A < 2(1 + r) + 2A
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Hence
a¯ + a < 2(1 + r) + 2A
⇒ µ < (1 + r) + A
⇒ µ − A
1 + r
< 1
Also observe that α¯2 < 2 by the following reasoning:
By using assumption 2,
2(1 + r) > 2a
⇒ 2(1 + r) + A > 2a + A
Again, by assumption 2,
2(1 + r) + A > a + 2A
⇒ a + 2A > a¯
⇒ a¯ − A < 2(1 + r)
⇒ a¯ − A
1 + r
< 2
Conclude from the preceding arguments that for α1 ∈ [0, α¯1] case (1) dominates
the other cases and the optimal choice of θ1 is therefore 1/2. For α1 ∈ (α¯1, α¯2]
case (3) dominates the other cases and the optimal choice of θ1 is therefore 1.
For α1 ≥ α¯2 case (2) dominates the other cases and the optimal choice of θ1 is
therefore 1.
Now consider the demand for bonds by international investors (d1(K1,D1, θ1, P)). It
follows (as in Proposition 5) from the linear optimization problem of the investors that
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d1 depends only on P and α1, and is summarized as follows:
d(K1,D1, θ1, P) =

∞ if P < 1 and α1 ≤ ω1
P < 12 and α1 ≤ ω2
[0,∞) if P = 1 and α1 ≤ ω1
P = 12 and α1 ∈ (ω1, ω2]
P = 0 and α1 > ω2
0 if P > 1
P > 12 and α1 ∈ (ω1, ω2]
P > 0 and α1 > ω2
(A.54)
Combining the optimal period 2 decision regarding default with the demand for
bonds, we find that if α1 ≤ α¯1, the price of bonds will be P = 1. If α1 ∈ (α¯1, α¯2], the
price for bonds will be P = 1/2. If α1 > α¯2 the price of bonds will be P = 0. From
α¯1 ∈ (0, 1) and α¯2 ∈ (α¯1, 2) we therefore have that Pα1 ∈ (0, 1) in any ECE.
It remains to determine the optimal K1 in period 1. Due to the additive separability
under the log-utility assumption, for all possible period 2 default regimes the optimal
K1 is determined by solving the following simplified optimization problem (for a given
K¯ > 0 and Pα1 ∈ (0, 1)):
max
{K1>0}
log(AK¯ − (1 − Pω¯)K1) + β log(K1) (A.55)
Since u is strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable and satisfies an Inada con-
dition at 0, first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a unique
solution to this problem and imply that the optimal K1 in the log-utility case is
K1(K¯, ω¯, P) =
βAK¯
(1 + β)(1 − Pω¯) (A.56)
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Note that K1 is well defined because Pα1 < 1.
We are now in a position to compare v¯(K¯, ω2, 1/2) and v¯(K¯, ω1, 1). Note that with
the optimal Kˆ1 determined from (A.56):
v¯(K¯, ω1, 1) = log(AK¯ − Kˆ1(1 − ω1)) + β log((µ)Kˆ1 − (1 + r)ω1Kˆ1) (A.57)
where Kˆ1 =
βAK¯
(1 + β)(1 − ω1) (A.58)
Likewise, with an optimal K∗1 determined from (A.56) but for P = 1/2, we have that
v¯(K¯, ω2, 1/2) = log(AK¯ − K∗1(1 −
ω2
2
)) +
β
2
[log(a¯K∗1 − (1 + r)ω2K∗1) + log(AK∗1)](A.59)
where K∗1 =
βAK¯
(1 + β)(1 − 12ω2)
(A.60)
Now compare the two values to show that there exists an  > 0 such that for |a−A| ≤
 the value from equation A.57 is strictly less than the value from equation A.59. For
the following, denote by  := a − A. Then it needs to be shown that
log(AK¯ − Kˆ1(1 − ω1)) + β log(µKˆ1 − (1 + r)ω1Kˆ1) <
log(AK¯ − K1(1 − ω22 )) +
β
2
[log(a¯K1 − (1 + r)ω2K1) + log(AK1)] (A.61)
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Substituting in for Kˆ1, K∗1 , ω1 and ω2, this simplifies to showing that
log(AK∗1) > log(µKˆ1 − (1 + r)ω1Kˆ1) (A.62)
⇔ AK∗1 > (µKˆ1 − (1 + r)ω1Kˆ1) (A.63)
⇔ AβAK¯
(1 + β)(1 − ω22 )
>
(µ − (1 + r)ω1)βAK¯
(1 + β)(1 − ω1) (A.64)
⇔ 1 − ω1
1 − ω22
>
µ − (1 + r)ω1
A
(A.65)
⇔ ω1 > 2(1 + r)(µ − A) − (a¯ − A)µ[2(1 + r) − (a¯ + A)](1 + r) (A.66)
⇔ (2µ − A) −
√
A[A + 4(a¯ − µ)]
2(1 + r)
>
2(1 + r)(µ − A) − (a¯ − A)µ
[2(1 + r) − (a¯ + A)](1 + r) (A.67)
⇔ A[(2(1 + r) − (2µ + ))] > (2(1 + r) − (2µ − )) √A[A + 2(a¯ − a)](A.68)
Since (2(1 + r) − (2µ + )) < 0 this is equivalent to showing that
(2(1 + r) − (2µ + ))
(2(1 + r) − (2µ − )) <
√
A[A + 2(a¯ − a)]
2A
(A.69)
Now just observe that the right hand side is strictly greater than 1, and that the left hand
side converges to 1 as  → 0. Hence, the above equality holds as long as |a − A| is
sufficiently small. This therefore completes the proof.
A.3 Description of Figures 2.1 and 2.2
Data sources and time coverage:
The data for FDI assets, portfolio equity assets, debt assets and debt liabilities is taken
from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Current US dollar GDP data is taken from the
World Bank World Development Indicators. The data covers the time period 1970
through 2007 and is annual. Credit-ratings data is taken from Standards & Poors ex-
ternal debt credit rating.
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Country coverage:
The dataset covers 36 emerging economies (according to IMF classification): Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela.
The subset of countries in figure 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 are based on the credit ratings data
from Standard & Poors. Countries that have a credit rating of BBB- and above are clas-
sified as investment grade (CR = 1), while countries with credit rating below BBB- are
classified as speculative grade (CR=0). This classification is also based on Standard &
Poors definition of investment and speculative grade. Countries in Speculative grade
for the period 1990-2007 are Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, India, Jordan, Morocco, Pak-
istan, Peru, Philippines, Turkey and Ukraine. Countries in Investment grade are Chile,
China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Singapore,
Slovenia and Thailand. The remaining countries are omitted in Figure 2.2 because their
credit-rating changes over the time interval 1990-2007.
Variables:
All quantities are in current US dollars. Asset accumulation is the average sum of FDI
and equity portfolio assets held abroad by domestic residents, and normalized with GDP.
Debt accumulation refers to average net foreign currency denominated debt (debt liabil-
ities - debt assets) normalized by GDP.
Methodology:
The best fit lines are obtained using a fractional polynomial fit in STATA. Figure 2.2.2
gives the best fit line with a 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 2.1 averages over all 36 emerging economies on an annual basis over the
period of 1970-2007. The net external debt stock starts to decrease from 1990 onwards.
The upward trend for foreign asset accumulation by all emerging economies also starts
in 1990.
Figure 2.2.1 looks at the heterogeneity in foreign asset accumulation by emerging
economies. CR=0 and CR=1 refer to the credit rating of countries (CR = 0 means
speculative grade for at least 1990-2007 and CR =1 means investment grade for at least
1990-2007). The same variables as in Figure 2.1 are depicted, but with annual averages
taken within the two groups only. The figures illustrate that economies that are of at least
investment grade experience much more stark increase in foreign asset stocks compared
to emerging economies with a speculative grade on their external debt. In particular,
countries with speculative grade have accumulated a negligible amount of foreign assets
relative to GDP. Meanwhile, the external debt to GDP of countries with investment grade
are considerably lower than for countries with a speculative grade, although there is a
very general downward trend after 1990.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX CHAPTER 2
Table B.1: List of Countries
Country Type Emerging Advanced
1 Argentina Australia
2 Brazil Austria
3 Chile Belgium
4 China Canada
5 Colombia Denmark
6 Ecuador Finland
7 Egypt France
8 India Germany
9 Indonesia Greece
10 Israel Iceland
11 Jordan Ireland
12 Korea Italy
13 Malaysia Japan
14 Mexico Netherlands
15 Morocco Norway
16 Pakistan Spain
17 Peru Sweden
18 Philippines Switzerland
19 Portugal United Kingdom
20 Singapore United States
21 South Africa
22 Thailand
23 Turkey
24 Uruguay
25 Venezuela
Table B.2: Full Sample Liabilities: (1985-2007)
Stats FDIGDP
FPI
GDP
Debt
GDP
Total
GDP
Full Sample
p25 .076058 .0128028 .3801419 .5632541
p50 .1577802 .0491577 .5669314 .8088205
p75 .2882503 .1512946 .8981233 1.275043
mean .2247362 .1509928 .75551 1.137985
Advanced
p25 .0861568 .0393494 .4846814 .6455074
p50 .1815498 .1024555 .7557432 1.088716
p75 .3113096 .2399529 1.195213 1.829892
mean .2431117 .2570972 1.005656 1.520167
Emerging
p25 .0725869 .00448 .3281209 .5311401
p50 .134385 .0286944 .4710821 .7160432
p75 .2669539 .076236 .694321 .9659828
mean .2100358 .0662939 .5553934 .8322403
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Table B.3: Liabilities: Threshold Regression Results
Sample Full Emerging Full Emerging Full Emerging Full Emerging
Single Threshold Total Total Debt Debt FDI FDI FPI FPI
Threshold 1 1.058066 1.058066 0.9174 0.9174 0.528463 0.528463 0.064819 0.013589
CImin 1.011161 0.904716 0.898123 0.838934 0.055132 0.455604 0.054797 0.008575
CImax 1.627313 1.099032 1.043391 1.043659 0.809554 0.812568 0.069974 0.017391
F 17.307267 17.062492 22.640593 13.04432 13.026565 10.756596 30.239348 20.170104
Bootstrap P 0.053333 0.103333 0.033333 0.043333 0.153333 0.106667 0.01 0.03
βt 0.003068 0.005209 0.000431 0.000085 0.001417 -0.003347 0.000443 -0.001546
OLS SE 0.004088 0.005895 0.001228 0.001899 0.001227 0.002126 0.003992 0.005131
HET SE 0.007177 0.009722 0.001923 0.002394 0.00244 0.002827 0.004745 0.006273
β1FL 0.975119 0.954454 1.005287 1.010049 1.022995 1.203085 0.930957 1.135867
OLS SE 0.03022 0.041708 0.015099 0.024483 0.014783 0.047303 0.030455 0.043254
HET SE 0.053772 0.070769 0.02183 0.028135 0.027206 0.053132 0.039742 0.047773
β2FL 1.059983 1.061649 1.080516 1.091684 0.869331 0.859 1.062365 1.014274
OLS SE 0.030763 0.042803 0.019482 0.028296 0.045661 0.099138 0.030119 0.035482
HET SE 0.073785 0.093699 0.037711 0.041426 0.060672 0.089843 0.043303 0.056541
Double Threshold Total Total Debt Debt FDI FDI FPI FPI
Threshold 1 1.058066 1.058066 0.832957 0.9174 0.413596 0.423 0.035209 0.013589
Threshold 2 1.927312 1.868297 0.9174 1.412609 0.528463 0.528463 0.064819 0.065085
CImin 1.819795 1.868297 0.79367 1.190079 0.311886 0.308665 0.012347 0.054797
CImax 1.927313 1.950202 1.496052 1.614858 0.422333 0.424 0.035765 0.071572
F 45.676992 30.082647 23.638476 29.038687 21.537517 12.709697 31.953343 33.823233
Bootstrap P 0.003333 0.01 0.006667 0.083333 0.016667 0.063333 0.003333 0.01
βt -0.004966 -0.005768 -0.000145 -0.00126 -0.000963 -0.002799 -0.001903 -0.000641
OLS SE 0.004139 0.006065 0.00122 0.00194 0.001323 0.002056 0.004034 0.004929
HET SE 0.00513 0.007078 0.00196 0.002553 0.002133 0.002749 0.005242 0.005328
β1FL 1.028881 1.025681 1.023256 1.024563 1.035204 1.056025 1.095262 1.130204
OLS SE 0.030345 0.042494 0.015397 0.024802 0.014873 0.023657 0.032327 0.041544
HET SE 0.042092 0.056508 0.022705 0.029675 0.026455 0.034858 0.046152 0.041994
β2FL 1.176755 1.197422 0.861046 1.159799 1.158254 1.220955 0.885002 0.934577
OLS SE 0.034819 0.048848 0.033926 0.036497 0.033314 0.050127 0.03259 0.037008
HET SE 0.045045 0.05903 0.049841 0.054071 0.040973 0.054683 0.049475 0.042797
β3FL 0.946235 0.94776 1.086396 1.046918 0.900305 0.850547 1.077082 1.10035
OLS SE 0.034575 0.046733 0.019293 0.03199 0.045691 0.09875 0.030307 0.037475
HET SE 0.034505 0.039325 0.03717 0.055607 0.058823 0.089957 0.045951 0.047307
Triple Threshold Total Total Debt Debt FDI FDI FPI FPI
Threshold 1 0.973211 0.761182 0.832957 0.774702 0.22671 0.055725 0.035209 0.013589
Threshold 2 1.058066 1.058066 0.9174 0.9174 0.413596 0.423 0.064819 0.035209
Threshold 3 1.927312 1.868297 1.401099 1.412609 0.528463 0.528463 0.08093 0.065085
CImin 0.341379 0.300654 1.138097 0.125577 0.055132 0.017849 0.008594 0.029116
CImax 0.973211 1.336437 1.605295 0.794695 1.26839 1.315356 0.599834 0.53047
F 11.985725 5.432536 9.42027 7.280141 12.048737 7.999638 15.538334 8.560893
Boot Strap P 0.183333 0.573333 0.153333 0.186667 0.123333 0.116667 0.173333 0.116667
βt -0.004346 -0.004344 -0.000936 -0.002517 0.000992 -0.000916 0.000207 -0.003182
OLS SE 0.004107 0.006066 0.001222 0.001987 0.001437 0.002155 0.004026 0.004928
HET SE 0.00519 0.006936 0.001969 0.002697 0.00195 0.002887 0.005417 0.005444
β1FL 1.033415 1.038732 1.031282 1.055873 1.032165 1.116755 1.080819 1.147336
OLS SE 0.030108 0.042671 0.015364 0.0274 0.014814 0.03227 0.032181 0.041337
HET SE 0.041582 0.055988 0.022988 0.033875 0.025667 0.044313 0.046322 0.042508
β2FL 0.79299 0.945358 0.867477 0.960639 0.960825 1.022358 0.872455 1.022484
OLS SE 0.077835 0.055777 0.033634 0.034688 0.026523 0.026508 0.032383 0.045601
HET SE 0.18198 0.075011 0.049671 0.032095 0.033991 0.039123 0.052343 0.057248
β3FL 1.171529 1.186641 1.145911 1.174839 1.12417 1.187508 1.190281 0.891986
OLS SE 0.034547 0.048822 0.023616 0.036734 0.034624 0.051267 0.042575 0.038841
HET SE 0.045307 0.058656 0.040779 0.055675 0.03817 0.057363 0.068449 0.050058
β4FL 0.946137 0.940793 1.030382 1.058206 0.874508 0.824285 1.027862 1.115889
OLS SE 0.034269 0.046581 0.023146 0.032093 0.046066 0.09857 0.032714 0.037292
HET SE 0.032854 0.039455 0.059307 0.052729 0.057514 0.091511 0.049917 0.048466
Observations 1035 575 1035 575 1035 575 1035 575
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Table B.4: Distribution of Emerging Economies for Total Liabilities in Full Sample
Emerging
country 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Argentina 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1
Brazil 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chile 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
China 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Colombia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ecuador 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Egypt 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Israel 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Jordan 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2
Korea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Malaysia 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Morocco 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Pakistan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Peru 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Philippines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Singapore 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
South Africa 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Thailand 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Uruguay 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1
Venezuela 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Regime 1 19 19 19 20 20 22 21 22 21 22 22 22 23 19 17 19 19 18 18 17 20 20 20 459
Regime 2 6 6 6 5 5 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 1 4 7 5 5 5 5 6 2 3 3 95
Regime 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 21
Table B.5: Distribution of Advanced Economies for Total Liabilities in Full Sample
Advanced
country 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
Belium 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2
Denmark 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 3
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Greece 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
Ireland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
Switzerland 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
United Kingdom 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
Regime 1 16 16 16 16 14 14 14 15 13 13 14 13 11 9 7 6 5 2 2 2 2 2 1 223
Regime 2 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 6 7 8 9 12 9 7 8 6 6 135
Regime 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 3 4 4 5 6 6 6 6 9 11 10 12 13 102
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Table B.6: Distribution of Emerging Economies for Debt Liabilities in Full Sample
Emerging
country 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Argentina 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1
Brazil 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chile 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
China 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Colombia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ecuador 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Egypt 3 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Israel 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Jordan 1 1 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Korea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Malaysia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Morocco 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Pakistan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Peru 1 2 1 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Philippines 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Singapore 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
South Africa 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Thailand 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Uruguay 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 1 1
Venezuela 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Regime 1 18 17 18 20 18 22 22 23 23 24 24 24 23 20 20 20 21 21 21 21 22 23 23 488
Regime2 2 3 2 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 23
Regime 3 5 5 5 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 3 4 2 2 3 4 4 2 2 2 64
Table B.7: Distribution of Advanced Economies for Debt Liabilities in Full Sample
Advanced
country 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Belgium 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Greece 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Ireland 3 2 3 2 3 3 2 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3
Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 2 3 3
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
Switzerland 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
United Kingdom 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
Regime 1 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 16 13 14 15 15 14 12 12 9 8 4 4 4 4 4 2 255
Regime 2 0 2 0 3 0 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 22
Regime 3 5 3 5 2 5 5 4 3 5 4 4 4 5 7 7 10 11 15 16 16 15 16 16 183
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Table B.8: Distribution of Emerging Economies for FDI Liabilities in Full Sample
Emerging
country 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Argentina 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Brazil 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Chile 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
China 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Colombia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ecuador 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Egypt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Israel 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Jordan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3
Korea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Malaysia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Morocco 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Pakistan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Peru 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Philippines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
Singapore 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
South Africa 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Thailand 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Uruguay 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Venezuela 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Regime 1 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 23 23 23 24 22 22 21 22 20 21 21 21 19 19 517
Regime 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 1 3 0 22
Regime 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 6 36
Table B.9: Distribution of Advanced Economies for FDI Liabilities in Full Sample
Advanced
country 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 2
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Greece 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3
Ireland 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 3
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 3 3
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Regime 1 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 18 19 18 18 18 17 16 16 14 12 12 13 11 9 388
Regime 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 3 4 3 4 2 3 32
Regime 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 3 3 4 5 3 7 8 40
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Table B.10: Distribution of Emerging Economies for FPI Liabilities in Full Sample
Emerging
country 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Argentina 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Brazil 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3
Chile 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
China 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3
Colombia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2
Ecuador 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Egypt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
India 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 3
Israel 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Jordan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Korea 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Malaysia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Morocco 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Pakistan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Peru 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
Philippines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 3
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Singapore 1 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
S. Africa 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Thailand 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 3
Uruguay 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Venezuela 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
Regime 1 23 22 24 22 22 22 19 19 15 12 15 11 12 10 10 10 10 13 9 8 7 6 5 326
Regime 2 2 3 1 3 1 1 4 2 4 6 3 5 3 5 3 5 5 3 5 6 4 4 4 82
Regime 3 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 6 7 7 9 10 10 12 10 10 9 11 11 14 15 16 167
Table B.11: Distribution of Advanced Economies for FPI Liabilities in Full Sample
Advanced
country 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Australia 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Canada 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Denmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
France 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Germany 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Greece 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
Iceland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Japan 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Netherlands 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Norway 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Switzerland 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
United Kingdom 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
United States 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Regime 1 13 12 14 11 10 9 7 10 5 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 107
Regime 2 4 4 2 5 5 7 8 6 6 6 6 5 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 71
Regime 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 9 10 11 13 17 19 18 18 18 18 19 19 20 20 20 282
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX CHAPTER 3 A
Table C.1: Data Source
Data Source
Variable Source
Stock of External Liabilities EWN II
Stock of External Assets EWN II
Stock of FDI liabilities EWN II
Stock of Equity Liabilities EWN II
Stock of External Debt Liabilities World Bank
Stock of FDI Assets EWN II
Stock of Equity Assets EWN II
Stock of External Debt Asssets EWN II
GDP WDI-WB
Anti-Corruption World Bank
Capital Openness Chinn-Ito
Government Expenditure WDI
Capital Formation WDI
Import and Export UNCTAD
Financial openness Trilema
Exchange Rate Trilema
M2 % of GDP Trilema
Crisis Dates RR
Notes: WDI-WB: World Development Indicators-World Bank ;
EWNII: Updated External Wealth of Nations ;
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development;
RR: Reinhart and Rogoff Financial Crash to Debt Crisis dataset
All data from EWN II, WDI and UNCTAD is in current price US dollar.
156
Table C.2: Summary statistics
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Log( TotalAssetsGDP ) -2.214 1.099 1083
Log( FXGDP ) -2.565 1.077 1122
Log( FDIGDP ) -4.459 1.759 957
Log( FXGDP ) -5.282 1.989 841
Log( DebtGDP ) -2.927 0.871 831
log( GDPcapita ) 3693.408 4493.335 1123
ER Regime 2.398 1.164 1051
ER Volatility 1.329 30.812 1036
Log( M2GDP ) 3.626 0.583 1087
K Open -0.059 1.463 1066
Log( TradeGDP ) -0.848 0.731 1113
Anti-Corrupt 3.048 1.198 1005
Crisis Events 0.114 0.318 1151
Year Dummy 0.568 0.496 1151
CA Surplus -33.017 15146.127 1151
Year*Log( DebtGDP ) -1.583 1.566 831
Year*Log( M2GDP ) 2.177 1.906 1087
Table C.3: Notes
Notes for Regression tables
Notes Explanations
Robust standard errors Presented in parentheses
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.1
Specification I Based on the sample from 1970-2007
Specification II Based on the sample from 1990-2007
Specification III Based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with debt variable
Specification IV Based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with M2 variable
Table C Detrended
Table C.4 - Table C.7 Emerging Economies - Non IV specification
Table C.8 - Table C.11 Emerging Economies - Trade agreements substituted for trade
Table C.12 - Table C.15 Emerging Economies - First stage regression results
Table C.16 - Table C.19 Emerging Economies - IV specification
Table D Non-Detrended
Table D.1 - Table D.4 Emerging Economies - Non IV specification
Table D.5 - Table D.8 Emerging Economies - Trade agreements substituted for trade
Table D.9 - Table D.12 Emerging Economies - First stage regression results
Table D.13 - Table D.16 Emerging Economies - IV specification
Table E Advanced
Table E.2 - Table E.5 Advanced Economies - Non IV specification
Table E.6 - Table E.9 Advanced Economies - IV specification
Table F Comparisons
Table F.1 - Table F.4 Emerging Economies Detrended and Non-Detrended - Comparison tables
Table F.5 - Table F.8 Emerging and Advanced Economies - Comparison tables
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Table C.4: Emerging Economies: Total Assets
Emerging Economies: Total Assets
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( TotalAssetsGDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP )
log( DebtGDP ) -0.237** 0.0617 -0.324*** -0.237***
(0.0853) (0.0839) (0.0777) (0.0803)
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) 0.171**
(0.0718)
log( GDPCapita ) -6.99e-06 -4.15e-05 -2.57e-05 -1.69e-05
(3.52e-05) (3.18e-05) (3.67e-05) (3.39e-05)
ER Regime 0.0448 0.0359 0.0420 0.0422
(0.0593) (0.0654) (0.0534) (0.0545)
ER Volatility -0.000314*** -0.00715* -0.000464*** -0.000454***
(9.98e-05) (0.00364) (0.000120) (0.000140)
log( M2GDP ) 0.646*** 0.489*** 0.685*** 0.659**
(0.209) (0.165) (0.207) (0.276)
K Open 0.0663* -0.0348 0.0666* 0.0643*
(0.0342) (0.0306) (0.0327) (0.0359)
Anti-Corruption -0.0969* 0.0298 -0.140** -0.125**
(0.0502) (0.0564) (0.0527) (0.0533)
Crisis Events -0.203** -0.157** -0.199*** -0.199***
(0.0760) (0.0694) (0.0665) (0.0657)
Year -0.0208 -0.0423** -0.0420**
(0.0135) (0.0177) (0.0173)
log( TradeGDP ) 0.638** 0.617** 0.613** 0.625***
(0.238) (0.234) (0.227) (0.218)
Year Dummy 0.346** 0.415**
(0.153) (0.171)
Year 1990-2007 -0.00437
(0.0146)
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) 0.0571
(0.228)
Constant 0.488* -0.669** 0.765*** 0.736**
(0.262) (0.271) (0.237) (0.271)
Observations 639 361 639 639
R-squared 0.246 0.282 0.289 0.278
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
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Table C.5: Emerging Economies: FX
Emerging Economies: FX
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FXGDP ) log(
FX
GDP ) log(
FX
GDP ) log(
FX
GDP )
log( DebtGDP ) -0.284*** -0.0127 -0.321*** -0.274***
(0.0822) (0.0961) (0.0813) (0.0759)
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) 0.0822
(0.0805)
log( GDPCapita ) -3.25e-05 -2.60e-05 -4.87e-05 -3.88e-05
(2.98e-05) (4.22e-05) (3.20e-05) (2.93e-05)
ER Regime -0.0219 0.0138 -0.0223 -0.0170
(0.0752) (0.0742) (0.0695) (0.0684)
ER Volatility -0.000281*** -0.00889 -0.000439*** -0.000467***
(9.90e-05) (0.00722) (0.000116) (0.000129)
log( M2GDP ) 0.651*** 0.392* 0.697*** 0.612**
(0.171) (0.227) (0.176) (0.243)
K Open 0.0541 -0.0658 0.0485 0.0506
(0.0421) (0.0415) (0.0417) (0.0448)
Anti-Corruption -0.0795 -0.0292 -0.123* -0.114*
(0.0630) (0.0706) (0.0642) (0.0648)
Crisis Events -0.288*** -0.175* -0.279*** -0.276***
(0.0975) (0.0865) (0.0902) (0.0879)
Year -0.000455 -0.0276* -0.0257*
(0.0100) (0.0146) (0.0143)
log( TradeGDP ) 0.659** 0.633** 0.646*** 0.652***
(0.240) (0.285) (0.230) (0.214)
Year Dummy 0.503*** 0.549***
(0.178) (0.188)
Year 1990-2007 0.0189
(0.0191)
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) 0.138
(0.251)
Constant 0.483 0.113 0.805*** 0.765**
(0.286) (0.340) (0.255) (0.287)
Observations 675 373 675 675
R-squared 0.274 0.279 0.318 0.319
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
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Table C.6: Emerging Economies: FDI
Emerging Economies: FDI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FDIGDP ) log(
FDI
GDP ) log(
FDI
GDP ) log(
FDI
GDP )
log( DebtGDP ) -0.188 -0.0299 -0.425** -0.197
(0.133) (0.0934) (0.196) (0.135)
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) 0.381*
(0.217)
log( GDPCapita ) 0.000203 6.88e-05 0.000184 0.000170
(0.000128) (5.30e-05) (0.000130) (0.000117)
ER Regime 0.240*** 0.126* 0.222** 0.229***
(0.0832) (0.0707) (0.0814) (0.0775)
ER Volatility -0.0131 0.00403 -0.0128 -0.00920
(0.0117) (0.00435) (0.0103) (0.00869)
log( M2GDP ) 0.349 0.983*** 0.353 0.907*
(0.496) (0.308) (0.471) (0.508)
K Open -0.183* -0.0988 -0.185* -0.201**
(0.0947) (0.0618) (0.0962) (0.0861)
Anti-Corruption -0.0340 0.100 -0.0565 -0.0474
(0.107) (0.0813) (0.116) (0.106)
Crisis Events 0.169 0.162 0.181 0.153
(0.127) (0.102) (0.124) (0.112)
Year 0.0755 0.0717 0.0647
(0.0536) (0.0516) (0.0472)
log( TradeGDP ) 1.303*** 0.787* 1.273*** 1.186**
(0.429) (0.427) (0.442) (0.464)
Year Dummy -0.0500 -0.0711
(0.153) (0.163)
Year 1990-2007 0.0409
(0.0307)
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) -0.703**
(0.321)
Constant -1.675** -1.032 -1.570** -1.584**
(0.712) (0.627) (0.640) (0.655)
Observations 558 366 558 558
R-squared 0.245 0.278 0.273 0.287
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
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Table C.7: Emerging Economies: FPI
Emerging Economies: FPI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FPIGDP ) log(
FPI
GDP ) log(
FPI
GDP ) log(
FPI
GDP )
log( DebtGDP ) -0.0237 -0.0648 0.200 -0.0375
(0.169) (0.156) (0.196) (0.158)
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) -0.366**
(0.169)
log( GDPCapita ) -0.000125* -5.36e-05 -0.000118 -0.000122
(6.86e-05) (7.19e-05) (7.69e-05) (7.72e-05)
ER Regime -0.0382 -0.00339 -0.0342 -0.0346
(0.0715) (0.0618) (0.0732) (0.0779)
ER Volatility 0.00130*** 0.00882 0.00138*** 0.00136***
(0.000366) (0.00789) (0.000360) (0.000388)
log( M2GDP ) 0.277 0.825** 0.302 0.576**
(0.332) (0.324) (0.305) (0.263)
K Open 0.142* 0.114 0.133* 0.115*
(0.0736) (0.0754) (0.0713) (0.0616)
Anti-Corruption -0.102 -0.0676 -0.0734 -0.126
(0.0922) (0.101) (0.0972) (0.0984)
Crisis Events -0.0862 0.0460 -0.102 -0.0854
(0.109) (0.133) (0.104) (0.105)
Year -0.0693** -0.0726* -0.0717*
(0.0313) (0.0375) (0.0390)
log( TradeGDP ) 0.371 0.425 0.427 0.440
(0.290) (0.402) (0.295) (0.315)
Year Dummy 0.128 -0.0747
(0.245) (0.324)
Year 1990-2007 -0.0571*
(0.0310)
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) -0.405
(0.427)
Constant 0.355 -0.645 0.325 0.571
(0.592) (0.650) (0.683) (0.699)
Observations 468 325 468 468
R-squared 0.122 0.130 0.150 0.136
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
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Table C.8: Emerging Economies: Trade Agreements and Total Assets
Emerging Economies: Trade Agreements and Total Assets
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( TotalAssetsGDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP )
log( DebtGDP ) -0.205** 0.0873 -0.301*** -0.206***
(0.0778) (0.0820) (0.0667) (0.0732)
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) 0.186***
(0.0647)
log( GDPcapita ) -2.45e-05 -7.83e-05** -4.32e-05 -3.54e-05
(3.25e-05) (3.05e-05) (3.44e-05) (3.50e-05)
ER Regime 0.0617 0.0632 0.0584 0.0592
(0.0484) (0.0606) (0.0438) (0.0453)
ER Volatility -0.000454*** -0.00786** -0.000601*** -0.000579***
(0.000132) (0.00318) (0.000145) (0.000156)
log( M2GDP ) 0.707*** 0.606*** 0.742*** 0.743***
(0.194) (0.170) (0.192) (0.256)
K Open 0.0607 -0.0462 0.0614 0.0573
(0.0407) (0.0321) (0.0390) (0.0408)
Anti-Corruption -0.140*** 0.0258 -0.183*** -0.169***
(0.0494) (0.0617) (0.0492) (0.0523)
Crisis Events -0.183** -0.155** -0.180** -0.181**
(0.0755) (0.0729) (0.0649) (0.0659)
Year -0.0302* -0.0514** -0.0515**
(0.0159) (0.0203) (0.0203)
Trade Agreements 0.0653** 0.0260 0.0624** 0.0609**
(0.0260) (0.0223) (0.0284) (0.0273)
Year Dummy 0.344** 0.413**
(0.148) (0.159)
Year 1990-2007 -0.0112
(0.0177)
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) 0.0231
(0.194)
Constant 0.394* -1.168*** 0.678*** 0.655**
(0.228) (0.296) (0.234) (0.259)
Observations 639 361 639 639
R-squared 0.653 0.810 0.674 0.672
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
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Table C.9: Emerging Economies: Trade Agreements and FX
Emerging Economies: Trade Agreements and FX
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FXGDP ) log(
FX
GDP ) log(
FX
GDP ) log(
FX
GDP )
log( DebtGDP ) -0.249*** 0.00805 -0.289*** -0.241***
(0.0758) (0.0929) (0.0733) (0.0703)
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) 0.0856
(0.0745)
log( GDPcapita ) -4.19e-05 -6.58e-05 -5.71e-05* -4.83e-05
(2.81e-05) (4.05e-05) (3.31e-05) (3.41e-05)
ER Regime 0.00197 0.0392 0.00194 0.00750
(0.0638) (0.0687) (0.0591) (0.0582)
ER Volatility -0.000402*** -0.00972 -0.000548*** -0.000567***
(0.000138) (0.00662) (0.000162) (0.000160)
log( M2GDP ) 0.691*** 0.515** 0.739*** 0.673***
(0.176) (0.227) (0.184) (0.233)
K Open 0.0408 -0.0736* 0.0343 0.0352
(0.0511) (0.0431) (0.0518) (0.0527)
Anti-Corruption -0.122* -0.0353 -0.166** -0.159**
(0.0604) (0.0741) (0.0599) (0.0621)
Crisis Events -0.263** -0.168* -0.257*** -0.255***
(0.0967) (0.0891) (0.0899) (0.0880)
Year -0.00660 -0.0325 -0.0308
(0.0130) (0.0194) (0.0195)
Trade Agreements 0.0717*** 0.0376 0.0648** 0.0636**
(0.0254) (0.0259) (0.0277) (0.0285)
Year Dummy 0.495** 0.539***
(0.181) (0.183)
Year 1990-2007 0.00865
(0.0214)
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) 0.110
(0.221)
Constant 0.334 -0.400 0.652** 0.616**
(0.244) (0.368) (0.260) (0.280)
Observations 675 373 675 675
R-squared 0.591 0.723 0.623 0.626
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
163
Table C.10: Emerging Economies: Trade Agreements and FDI
Emerging Economies: Trade Agreements and FDI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FDIGDP ) log(
FDI
GDP ) log(
FDI
GDP ) log(
FDI
GDP )
log( DebtGDP ) -0.131 -0.00237 -0.390** -0.150
(0.141) (0.0958) (0.177) (0.136)
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) 0.408*
(0.209)
log( GDPcapita ) 0.000152 2.18e-05 0.000130 0.000113
(0.000132) (5.94e-05) (0.000134) (0.000120)
ER Regime 0.261*** 0.161** 0.240*** 0.242***
(0.0863) (0.0675) (0.0855) (0.0763)
ER Volatility -0.0160 0.00317 -0.0157 -0.0114
(0.0119) (0.00475) (0.0104) (0.00875)
log( M2GDP ) 0.583 1.134*** 0.588 1.209**
(0.518) (0.344) (0.490) (0.516)
K Open -0.203** -0.112* -0.204* -0.219**
(0.0985) (0.0607) (0.100) (0.0883)
Anti-Corruption -0.109 0.0938 -0.136 -0.119
(0.110) (0.0852) (0.111) (0.0984)
Crisis Events 0.173 0.167 0.186 0.158
(0.139) (0.101) (0.135) (0.125)
Year 0.0559 0.0477 0.0391
(0.0578) (0.0569) (0.0517)
Trade Agreements 0.0835 0.0347 0.0866 0.0916*
(0.0557) (0.0425) (0.0573) (0.0531)
Year Dummy 0.00171 -0.0348
(0.156) (0.169)
Year 1990-2007 0.0315
(0.0326)
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) -0.821***
(0.281)
Constant -1.854** -1.669*** -1.678** -1.662**
(0.759) (0.535) (0.689) (0.708)
Observations 558 366 558 558
R-squared 0.710 0.865 0.718 0.720
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
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Table C.11: Emerging Economies: Trade Agreements and FPI
Emerging Economies: Trade Agreements and FPI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FPIGDP ) log(
FPI
GDP ) log(
FPI
GDP ) log(
FPI
GDP )
log( DebtGDP ) -0.0208 -0.0506 0.190 -0.0345
(0.172) (0.165) (0.190) (0.163)
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) -0.345**
(0.162)
log( GDPcapita ) -0.000136** -7.65e-05 -0.000132* -0.000137*
(6.43e-05) (6.99e-05) (7.17e-05) (7.13e-05)
ER Regime -0.0219 0.0205 -0.0164 -0.0177
(0.0726) (0.0642) (0.0734) (0.0786)
ER Volatility 0.00129*** 0.00894 0.00136*** 0.00133***
(0.000393) (0.00779) (0.000394) (0.000420)
log( M2GDP ) 0.320 0.905*** 0.353 0.591*
(0.331) (0.305) (0.304) (0.287)
K Open 0.141* 0.105 0.132* 0.117*
(0.0743) (0.0750) (0.0724) (0.0617)
Anti-Corruption -0.118 -0.0708 -0.0951 -0.143
(0.0873) (0.0977) (0.0970) (0.0961)
Crisis Events -0.0834 0.0428 -0.0990 -0.0810
(0.108) (0.133) (0.103) (0.104)
Year -0.0699** -0.0742* -0.0745*
(0.0312) (0.0382) (0.0389)
Trade Agreements 0.00782 0.00101 0.00798 0.0135
(0.0309) (0.0517) (0.0318) (0.0346)
Year Dummy 0.141 -0.0407
(0.251) (0.328)
Year 1990-2007 -0.0575
(0.0366)
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) -0.355
(0.422)
Constant 0.183 -0.981* 0.148 0.376
(0.633) (0.517) (0.702) (0.710)
Observations 468 325 468 468
R-squared 0.842 0.889 0.847 0.845
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
Table C.12: Summary results for first-stage regressions
Effect on FPI
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 25) P-value
log(TradeGDP ) 0.0845 0.0845 19.17 0.0002
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Table C.13: Underidentification tests
Underidentification tests
Tests Chi-sq(1) P-val
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic Chi-sq(1)=9.56 P-val=0.002
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic Chi-sq(1)=21.09 P-val=0.0000
Note: Ho: matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank=K1-1 (underidentified)
Ha: matrix has rank=K1 (identified)
Table C.14: Underidentification tests
Weak identification test
Test F statistics
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 19.17
Ho: equation is weakly identified
Table C.15: Weak-instrument-robust inference
Weak identification test
Tests Statistics P-val
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F(1,25)= 6.05 P-val=0.0211
Anderson-Rubin Wald test Chi-sq(1)=6.66 P-val=0.0098
Tests of joint significance of endogenous regressors B1 in main equation
Ho: B1=0 and overidentifying restrictions are valid
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Table C.16: Emerging Economies:Instrument Variable and Total Assets
Emerging Economies: Instrument Variable and Total Assets
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( TotalAssetsGDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP )
log( TradeGDP ) 1.224** 1.275 1.169** 1.134**
(0.485) (1.076) (0.518) (0.523)
log( DebtGDP ) -0.265*** 0.0294 -0.345*** -0.260***
(0.0991) (0.124) (0.100) (0.0901)
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) 0.161*
(0.0829)
log( GDPCapita ) 1.23e-06 -8.22e-06 -1.71e-05 -8.58e-06
(4.17e-05) (5.89e-05) (4.16e-05) (3.70e-05)
ER Regime 0.0181 -0.000543 0.0168 0.0192
(0.0640) (0.0732) (0.0588) (0.0614)
ER Volatility -0.000272*** -0.00668* -0.000417*** -0.000417***
(0.000103) (0.00406) (0.000118) (0.000139)
log( M2GDP ) 0.562** 0.364 0.604*** 0.573*
(0.242) (0.244) (0.231) (0.316)
K Open 0.0863* -0.0141 0.0855* 0.0821*
(0.0477) (0.0351) (0.0443) (0.0473)
Anti-Corruption -0.0470 0.0322 -0.0906 -0.0796
(0.0777) (0.0508) (0.0784) (0.0777)
Crisis Events -0.197*** -0.146** -0.194*** -0.194***
(0.0703) (0.0665) (0.0612) (0.0605)
Year -0.0212 -0.0419** -0.0412**
(0.0171) (0.0197) (0.0184)
Year Dummy 0.334** 0.403**
(0.151) (0.173)
Year 1990-2007 -0.00452
(0.0147)
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) 0.0748
(0.259)
Constant 1.295*** 0.505 1.630*** 1.574***
(0.226) (0.547) (0.200) (0.227)
Observations 639 361 639 639
R-squared 0.653 0.810 0.674 0.672
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
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Table C.17: Emerging Economies: Instrument Variable and FX
Emerging Economies: Instrument Variable and FX
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FXGDP ) log(
FX
GDP ) log(
FX
GDP ) log(
FX
GDP )
log( TradeGDP ) 1.409*** 1.732 1.275** 1.243**
(0.540) (1.224) (0.572) (0.602)
log( DebtGDP ) -0.318*** -0.0541 -0.348*** -0.300***
(0.0991) (0.126) (0.108) (0.0872)
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) 0.0804
(0.0920)
log( GDPCapita ) -3.23e-05 2.84e-05 -4.82e-05 -3.77e-05
(4.66e-05) (7.63e-05) (4.31e-05) (3.75e-05)
ER Regime -0.0647 -0.0479 -0.0582 -0.0506
(0.0799) (0.0931) (0.0730) (0.0755)
ER Volatility -0.000253** -0.00818 -0.000412*** -0.000446***
(0.000110) (0.00770) (0.000109) (0.000129)
log( M2GDP ) 0.564*** 0.176 0.624*** 0.532*
(0.203) (0.315) (0.192) (0.284)
K Open 0.0880 -0.0331 0.0771 0.0779
(0.0600) (0.0463) (0.0563) (0.0592)
Anti-Corruption -0.0157 -0.0196 -0.0690 -0.0629
(0.0965) (0.0668) (0.0927) (0.0938)
Crisis Events -0.284*** -0.159* -0.276*** -0.273***
(0.0920) (0.0831) (0.0850) (0.0829)
Year -0.00525 -0.0311 -0.0287
(0.0186) (0.0191) (0.0179)
Year Dummy 0.493*** 0.542***
(0.169) (0.188)
Year 1990-2007 0.0201
(0.0202)
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) 0.153
(0.280)
Constant 1.357*** 1.234** 1.731*** 1.672***
(0.320) (0.620) (0.268) (0.295)
Observations 675 373 675 675
R-squared 0.591 0.723 0.623 0.626
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
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Table C.18: Emerging Economies: Instrument Variable and FDI
Emerging Economies: Instrument Variable and FDI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FDIGDP ) log(
FDI
GDP ) log(
FDI
GDP ) log(
FDI
GDP )
log( TradeGDP ) 1.934* 1.614 1.994* 2.075*
(1.151) (1.885) (1.163) (1.073)
log( DebtGDP ) -0.216 -0.0618 -0.448** -0.233
(0.143) (0.116) (0.216) (0.149)
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) 0.369
(0.227)
log( GDPCapita ) 0.000219* 0.000110 0.000205* 0.000197*
(0.000120) (8.72e-05) (0.000121) (0.000109)
ER Regime 0.222** 0.0792 0.203** 0.206**
(0.0894) (0.135) (0.0860) (0.0842)
ER Volatility -0.0122 0.00454 -0.0118 -0.00846
(0.0117) (0.00439) (0.0105) (0.00908)
log( M2GDP ) 0.216 0.821* 0.196 0.658
(0.555) (0.427) (0.540) (0.613)
K Open -0.163* -0.0736 -0.162* -0.172*
(0.0961) (0.0602) (0.0972) (0.0929)
Anti-Corruption 0.00796 0.106 -0.00520 0.0154
(0.109) (0.0770) (0.120) (0.112)
Crisis Events 0.178 0.171* 0.192 0.168
(0.126) (0.104) (0.123) (0.114)
Year 0.0777 0.0761 0.0709
(0.0510) (0.0478) (0.0438)
Year Dummy -0.0770 -0.0962
(0.165) (0.174)
Year 1990-2007 0.0412
(0.0288)
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) -0.628*
(0.354)
Constant -0.881 1.404 -0.733 -0.820
(0.713) (1.032) (0.596) (0.597)
Observations 558 366 558 558
R-squared 0.710 0.865 0.718 0.720
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
169
Table C.19: Emerging Economies: Instrument Variable and FPI
Emerging Economies: Instrument Variable and FPI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FPIGDP ) log(
FPI
GDP ) log(
FPI
GDP ) log(
FPI
GDP )
log( TradeGDP ) 0.193 0.0469 0.196 0.347
(0.735) (2.320) (0.756) (0.855)
log( DebtGDP ) -0.0217 -0.0520 0.196 -0.0364
(0.166) (0.202) (0.190) (0.156)
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) -0.354**
(0.176)
log( GDPCapita ) -0.000129** -7.38e-05 -0.000125* -0.000125*
(6.40e-05) (0.000129) (6.75e-05) (7.46e-05)
ER Regime -0.0297 0.0181 -0.0239 -0.0305
(0.0760) (0.147) (0.0774) (0.0802)
ER Volatility 0.00130*** 0.00894 0.00138*** 0.00136***
(0.000366) (0.00751) (0.000361) (0.000380)
log( M2GDP ) 0.299 0.896* 0.331 0.579**
(0.362) (0.491) (0.339) (0.255)
K Open 0.141** 0.106 0.132* 0.115*
(0.0716) (0.0796) (0.0692) (0.0597)
Anti-Corruption -0.110 -0.0703 -0.0854 -0.130
(0.0925) (0.0930) (0.0994) (0.0968)
Crisis Events -0.0863 0.0428 -0.102 -0.0856
(0.106) (0.128) (0.102) (0.102)
Year -0.0689** -0.0726** -0.0717*
(0.0301) (0.0354) (0.0373)
Year Dummy 0.135 -0.0672
(0.236) (0.340)
Year 1990-2007 -0.0572*
(0.0300)
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) -0.393
(0.477)
Constant 1.965*** 1.084 1.872*** 2.131***
(0.635) (1.330) (0.713) (0.723)
Observations 468 325 468 468
R-squared 0.842 0.889 0.847 0.845
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
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APPENDIX D
APPENDIX CHAPTER 3 B: NON-DETRENDED
Table D.1: Emerging Economies:Total Assets
Emerging Economies:Total Assets
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES Log( TotalAssetsGDP ) Log(
TotalAssets
GDP ) Log(
TotalAssets
GDP ) LOG(
TotalAssets
GDP )
Log( DebtGDP ) -0.279** -0.0513 -0.324*** -0.240***
(0.101) (0.115) (0.0747) (0.0836)
Year*Log( DebtGDP ) 0.152**
(0.0616)
log( GDPcapita ) 6.88e-05** 2.97e-05 -6.82e-06 -1.47e-06
(2.93e-05) (2.84e-05) (3.36e-05) (3.18e-05)
ER Regime 0.112 0.0143 0.0620 0.0576
(0.0723) (0.0603) (0.0504) (0.0539)
ER Volatility -0.000435*** -0.00594 -0.000537*** -0.000522***
(8.80e-05) (0.00381) (9.31e-05) (0.000128)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.823*** 0.656*** 0.751*** 0.676**
(0.223) (0.185) (0.209) (0.277)
K Open 0.0762 0.00578 0.0672* 0.0655*
(0.0446) (0.0327) (0.0354) (0.0364)
Log( TradeGDP ) 0.903*** 1.268*** 0.681*** 0.674***
(0.229) (0.230) (0.233) (0.222)
Anti-Corruption -0.0832* -0.0496 -0.142*** -0.124**
(0.0468) (0.0500) (0.0500) (0.0517)
Crisis Events -0.181** -0.128* -0.193*** -0.193***
(0.0820) (0.0733) (0.0666) (0.0659)
Year Dummy 0.915*** 0.114
(0.241) (0.753)
Year*Log( M2GDP ) 0.103
(0.222)
Constant -5.410*** -3.394*** -5.345*** -4.897***
(1.256) (0.843) (1.091) (1.156)
Observations 639 361 639 639
R-squared 0.582 0.573 0.627 0.623
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D.2: Emerging Economies:FX
Emerging Economies:FX
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES Log( FXGDP ) Log(
FX
GDP ) Log(
FX
GDP ) Log(
FX
GDP )
Log( DebtGDP ) -0.326*** -0.0825 -0.323*** -0.269***
(0.0979) (0.117) (0.0775) (0.0781)
Year*Log( DebtGDP ) 0.0814
(0.0684)
log( GDPcapita ) 3.71e-05 2.91e-05 -4.25e-05 -3.32e-05
(2.86e-05) (3.68e-05) (2.86e-05) (2.88e-05)
ER Regime 0.0255 -0.00358 -0.0165 -0.0108
(0.0902) (0.0697) (0.0696) (0.0692)
ER Volatility -0.000395*** -0.00805 -0.000464*** -0.000497***
(8.71e-05) (0.00727) (9.75e-05) (0.000120)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.852*** 0.526** 0.722*** 0.595**
(0.194) (0.227) (0.173) (0.245)
K Open 0.0650 -0.0370 0.0486 0.0499
(0.0502) (0.0422) (0.0424) (0.0442)
Log( TradeGDP ) 0.922*** 1.134*** 0.670*** 0.659***
(0.225) (0.268) (0.228) (0.213)
Anti-Corruption -0.0551 -0.0856 -0.123* -0.109
(0.0705) (0.0656) (0.0642) (0.0661)
Crisis Events -0.275** -0.155* -0.277*** -0.275***
(0.101) (0.0879) (0.0902) (0.0878)
Year Dummy 0.782*** -0.111
(0.246) (0.852)
Year*Log( M2GDP ) 0.180
(0.249)
Constant -5.683*** -3.287*** -5.326*** -4.797***
(1.108) (1.004) (0.908) (0.923)
Observations 675 373 675 675
R-squared 0.487 0.429 0.541 0.542
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D.3: Emerging Economies:FDI
Emerging Economies:FDI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES Log( FDIGDP ) Log(
FDI
GDP ) Log(
FDI
GDP ) Log(
FDI
GDP )
Log( DebtGDP ) -0.357* -0.162* -0.487* -0.326**
(0.178) (0.0932) (0.244) (0.158)
Year*Log( DebtGDP ) 0.284
(0.218)
log( GDPcapita ) 0.000344*** 0.000172*** 0.000244** 0.000232**
(0.000101) (6.08e-05) (0.000113) (0.000106)
ER Regime 0.328*** 0.0927 0.275*** 0.269***
(0.0765) (0.0760) (0.0692) (0.0684)
ER Volatility -0.00712 0.00563 -0.00951 -0.00656
(0.0111) (0.00474) (0.00917) (0.00817)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.729 1.221*** 0.686 1.150**
(0.479) (0.345) (0.458) (0.507)
K Open -0.130 -0.0395 -0.163* -0.167*
(0.0887) (0.0635) (0.0940) (0.0851)
Log( TradeGDP ) 2.066*** 1.733*** 1.667*** 1.638***
(0.518) (0.408) (0.446) (0.476)
Anti-Corruption -0.0429 -0.0148 -0.117 -0.124
(0.110) (0.0775) (0.124) (0.119)
Crisis Events 0.155 0.191 0.150 0.138
(0.149) (0.114) (0.129) (0.118)
Year Dummy 1.409 2.801**
(0.835) (1.274)
Year*Log( M2GDP ) -0.599*
(0.338)
Constant -8.100*** -8.487*** -8.542*** -9.742***
(2.137) (1.682) (1.943) (2.105)
Observations 558 366 558 558
R-squared 0.591 0.571 0.623 0.631
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D.4: Emerging Economies:FPI
Emerging Economies:FPI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES Log( FPIGDP ) Log(
FPI
GDP ) Log(
FPI
GDP ) Log(
FPI
GDP )
Log( DebtGDP ) -0.175 -0.159 0.129 -0.185
(0.183) (0.154) (0.222) (0.161)
Year*Log( DebtGDP ) -0.468**
(0.192)
log( GDPcapita ) 0.000112 3.88e-05 -4.97e-06 -6.22e-06
(8.07e-05) (6.50e-05) (8.26e-05) (8.70e-05)
ER Regime 0.124 -0.0195 0.0387 0.0364
(0.107) (0.0681) (0.0933) (0.0977)
ER Volatility 0.000642* 0.00803 0.000725** 0.000730*
(0.000332) (0.00842) (0.000342) (0.000363)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.850** 1.067*** 0.758** 1.155***
(0.353) (0.373) (0.334) (0.284)
K Open 0.0908 0.132 0.0917 0.0679
(0.0781) (0.0788) (0.0791) (0.0712)
Log( TradeGDP ) 1.478*** 1.214*** 1.071*** 1.123***
(0.319) (0.289) (0.309) (0.302)
Anti-Corruption -0.171* -0.156 -0.175* -0.251**
(0.0985) (0.0992) (0.101) (0.0937)
Crisis Events -0.00745 0.0802 -0.0725 -0.0464
(0.153) (0.128) (0.115) (0.119)
Year Dummy -0.522 2.710*
(0.687) (1.583)
Year*Log( M2GDP ) -0.561
(0.457)
Constant -7.976*** -8.347*** -7.202*** -9.140***
(1.727) (1.831) (1.861) (1.424)
Observations 468 325 468 468
R-squared 0.512 0.491 0.576 0.568
Number of countries1 26 26 26 26
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D.5: Emerging Economies:Trade Agreements and Total Assets
Emerging Economies:Trade Agreements and Total Assets
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( TotalAssetsGDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP )
Log( DebtGDP ) -0.243*** -0.0700 -0.294*** -0.214***
(0.0802) (0.107) (0.0589) (0.0739)
Year ∗ Log( DebtGDP ) 0.153***
(0.0493)
log( GDPcapita ) 6.74e-05* -2.04e-05 -1.64e-05 -1.19e-05
(3.77e-05) (4.24e-05) (3.96e-05) (3.94e-05)
ER 0.161*** 0.0751 0.0917** 0.0873**
(0.0414) (0.0506) (0.0357) (0.0393)
ER Volatility -0.000720*** -0.00709** -0.000743*** -0.000713***
(8.45e-05) (0.00255) (8.85e-05) (0.000103)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.976*** 1.136*** 0.858*** 0.807***
(0.180) (0.206) (0.181) (0.255)
K Open 0.0747 0.00765 0.0626 0.0597
(0.0519) (0.0382) (0.0429) (0.0430)
Trade Agreements 0.117*** 0.0809*** 0.0764** 0.0723**
(0.0281) (0.0263) (0.0278) (0.0267)
Anti-Corruption -0.143*** -0.127** -0.193*** -0.178***
(0.0431) (0.0584) (0.0465) (0.0516)
Crisis Events1 -0.135 -0.0996 -0.164** -0.167**
(0.0827) (0.0862) (0.0648) (0.0654)
Year Dummy19902007 0.992*** 0.315
(0.196) (0.669)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) 0.0696
(0.187)
Constant -6.934*** -6.351*** -6.430*** -6.055***
(0.746) (0.987) (0.773) (0.958)
Observations 639 361 639 639
R-squared 0.543 0.476 0.604 0.599
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D.6: Emerging Economies:Trade Agreements and FX
FX
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FXGDP ) log(
FX
GDP ) log(
FX
GDP ) log(
FX
GDP )
Log( DebtGDP ) -0.288*** -0.0921 -0.284*** -0.241***
(0.0780) (0.107) (0.0670) (0.0699)
Year ∗ Log( DebtGDP ) 0.0653
(0.0633)
log( GDPcapita ) 4.97e-05 -1.78e-05 -4.00e-05 -3.12e-05
(3.89e-05) (3.86e-05) (4.11e-05) (4.19e-05)
ER 0.0802 0.0483 0.0203 0.0257
(0.0673) (0.0553) (0.0577) (0.0570)
ER Volatility -0.000649*** -0.00921 -0.000630*** -0.000655***
(9.62e-05) (0.00582) (0.000115) (0.000107)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.993*** 0.953*** 0.814*** 0.706***
(0.181) (0.234) (0.158) (0.231)
K Open 0.0516 -0.0348 0.0341 0.0347
(0.0622) (0.0479) (0.0548) (0.0547)
Trade Agreements 0.125*** 0.0797** 0.0737*** 0.0696**
(0.0276) (0.0295) (0.0263) (0.0273)
Anti-Corruption -0.110* -0.151** -0.171*** -0.159**
(0.0638) (0.0664) (0.0593) (0.0641)
Crisis Events -0.225** -0.127 -0.248** -0.247***
(0.0984) (0.0980) (0.0904) (0.0883)
Year Dummy 0.813*** 0.0523
(0.197) (0.786)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) 0.157
(0.222)
Constant -7.248*** -5.920*** -6.370*** -5.915***
(0.742) (1.085) (0.614) (0.785)
Observations 675 373 675 675
R-squared 0.445 0.363 0.516 0.517
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D.7: Emerging Economies:Trade Agreements and FDI
Emerging Economies:Trade Agreements and FDI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FDIGDP ) log(
FDI
GDP ) log(
FDI
GDP ) log(
FDI
GDP )
Log( DebtGDP ) -0.330* -0.178 -0.462** -0.289*
(0.176) (0.110) (0.216) (0.156)
Year ∗ Log( DebtGDP ) 0.308
(0.193)
log( GDPcapita ) 0.000305*** 0.000104 0.000179 0.000162
(0.000107) (8.35e-05) (0.000123) (0.000116)
ER 0.398*** 0.177* 0.307*** 0.294***
(0.0732) (0.0917) (0.0715) (0.0655)
ER Volatility -0.0105 0.00419 -0.0131 -0.00968
(0.0110) (0.00614) (0.00908) (0.00844)
Log( M2GDP ) 1.312** 1.884*** 1.088** 1.623***
(0.484) (0.373) (0.476) (0.489)
K Open -0.133 -0.0349 -0.178* -0.180*
(0.0874) (0.0596) (0.0970) (0.0876)
Trade Agreements 0.203*** 0.108** 0.148** 0.157***
(0.0637) (0.0495) (0.0554) (0.0529)
Anti-Corruption -0.179* -0.125 -0.241** -0.245**
(0.101) (0.0917) (0.111) (0.103)
Crisis Events 0.170 0.230* 0.158 0.147
(0.179) (0.119) (0.148) (0.139)
Year Dummy 1.717** 3.455***
(0.813) (1.116)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) -0.715**
(0.282)
Constant -12.28*** -12.53*** -11.61*** -12.99***
(1.602) (1.679) (1.711) (1.713)
Observations 558 366 558 558
R-squared 0.515 0.495 0.579 0.591
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D.8: Emerging Economies:Trade Agreements and FPI
Emerging Economies:Trade Agreements and FPI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FPIGDP ) log(
FPI
GDP ) log(
FPI
GDP ) log(
FPI
GDP )
Log( DebtGDP ) -0.228 -0.175 0.0717 -0.215
(0.184) (0.174) (0.199) (0.161)
Year ∗ Log( DebtGDP ) -0.429**
(0.187)
log( GDPcapita ) 0.000124* -2.09e-07 -2.73e-05 -3.17e-05
(6.56e-05) (8.30e-05) (7.71e-05) (7.95e-05)
ER 0.246** 0.0577 0.0975 0.0956
(0.110) (0.0844) (0.0955) (0.0993)
ER Volatility 0.000169 0.00727 0.000375 0.000339
(0.000270) (0.00939) (0.000269) (0.000283)
Log( M2GDP ) 1.232*** 1.588*** 0.988*** 1.317***
(0.337) (0.294) (0.311) (0.324)
K Open 0.0827 0.121 0.0867 0.0690
(0.0862) (0.0881) (0.0868) (0.0784)
Trade Agreements 0.136*** 0.0563 0.0816*** 0.0916***
(0.0330) (0.0433) (0.0254) (0.0271)
Anti-Corruption -0.268** -0.240** -0.256** -0.324***
(0.103) (0.0958) (0.101) (0.0895)
Crisis Events 0.0723 0.117 -0.0337 -0.00683
(0.165) (0.147) (0.121) (0.125)
Year Dummy -0.195 2.595
(0.624) (1.636)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) -0.463
(0.468)
Constant -11.34*** -11.40*** -9.456*** -11.18***
(1.244) (1.476) (1.343) (1.254)
Observations 468 325 468 468
R-squared 0.455 0.449 0.548 0.539
Number of countries 26 26 26 26
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table D.9: Summary results for first-stage regressions
First-Stage Regression
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 25) P-value
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
log(TradeGDP ) 0.0957 0.0957 61.57 0.0000
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Table D.10: Underidentification tests
Underidentification tests
Tests Chi-sq(1) P-val
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic Chi-sq(1)=3.84 P-val=0.0502
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic Chi-sq(1)=67.64 P-val=0.0000
Note: Ho: matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank=K1-1 (underidentified)
Ha: matrix has rank=K1 (identified)
Table D.11: Underidentification tests
Weak identification test
Test F statistics
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 61.57
Ho: equation is weakly identified
Table D.12: Weak-instrument-robust inference
Weak identification test
Tests Statistics P-val
Anderson-Rubin Wald test F(1,25)= 49.13 P-val=0.0000
Anderson-Rubin Wald test Chi-sq(1)=53.97 P-val=0.0000
Tests of joint significance of endogenous regressors B1 in main equation
Ho: B1=0 and overidentifying restrictions are valid
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Table D.13: Emerging Economies:Instrument Variable and Total Assets
Emerging Economies:Instrument Variable and Total Assets
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( TotalAssetsGDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP ) log(
TotalAssets
GDP )
log( TradeGDP ) 1.531*** 1.883*** 1.189*** 1.112***
(0.362) (0.563) (0.425) (0.418)
Log( DebtGDP ) -0.291** -0.0337 -0.345*** -0.254***
(0.117) (0.104) (0.0988) (0.0904)
Year ∗ Log( DebtGDP ) 0.162**
(0.0688)
log( GDPcapita ) 3.70e-05 3.83e-05 -1.28e-05 -6.47e-06
(5.05e-05) (3.09e-05) (4.30e-05) (3.81e-05)
ER 0.0386 -0.0282 0.0221 0.0230
(0.0699) (0.0707) (0.0595) (0.0664)
ER Volatility -0.000310*** -0.00594 -0.000436*** -0.000433***
(0.000107) (0.00421) (0.000111) (0.000139)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.612** 0.368 0.616** 0.557*
(0.264) (0.281) (0.244) (0.320)
K Open 0.0972* 0.0134 0.0853* 0.0810*
(0.0561) (0.0291) (0.0442) (0.0434)
Anti-Corruption -0.0247 0.000820 -0.0891 -0.0782
(0.0824) (0.0524) (0.0774) (0.0769)
Crisis Events -0.186** -0.129* -0.193*** -0.193***
(0.0749) (0.0721) (0.0630) (0.0626)
Year Dummy 0.830*** 0.00571
(0.256) (0.834)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) 0.107
(0.243)
Constant -3.368*** -1.238 -3.611*** -3.281**
(1.278) (1.130) (1.211) (1.345)
Observations 639 361 639 639
R-squared 0.746 0.819 0.779 0.780
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D.14: Emerging Economies:Instrument Variable and FX
Emerging Economies:Instrument Variable and FX
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FXGDP ) log(
FX
GDP ) log(
FX
GDP ) log(
FX
GDP )
log( TradeGDP ) 1.635*** 1.865*** 1.180*** 1.099**
(0.370) (0.645) (0.447) (0.464)
Log( DebtGDP ) -0.338*** -0.0657 -0.350*** -0.283***
(0.113) (0.107) (0.102) (0.0839)
Year ∗ Log( DebtGDP ) 0.102
(0.0817)
log( GDPcapita ) -1.11e-05 3.89e-05 -5.69e-05 -4.57e-05
(5.70e-05) (4.58e-05) (4.23e-05) (3.91e-05)
ER -0.0585 -0.0540 -0.0615 -0.0498
(0.0855) (0.0853) (0.0733) (0.0791)
ER Volatility -0.000283** -0.00803 -0.000388*** -0.000426***
(0.000119) (0.00762) (0.000110) (0.000140)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.609*** 0.180 0.596*** 0.486*
(0.232) (0.337) (0.210) (0.288)
K Open 0.0980 -0.0274 0.0734 0.0712
(0.0654) (0.0384) (0.0528) (0.0526)
Anti-Corruption 0.00417 -0.0263 -0.0730 -0.0652
(0.0995) (0.0747) (0.0894) (0.0893)
Crisis Events -0.279*** -0.156* -0.279*** -0.276***
(0.0936) (0.0863) (0.0858) (0.0839)
Year Dummy 0.727*** -0.200
(0.264) (0.908)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) 0.178
(0.266)
Constant -3.361*** -1.070 -3.575*** -3.148***
(1.093) (1.326) (1.016) (1.145)
Observations 675 373 675 675
R-squared 0.658 0.743 0.706 0.711
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D.15: Emerging Economies:Instrument Variable and FDI
Emerging Economies:Instrument Variable and FDI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FDIGDP ) log(
FDI
GDP ) log(
FDI
GDP ) log(
FDI
GDP )
log( TradeGDP ) 3.075*** 2.542** 2.746*** 2.875***
(0.770) (1.011) (0.881) (0.828)
Log( DebtGDP ) -0.347* -0.144 -0.499* -0.339**
(0.184) (0.0953) (0.276) (0.172)
Year ∗ Log( DebtGDP ) 0.283
(0.237)
log( GDPcapita ) 0.000322*** 0.000183*** 0.000260** 0.000252**
(0.000112) (5.31e-05) (0.000108) (0.000101)
ER 0.256*** 0.0367 0.227*** 0.215**
(0.0917) (0.108) (0.0840) (0.0859)
ER Volatility -0.00779 0.00560 -0.00896 -0.00613
(0.0121) (0.00458) (0.0103) (0.00904)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.299 0.844* 0.321 0.703
(0.605) (0.479) (0.576) (0.635)
K Open -0.111 -0.0307 -0.133 -0.132
(0.0997) (0.0613) (0.101) (0.0956)
Anti-Corruption 0.0480 0.0536 -0.0114 -0.00105
(0.110) (0.0953) (0.125) (0.119)
Crisis Events 0.179 0.190 0.177 0.169
(0.139) (0.119) (0.128) (0.117)
Year Dummy 1.168 2.399*
(0.876) (1.371)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) -0.563
(0.380)
Constant -5.101* -4.759** -5.616** -6.494**
(2.811) (2.385) (2.789) (2.858)
Observations 558 366 558 558
R-squared 0.769 0.865 0.787 0.786
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table D.16: Emerging Economies:Instrument Variable and FPI
Emerging Economies:Instrument Variable and FPI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FPIGDP ) log(
FPI
GDP ) log(
FPI
GDP ) log(
FPI
GDP )
log( TradeGDP ) 2.037*** 1.359 1.478*** 1.723***
(0.463) (1.115) (0.512) (0.566)
Log( DebtGDP ) -0.152 -0.156 0.150 -0.168
(0.176) (0.139) (0.216) (0.152)
Year ∗ Log( DebtGDP ) -0.482**
(0.191)
log( GDPcapita ) 8.26e-05 4.07e-05 -6.10e-06 -7.56e-06
(9.62e-05) (6.25e-05) (8.71e-05) (9.51e-05)
ER 0.0524 -0.0311 0.00632 -0.0107
(0.113) (0.0997) (0.103) (0.106)
ER Volatility 0.000761** 0.00805 0.000823*** 0.000895**
(0.000307) (0.00811) (0.000310) (0.000358)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.632 0.995 0.636 1.037***
(0.460) (0.619) (0.414) (0.291)
K Open 0.108 0.135* 0.101 0.0779
(0.0766) (0.0731) (0.0749) (0.0667)
Anti-Corruption -0.121 -0.144 -0.136 -0.201*
(0.112) (0.122) (0.107) (0.108)
Crisis Events -0.0236 0.0782 -0.0765 -0.0503
(0.141) (0.127) (0.110) (0.114)
Year Dummy -0.672 2.830*
(0.693) (1.528)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) -0.644
(0.462)
Constant -5.518*** -6.148** -5.103** -6.897***
(2.091) (2.713) (2.125) (1.572)
Observations 468 325 468 468
R-squared 0.818 0.884 0.844 0.839
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX E
APPENDIX CHAPTER 3 C: ADVANCED ECONOMIES
This section provides a comparison of the results based on both non-instrument vari-
able regressions and instrument variable regressions for emerging economies and indus-
trialized economies which again highlight some key differences between the two set of
economies. For easy comparison, the results for total assets and each class of assets are
provided in Table F.5-F.8 and the discussion of results is provided in Section E.1 below.
E.1 Emerging Economies Vs. Industrial Economies
The paper discusses, how different macroeconomic, institutional, financial and trade
variables can help explain the evolution of total foreign assets and different classes of
assets in emerging economies. However, a comparison between emerging economies
and industrialized economies can provide more insights for the accumulation of assets
based on wide set of variables.1 Before that, it must be noted that the variable based
on short term external debt will not be appropriate for these economies since there is
no foreign currency denominated debt held by these economies. I again use two spec-
ifications based on a Non-IV approach and an IV approach, for this section. The first
specification with a Non-IV approach simply uses trade openness indicator to compare
the bench mark results from emerging economies. These results for advanced economies
are reported in Table E.2 - E.5. While the second specification based on IV approach is
reported in Table E.6- E.9, is based on using trade agreements as IV for trade openness
for advanced economies. The comparison between the estimated coefficients from these
two approaches is also provided in Table F.5 - F.8, column 1 and 3.
1List of advanced economies used is provided in the appendix in Table E.1.
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The first set of results (Table E.2 - E.5) highlight some of the key differences be-
tween these emerging and advanced group of countries and their behavior in terms of
accumulation of foreign assets. A few key contrasts appear immediately. The first one is
that in industrial economies, GDP per capita, though small, is positively associated with
all forms of foreign assets except foreign exchange reserves. In emerging economies
GDP per capita is only relevant for FDI where the estimated coefficients are bigger
than advanced economies respective coefficients. The second key contrast comes with
respect to capital openness indicator. In emerging economies, capital openness indica-
tor was unable to explain any evolution of foreign assets and atleast in terms of FDI
in emerging economies the association is though insignificant, it is negative, while in
advanced economies, capital openness is positively and significantly related to foreign
asset accumulation of any class. This is the key distinguishing factor since the asso-
ciated coefficient is economically significant as well. Another difference appears for
the anti-corruption variable which is insignificant for the total foreign assets and FDI
however for FPI and FX the effect is negatively and economically more significant than
the corresponding coefficients from emerging economies. Lastly, comparison between
FX reserves in industrial and emerging economies (see Table F.6, also show that finan-
cial depth is not relevant for FX in industrial economies which is very different to what
is found for emerging economies. Furthermore, crisis events seem to be unrelated in
this present case which relevant for FX and total assets in emerging economies. The R
squared for industrialized economies is bigger as compared to the R squared from simi-
lar set of specifications for emerging economies except for foreign exchange reserves.
Next I compare the results for the industrialized economies with an IV specifica-
tion (Table E.6 - E.9) to a non-IV (Table E.2 - E.5)specification and then I turn to a
comparison of the former with the IV specification for emerging economies. The first
comparison (see Table F.5 - F.8, column 1 and 3), highlights that except for FDI, finan-
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cial depth seems to play no significant role in the evolution of foreign assets. Secondly,
the instrument variable has now been insignificant for both FX and FDI but highly sig-
nificant for FPI.
The second comparison exercise shows more interesting results. First of all, the
instrument variable for trade openness has been significantly positive for emerging
economies while in industrial economies, the variable becomes insignificant for FX
and FDI except for the specification that is based on the restricted sample for 1990
to 2007. But the results do not sustain with other structural break specifications. The
second key interesting comparison reveals that capital openness is much more relevant
for industrial economies for all classes of assets and the coefficients are economically
very significant as well. Financial depth that has been a major factor for the emerging
economies, seem to have no significance for FX in industrialized economies but instead
significant for FDI. Again, with regards to exchange rate volatility and crisis events,
advanced economies’ all classes of foreign assets are mostly not responsive. Overall,
the main differences are not very evident with the total assets but the differences appear
when different classes of assets are considered and analyzed individually. The R squared
for advanced economies specifications are higher than emerging economies which may
be primarily due to difference in the levels of foreign assets accumulated in industrial-
ized economies.
Overall, when comparison is made between advanced economies and emerging
economies, total assets seem to behave quite similarly but the analysis based on sub-
assets show that these results are masked since FX and FPI show either different affects
or significance from the same variables in the two groups of countries. This is indeed
representative of many differences that are inherent in these groups. While the time in-
variant differences are dealt with using fixed effects model, the time varying differences
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do show some stark differences between different classes of assets in the two groups of
countries.
Table E.1: Advanced Economies
Advanced Economies
Country Time Period Country Time Period
Australia 1973-2007 Austria 1973-2007
Belgium 1973-2007 Canada 1970-2007
Denmark 1970-2007 Finland 1973-2007
France 1973-2007 Germany 1973-2007
Greece 1973-2007 Ireland 1973-2007
Italy 1970-2007 Japan 1970-2007
Netherlands 1972-2007 Norway 1973-2007
Spain 1971-2007 Sweden 1970-2007
Switzerland 1970-2007 United Kingdom 1970-2007
United States 1970-2007
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Table E.2: Advanced Economies:Total Assets
Advanced Economies:Total Assets
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES Log TotalAssetsGDP Log
TotalAssets
GDP Log
TotalAssets
GDP Log
TotalAssets
GDP
log( GDPcapita ) 3.37e-05*** 2.13e-05*** 2.74e-05*** 2.70e-05***
(5.56e-06) (4.31e-06) (4.24e-06) (5.11e-06)
ER 0.0624 -0.0860 0.0589 0.0600
(0.0433) (0.166) (0.0457) (0.0456)
ER Volatility -0.109 -0.0555 -0.186 -0.207
(0.195) (0.160) (0.172) (0.142)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.621*** 0.375* 0.524*** 0.497***
(0.162) (0.186) (0.169) (0.158)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) 0.0488
(0.175)
K Open 0.229*** 0.178 0.204*** 0.211***
(0.0429) (0.170) (0.0453) (0.0607)
Log TradeGDP 1.486*** 1.953*** 1.323*** 1.348***
(0.311) (0.251) (0.272) (0.229)
Anti-Corruption -0.113 -0.121** -0.110 -0.104
(0.0710) (0.0511) (0.0655) (0.0640)
Crisis Events 0.0324 -0.0897 -0.0174 -0.0202
(0.106) (0.146) (0.0808) (0.0820)
Year Dummy 0.254** 0.0492
(0.0934) (0.777)
Constant -3.493*** -1.099 -3.193*** -3.104***
(0.694) (1.031) (0.712) (0.648)
Observations 311 185 311 311
R-squared 0.865 0.738 0.872 0.872
Number of countries 19 19 19 19
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E.3: Advanced Economies:FX
Advanced Economies:FX
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FXGDP ) log(
FX
GDP ) log(
FX
GDP ) log(
FX
GDP )
log( GDPcapita ) -1.47e-07 -2.40e-05* -8.12e-06 -1.03e-05
(6.85e-06) (1.30e-05) (8.80e-06) (9.03e-06)
ER -0.0294 -0.0206 -0.0338 -0.0271
(0.0673) (0.164) (0.0728) (0.0715)
ER Volatility -0.0923 -0.568 -0.190 -0.312
(0.317) (0.392) (0.300) (0.289)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.184 -0.380 0.0606 -0.103
(0.225) (0.402) (0.252) (0.280)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) 0.294
(0.182)
K Open 0.208** -0.00489 0.177** 0.220**
(0.0832) (0.172) (0.0734) (0.0797)
Log TradeGDP 0.606* 1.324** 0.400 0.547*
(0.342) (0.553) (0.275) (0.268)
Anti-Corruption -0.310** -0.335*** -0.305** -0.268**
(0.131) (0.0825) (0.122) (0.118)
Crisis Events 0.169 -0.128 0.106 0.0893
(0.193) (0.143) (0.162) (0.166)
Year Dummy 0.322* -0.914
(0.183) (0.788)
Constant -2.306* 1.948 -1.926 -1.388
(1.316) (2.174) (1.388) (1.500)
Observations 311 185 311 311
R-squared 0.313 0.309 0.335 0.343
Number of countries 19 19 19 19
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E.4: Advanced Economies:FDI
Advanced Economies:FDI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FDIGDP ) log(
FDI
GDP ) log(
FDI
GDP ) log(
FDI
GDP )
log( GDPcapita ) 3.74e-05*** 1.72e-05*** 3.13e-05*** 3.39e-05***
(9.55e-06) (4.77e-06) (7.48e-06) (8.90e-06)
ER 0.142*** -0.132 0.138*** 0.130***
(0.0382) (0.198) (0.0352) (0.0292)
ER Volatility -0.149 -0.371*** -0.224 -0.0751
(0.172) (0.126) (0.148) (0.180)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.400 0.520*** 0.305 0.504**
(0.236) (0.172) (0.279) (0.208)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) -0.359
(0.320)
K Open 0.347*** 0.262 0.323*** 0.270**
(0.0768) (0.213) (0.0835) (0.0982)
Log TradeGDP 0.960** 1.552*** 0.802** 0.622
(0.335) (0.321) (0.334) (0.415)
Anti-Corruption 0.0222 -0.00623 0.0256 -0.0195
(0.0655) (0.0569) (0.0674) (0.0910)
Crisis Events 0.241 -0.118 0.192 0.213
(0.198) (0.164) (0.157) (0.159)
Year Dummy 0.248* 1.757
(0.141) (1.417)
Constant -4.995*** -3.289*** -4.703*** -5.359***
(1.065) (0.878) (1.213) (1.083)
Observations 311 185 311 311
R-squared 0.810 0.586 0.815 0.820
Number of countries 19 19 19 19
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E.5: Advanced Economies:FPI
Advanced Economies:FPI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FPIGDP ) log(
FPI
GDP ) log(
FPI
GDP ) log(
FPI
GDP )
log( GDPcapita ) 7.77e-05*** 4.47e-05*** 5.57e-05*** 5.61e-05***
(1.46e-05) (6.90e-06) (9.22e-06) (9.74e-06)
ER 0.159 -0.00652 0.137 0.134
(0.120) (0.181) (0.128) (0.132)
ER Volatility 0.332 0.644* 0.0659 0.111
(0.467) (0.342) (0.329) (0.324)
Log( M2GDP ) 1.092* 0.265 0.838 0.929
(0.626) (0.323) (0.525) (0.541)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) -0.111
(0.337)
K Open 0.496*** 0.348 0.411*** 0.396***
(0.0654) (0.251) (0.0483) (0.0898)
Log TradeGDP 2.323** 2.535*** 1.740** 1.672**
(0.870) (0.404) (0.669) (0.773)
Anti-Corruption -0.268* -0.266** -0.258** -0.273**
(0.142) (0.103) (0.105) (0.124)
Crisis Events 0.170 -0.0575 -0.0159 -0.0161
(0.273) (0.221) (0.191) (0.195)
Year Dummy 0.870*** 1.338
(0.180) (1.550)
Constant -7.539** -1.887 -6.825*** -7.160***
(2.779) (1.764) (2.093) (2.099)
Observations 299 185 299 299
R-squared 0.872 0.691 0.893 0.893
Number of countries 19 19 19 19
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E.6: Advanced Economies:Instrument Variable and Total Assets
Advanced Economies:Instrument Variable and Total Assets
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES Log T AGDP Log
T A
GDP Log
T A
GDP Log
T A
GDP
log( TradeGDP ) 1.811*** 3.150*** 1.721*** 1.780***
(0.265) (0.660) (0.431) (0.501)
log( GDPcapita ) 3.32e-05*** 1.91e-05*** 2.81e-05*** 2.71e-05***
(2.90e-06) (4.91e-06) (4.23e-06) (5.16e-06)
ER Regime 0.0560* -0.0845 0.0524 0.0558
(0.0317) (0.146) (0.0396) (0.0372)
ER Regime Volatility -0.212 -0.426* -0.286*** -0.341***
(0.177) (0.223) (0.100) (0.121)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.610*** 0.329 0.530*** 0.453***
(0.110) (0.231) (0.166) (0.129)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) 0.140
(0.266)
K Open 0.236*** 0.227 0.217*** 0.238***
(0.0369) (0.160) (0.0508) (0.0770)
Anti-Corruption -0.0895** -0.0271 -0.0838* -0.0670
(0.0349) (0.0624) (0.0488) (0.0555)
Crisis Events 0.0922 0.0348 0.0596 0.0495
(0.0903) (0.147) (0.0900) (0.0796)
Year Dummy 0.203 -0.381
(0.128) (1.212)
Constant -2.111*** 1.988 -1.890** -1.580
(0.631) (1.859) (0.767) (0.969)
Observations 311 185 311 311
R-squared 0.937 0.929 0.940 0.940
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E.7: Advanced Economies:Instrument Variable and FX
Advanced Economies:Instrument Variable and FX
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FXGDP ) log(
FX
GDP ) log(
FX
GDP ) log(
FX
GDP )
log( TradeGDP ) 1.434 3.297** 1.345 1.558
(1.008) (1.577) (1.054) (1.158)
log( GDPcapita ) -1.28e-06 -2.76e-05** -6.31e-06 -1.01e-05
(8.29e-06) (1.38e-05) (9.71e-06) (9.22e-06)
ER Regime -0.0457 -0.0181 -0.0492 -0.0370
(0.0510) (0.142) (0.0542) (0.0501)
ER Regime Volatility -0.353 -1.178* -0.427 -0.627
(0.407) (0.603) (0.367) (0.407)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.155 -0.455 0.0762 -0.205
(0.212) (0.471) (0.222) (0.300)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) 0.507
(0.322)
K Open 0.227*** 0.0760 0.208*** 0.282***
(0.0828) (0.126) (0.0775) (0.0929)
Anti-Corruption -0.249** -0.179** -0.244*** -0.182*
(0.103) (0.0883) (0.0944) (0.0958)
Crisis Events 0.321 0.0768 0.289 0.253
(0.219) (0.153) (0.211) (0.192)
Year Dummy 0.201 -1.921
(0.205) (1.464)
Constant -2.252 4.241 -2.034 -0.908
(2.365) (3.833) (2.328) (2.831)
Observations 311 185 311 311
R-squared 0.800 0.826 0.804 0.806
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E.8: Advanced Economies:Instrument Variable and FDI
Advanced Economies:Instrument Variable and FDI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FDIGDP ) log(
FDI
GDP ) log(
FDI
GDP ) log(
FDI
GDP )
log( TradeGDP ) 0.539 2.035*** 0.406 0.219
(0.552) (0.626) (0.583) (0.603)
log( GDPcapita ) 3.80e-05*** 1.63e-05*** 3.05e-05*** 3.38e-05***
(9.11e-06) (4.63e-06) (6.48e-06) (8.06e-06)
ER Regime 0.150*** -0.132 0.145*** 0.134***
(0.0333) (0.183) (0.0299) (0.0222)
ER Regime Volatility -0.0163 -0.520** -0.125 0.0505
(0.133) (0.218) (0.115) (0.174)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.415* 0.501*** 0.299 0.545**
(0.220) (0.190) (0.264) (0.221)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) -0.444
(0.343)
K Open 0.337*** 0.282 0.310*** 0.245***
(0.0688) (0.210) (0.0767) (0.0944)
Anti-Corruption -0.00850 0.0318 -0.000164 -0.0538
(0.0461) (0.0596) (0.0522) (0.0838)
Crisis Events 0.163 -0.0682 0.115 0.148
(0.172) (0.179) (0.121) (0.117)
Year Dummy 0.298* 2.159
(0.158) (1.536)
Constant -5.145*** -1.443 -4.820*** -5.807***
(1.465) (1.529) (1.449) (1.630)
Observations 311 185 311 311
R-squared 0.909 0.928 0.912 0.914
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E.9: Advanced Economies:Instrument Variable and FPI
Advanced Economies:Instrument Variable and FPI
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES log( FPIGDP ) log(
FPI
GDP ) log(
FPI
GDP ) log(
FPI
GDP )
log( TradeGDP ) 3.123*** 4.268*** 2.780** 2.885**
(1.126) (1.286) (1.170) (1.308)
log( GDPcapita ) 7.78e-05*** 4.15e-05*** 5.92e-05*** 5.83e-05***
(1.38e-05) (7.53e-06) (8.65e-06) (8.50e-06)
ER Regime 0.141 -0.00431 0.119 0.126
(0.106) (0.149) (0.107) (0.107)
ER Regime Volatility 0.103 0.108 -0.164 -0.247
(0.499) (0.422) (0.333) (0.384)
Log( M2GDP ) 0.985* 0.199 0.751 0.573
(0.528) (0.315) (0.489) (0.492)
Year ∗ Log( M2GDP ) 0.219
(0.490)
K Open 0.508*** 0.419* 0.438*** 0.468***
(0.0622) (0.243) (0.0589) (0.118)
Anti-Corruption -0.211* -0.130 -0.191** -0.165
(0.118) (0.101) (0.0832) (0.125)
Crisis Events 0.325 0.123 0.197 0.191
(0.263) (0.228) (0.217) (0.201)
Year Dummy 0.734*** -0.189
(0.257) (2.283)
Constant -4.538 2.571 -3.939 -3.207
(2.861) (3.067) (2.610) (3.168)
Observations 299 185 299 299
R-squared 0.926 0.885 0.936 0.936
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX F
APPENDIX CHAPTER 3 D: COMPARISON
Table F.1: Effects on Total Assets
Detrend Trend Detrend Trend
Variable Specification Non-IV Non-IV IV IV
Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging
GDP per capita I -6.99e-06 3.32e -05*** 1.23e-06 6.88e-05**
II -4.15e-05 2.97e-05 -8.22e-06 3.83e-0.5
III -2.57e-05 -6.82e-06 -1.71e-05 -1.28e-05
IV -1.69e-05 -1.47e-06 -8.58e-06 -6.47e-06
ER Volatility I -0.000314*** -0.000435*** -0.000272*** -0.00310***
II -0.00715* -0.00594000 -0.00668* -0.00594
III -0.000464*** -0.000537*** -0.000417*** -0.000436***
IV -0.000454*** -0.000522*** -0.000417*** -0.000433***
log( DebtGDP ) I -0.237** -0.279** -0.265*** -0.291**
II 0.06170000 0.05130000 0.02940000 -0.0337
III -0.324*** -0.324*** -0.345*** -0.345***
IV -0.237*** -0.240*** -0.260*** -0.254***
Year * log( DebtGDP ) I
II
III 0.171** 0.152** 0.161* 0.162**
IV
K Open I 0.0663* 0.07620000 0.0863* 0.0972*
II -0.0348 0.00578000 -0.0141 0.01340000
III 0.0666* 0.0672* 0.0855* 0.0853*
IV 0.0643* 0.0655* 0.0821* 0.0810*
ER Regime I 0.04480000 0.11200000 0.01810000 0.03860000
II 0.03590000 0.01430000 -0.000543 -0.0282
III 0.04200000 0.06200000 0.01680000 0.02210000
IV 0.04220000 0.06760000 0.01920000 0.02300000
Anti-Corruption I -0.0969* -0.0832* -0.04700000 -0.0247
II 0.02980000 -0.0496 0.03220000 0.00820000
III -0.140** -0.142*** -0.0906 -0.0891
IV -0.125** -0.124** -0.0796 -0.0782
Crisis Year I -0.203** -0.181** -0.197*** -0.186**
II -0.157** -0.128* -0.146** -0.129*
III -0.199*** -0.193*** -0.194*** -0.193***
IV -0.199*** -0.193*** -0.194*** -0.193***
Trade Openness I 0.638** 0.930*** 1.224** 1.531***
II 0.617** 1.268*** 1.27500000 1.883***
III 0.613** 0.681*** 1.169** 1.189***
IV 0.625*** 0.674*** 1.134** 1.112***
log( M2GDP ) I 0.646*** 0.823*** 0.562* 0.612**
II 0.489*** 0.656*** 0.36400000 0.36800000
III 0.685*** 0.751*** 0.604*** 0.616**
IV 0.659** 0.676** 0.573* 0.557*
Year * log( M2GDP ) I
II
III
IV 0.05710000 0.10300000 0.07480000 0.10700000
Year I -0.0208 -0.0212
II -0.00437 -0.00452
III -0.0423** -0.0419**
IV -0.0420** -0.0412**
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification I is based on the sample from 1970-2007
Specification II is based on the sample from 1990-2007
Specification III is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with debt variable
Specification IV is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with M2 variable
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Table F.2: Effects on FX
Detrend Trend Detrend Trend
Variable Specification Non-IV Non-IV IV IV
Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging
GDP per capita I -3.25e-05 3.71e-05 -3.23e-05 -1.11e-05
II -2.60e-05 2.91e-05 2.84E-05 3.89E-05
III -4.87e-05 -4.25e-05 -4.82e-05 -5.69e-05
IV -3.88e-05 -3.32e-05 -3.77e-05 -4.57e-05
ER Volatility I -0.000281*** -0.0000395*** -0.000253** -0.000283**
II -0.00889 -0.00805 -0.00818 -0.00803
III -0.000439*** -0.000464*** -0.000412*** -0.000388***
IV -0.000467*** -0.000497*** -0.000446*** -0.000426***
log( DebtGDP ) I -0.284*** -0.326*** -0.318*** -0.338***
II -0.0127 -0.0825 -0.0541 -0.0657
III -0.321*** -0.323*** -0.348*** -0.350***
IV -0.274*** -0.269*** -0.300*** -0.283***
Year * log( DebtGDP ) I
II
III 0.0822 0.0814 0.0804 0.102
IV
K Open I 0.0541 0.065 0.088 0.098
II -0.0658 -0.037 -0.0331 -0.0274
III 0.0485 0.0486 0.0771 0.0734
IV 0.0506 0.0499 0.0779 0.0712
ER Regime I -0.0219 0.0255 -0.0647 -0.0585
II 0.0138 -0.00358 -0.0479 -0.054
III -0.0223 -0.0165 -0.0582 -0.0615
IV -0.0170 -0.0108 -0.0506 -0.0498
Anti-Corruption I -0.0795 -0.0551 -0.0157 0.00417
II -0.0292 -0.0856 -0.0196 -0.0263
III -0.123* -0.123*** -0.069 -0.073
IV -0.114* -0.109 -0.0629 -0.0652
Crisis Year I -0.288*** -0.275*** -0.284*** -0.279***
II -0.175* -0.155* -0.159* -0.156*
III -0.279*** -0.277*** -0.276*** -0.279***
IV -0.276*** -0.275*** -0.273*** -0.276***
Trade Openness I 0.659** 0.922*** 1.409*** 1.635***
II 0.633** 1.134*** 1.732 1.865***
III 0.646* 0.670*** 1.275** 1.180***
IV 0.652* 0.649*** 1.243** 1.099**
log( M2GDP ) I 0.651*** 0.852*** 0.564*** 0.609***
II 0.392* 0.526** 0.176 0.18
III 0.697*** 0.722*** 0.624*** 0.596***
IV 0.612** 0.595** 0.532* 0.486*
Year * log( M2GDP ) I
II
III
IV 0.138 0.18 0.153 0.178
Year I -0.000455 -0.00525
II 0.0189 0.0201
III -0.0276* -0.0311
IV -0.0257* -0.0287
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification I is based on the sample from 1970-2007
Specification II is based on the sample from 1990-2007
Specification III is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with debt variable
Specification IV is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with M2 variable
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Table F.3: Effects on FDI
Detrend Trend Detrend Trend
Variable Specification Non-IV Non-IV IV IV
Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging
GDP per capita I 0.000203 0.000344*** 0.000219* 0.000322***
II 6.88e-05 0.000172*** 0.00011 0.000183***
III 0.000184 0.000244** 0.000205* 0.000260***
IV 0.00017 0.000232** 0.000197* 0.000252***
ER Volatility I -0.0131 -0.00712 -0.0122 -0.00779
II 0.00403 0.00563 0.00454 0.0056
III -0.0128 -0.00951 -0.0118 -0.00896
IV -0.00920 -0.00656 -0.00846 -0.00613
log( DebtGDP ) I -0.188 -0.357* 0.216 -0.347***
II -0.0299 -0.162* -0.0618 -0.0144
III -0.425** -0.487* -0.448* -0.499***
IV -0.197 -0.326** -0.233 -0.339***
Year * log( DebtGDP ) I
II
III 0.381* 0.284 0.369 0.283
IV
K Open I -0.183* -0.130 -0.163* -0.111
II -0.0988 -0.0395 -0.0736 -0.0307
III -0.185* -0.163* -0.162* -0.133
IV -0.201** -0.167* -0.172* -0.132
ER Regime I 0.240*** 0.328*** 0.222** 0.256***
II 0.126* 0.0927 0.0792 0.0367
III 0.222** 0.275*** 0.203** 0.227***
IV 0.229*** 0.269*** 0.206** 0.215***
Anti-Corruption I -0.0340 -0.0429 0.00796 0.048
II 0.1 -0.0148 0.106 0.0536
III -0.0565 -0.117 -0.0052 -0.0114
IV -0.0474 -0.124 0.00154 -0.00105
Crisis Year I 0.169 0.155 0.178 0.179
II 0.162 0.191 0.171* 0.19
III 0.181 0.15 0.192 0.177
IV 0.153 0.138 0.168 0.169
Trade Openness I 1.303*** 2.066*** 1.934* 3.075***
II 0.787* 1.733*** 1.614 2.542***
III 1.273*** 1.667*** 1.994* 2.746***
IV 1.186** 1.638*** 2.075* 2.875**
log( M2GDP ) I 0.349 0.792 0.216 0.299
II 0.983*** 1.221*** 0.821* 0.844*
III 0.353 0.686 0.196 0.321
IV 0.907* 1.150** 0.658 0.703
Year * log( M2GDP ) I
II
III
IV -0.703** -0.599* -0.628* -0.563
Year I 0.0755 0.0777
II 0.0409 0.0412
III 0.0717 0.0761
IV 0.0647 0.0709
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification I is based on the sample from 1970-2007
Specification II is based on the sample from 1990-2007
Specification III is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with debt variable
Specification IV is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with M2 variable
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Table F.4: Effects on FPI
Detrend Trend Detrend Trend
Variable Specification Non-IV Non-IV IV IV
Emerging Emerging Emerging Emerging
GDP per capita I -0.000125* 0.000112 -0.000129** 8.26e-05
II -5.36e-05 3.88e-05 -7.38e-05 4.07e-05
III -0.000118 -4.97e-06 -0.000125* -6.10e-06
IV -0.000122 -6.22e-06 -0.000125* -7.56e-06
ER Volatility I 0.00130*** 0.000642* 0.00130*** 0.00761**
II 0.00882 0.00803 0.00894 0.00805
III 0.00138*** 0.000725** 0.00138*** 0.000823***
IV 0.00136*** 0.000730* 0.00136*** 0.000895**
log( DebtGDP ) I -0.0237 -0.175* -0.0217 -0.152
II -0.0648 -0.159 -0.052 -0.156
III -0.2 0.129 0.196 0.15
IV -0.0375 -0.185 -0.0364 -0.168
Year * log( DebtGDP ) I
II
III -0.366** -0.468** -0.354** -0.482**
IV
K Open I 0.142* 0.0908 0.141** 0.108
II 0.114 0.132 0.106 0.135*
III 0.133* 0.0917 0.132* 0.101
IV 0.115* 0.0679 0.115* 0.0779
ER Regime I -0.0382 0.124 -0.0297 0.0524
II -0.00339 -0.0195 0.0181 -0.0311
III -0.0342 0.0387 -0.0239 0.00632
IV -0.0346 0.0364 -0.0305 -0.0107
Anti-Corruption I -0.102 -0.171* -0.11 -0.121
II -0.0676 -0.156 -0.0703 -0.144
III -0.0734 -0.175* -0.0854 -0.136
IV -0.126 -0.251* -0.13 -0.201*
Crisis Year I -0.0862 -0.00745 -0.0863 -0.0236
II 0.0460 0.0802 0.0428 0.0782
III -0.102 -0.0725 -0.102 -0.0765
IV -0.0854 -0.0464 -0.0856 -0.0503
Trade Openness I 0.371 1.478*** 0.193 2.037***
II 0.425 1.214*** 0.0469 1.359
III 0.427 1.071*** 0.196 1.478***
IV 0.44 1.123*** 0.347 1.723**
log( M2GDP ) I 0.277 0.850** 0.299 0.623
II 0.825* 1.067*** 0.896* 0.9995
III 0.302 0.758** 0.331 0.636
IV 0.576** 1.155*** 0.579** 1.037***
Year * log( M2GDP ) I
II
III
IV -0.405 -0.561 -0.393 -0.644
Year I -0.0693** -0.0689*
II -0.0571* -0.0572*
III -0.0726* -0.0726**
IV -0.0717* -0.0717*
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification I is based on the sample from 1970-2007
Specification II is based on the sample from 1990-2007
Specification III is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with debt variable
Specification IV is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with M2 variable
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Table F.5: Effects on Total Assets
Variable Specification Non-IV Non-IV IV IV
Industrial Emerging Industrial Emerging
log( GDPPopulation ) I 3.37e − 05∗∗∗ 3.32e − 05∗∗∗ 3.70e − 05 6.88e − 05∗∗
II 2.13e − 05∗∗∗ 2.97e − 05 1.91e − 05∗∗∗ 3.83e − 05
III 2.74e − 05∗∗∗ −6.82e − 06 2.81e − 05∗∗∗ −1.28e − 05
IV 2.70e − 05∗∗∗ −1.47e − 06 2.71e − 05∗∗∗ −6.47e − 06
ER Volatility I −0.109 −0.000435∗∗∗ −0.212 −.000310∗∗∗
II −0.0555 −.00594 −0.426∗ −0.00594
III −0.186 −0.000537∗∗∗ −0.426∗ −.000436∗∗∗
IV −0.207 −0.000522∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗ −0.000433∗∗∗
log( DebtGDP ) I −0.279∗∗ −0.291∗∗
II 0.0513 −0.0337
III −0.324∗∗∗ −0.345∗∗∗
IV −0.240∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) I
II
III 0.152∗∗ 0.162∗∗
IV
K Open I 0.229∗∗∗ 0.0762 0.236∗∗∗ 0.0972∗
II 0.178 0.00578 0.227 0.0134
III 0.204∗∗∗ 0.0672∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.0853∗
IV 0.211∗∗∗ 0.0655∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.0810∗
ER Regime I 0.0624 0.112 0.0560∗ 0.0386
II −0.0860 0.0143 −0.0845 −0.0282
III 0.0589 0.0620 0.0524 0.0221
IV 0.0600 0.0676 0.0558 0.0230
Anti-Corruption I −0.113 −0.0832∗ −0.0895∗∗ −0.0247
II −0.121∗ −0.0496 −0.0271 0.00820
III −0.110 −0.142∗∗∗ −0.0838∗ −0.0891
IV −0.104 −0.124∗∗ −0.0670 −0.0782
Crisis Year I 0.0324 −0.181∗∗ 0.0922 −0.186∗∗
II −0.0897 −0.128∗ 0.0348 −0.129∗
III −0.0174 −0.93∗∗∗ 0.0596 −0.193∗∗∗
IV −0.0202 −0.193∗∗∗ 0.0495 −0.193∗∗∗
Trade Openness I 1.486∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗∗ 1.811∗∗∗ 1.531∗∗∗
II 1.953∗∗∗ 1.268∗∗∗ 3.150∗∗∗ 1.883∗∗∗
III 1.323∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 1.721∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗
IV 1.348∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 1.780∗∗∗ 1.112∗∗∗
log( M2GDP ) I 0.621
∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗
II 0.375∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.329 0.368
III 0.524∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗
IV 0.497∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 0.557∗
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) I
II
III
IV 0.0488 0.103 0.140 0.107
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification I is based on the sample from 1970-2007
Specification II is based on the sample from 1990-2007
Specification III is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with debt variable
Specification IV is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with M2 variable
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Table F.6: Effects on FX
Variable Specification Non-IV Non-IV IV IV
Industrial Emerging Industrial Emerging
log( GDPPopulation ) I −1.47e − 07 3.71e − 05 −1.28e − 06 −1.11e − 05
II −2.40e − 05∗ 2.91e − 05 −2.76e − 05∗∗ 3.89e − 05
III −8.12e − 06 −4.25e − 05 −6.31e − 06 −5.69e − 05
IV −1.03e − 05 −3.32e − 05 −1.01e − 05 −4.57e − 05
ER Volatility I −0.0923 −0.000395∗∗∗ −0.353 −0.000283∗∗
II −0.568 −.00805 −1.178∗ −0.00803
III −0.190 −0.000464∗∗∗ −0.427 −.000388∗∗∗
IV −0.312 −0.000497∗∗∗ −0.627 −0.000426∗∗∗
log( DebtGDP ) I −0.326∗∗∗ −0.338∗∗∗
II −0.0825 −0.0657
III −0.323∗∗∗ −0.350∗∗∗
IV −0.269∗∗∗ −0.283∗∗∗
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) I
II
III 0.0814 0.102
IV
K Open I 0.208∗∗ 0.0650 0.227∗∗∗ 0.0980
II −0.00489 −0.0370 0.0760 −0.0274
III 0.177∗∗∗ 0.0486 0.208∗∗∗ 0.0734
IV 0.220∗∗ 0.0499 0.282∗∗∗ 0.0712
ER Regime I −0.0294 0.0255 −0.0457 −0.0585
II −0.0206 −0.00358 −0.0181 −0.0540
III −0.0338 −0.0165 −0.0492 −0.0615
IV −0.0271 −0.0108 −0.0370 −0.0498
Anti-Corruption I −0.310∗∗ −0.0551 −0.249∗∗ 0.00417
II −0.335∗∗∗ −0.0856 −0.179∗∗ −0.0263
III −0.305∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗ −0.0730
IV −0.268∗∗ −0.109 −0.182∗ −0.0652
Crisis Year I 0.169 −0.275∗∗ 0.321 −0.279∗∗∗
II −0.128 −0.155∗ 0.0768 −0.156∗
III 0.106 −0.277∗∗∗ 0.289 −0.279∗∗∗
IV 0.0893 −0.275∗∗∗ 0.253 −0.276∗∗∗
Trade Openness I 0.606∗ 0.922∗∗∗ 1.434 1.635∗∗∗
II 1.324∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗ 3.297∗∗ 1.865∗∗∗
III 0.400 0.670∗∗∗ 1.345 1.180∗∗∗
IV 0.547∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 1.558 1.099∗∗
log( M2GDP ) I 0.184 0.852
∗∗∗ 0.155 0.609∗∗∗
II −0.380 0.526∗∗ −0.455 0.180
III 0.0606 0.722∗∗∗ 0.0762 0.596∗∗∗
IV −0.103 0.595∗∗ −0.205 0.486∗
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) I
II
III
IV 0.294 0.180 0.507 0.178
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification I is based on the sample from 1970-2007
Specification II is based on the sample from 1990-2007
Specification III is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with debt variable
Specification IV is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with M2 variable
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Table F.7: Effects on FDI
Variable Specification Non-IV Non-IV IV IV
Industrial Emerging Industrial Emerging
log( GDPPopulation ) I 3.74e − 05∗∗∗ 0.000344∗∗∗ 3.80e − 05∗∗∗ 0.000322∗∗∗
II 1.72e − 05∗∗∗ 0.000172∗∗∗ 1.63e − 05∗∗ 0.000183∗∗∗
III 3.13e − 05∗∗∗ 0.000244∗∗ 3.05e − 05∗∗∗ 0.000260∗∗∗
IV 3.39e − 05∗∗∗ 0.000232∗∗ 3.38e − 05∗∗∗ 0.000252∗∗∗
ER Volatility I −0.149 −0.00712 −0.0163 −0.00779
II −0.371∗∗∗ 0.00563 −0.520∗∗ 0.00560
III −0.224 −0.00951 −0.125 −0.00896
IV −0.0751 −0.00656 0.0505 −0.00613
log( DebtGDP ) I −0.357∗ −0.347∗∗∗
II −0.162∗ −0.0144
III −0.487∗ −0.499∗∗∗
IV −0.326∗∗ −0.339∗∗∗
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) I
II
III 0.284 0.283
IV
K Open I 0.347∗∗ −0.130 0.337∗∗∗ −0.111
II 0.262 −0.0395 0.282 −0.0307
III 0.323∗∗∗ −0.163∗ 0.310∗∗∗ −0.133
IV 0.270∗∗ −0.167∗ 0.245∗∗∗ −0.132
ER Regime I 0.142∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
II −0.132 0.0927 −0.0132 0.0367
III 0.138∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
IV 0.130∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
Anti-Corruption I 0.0222 −0.0429 −0.00850 0.0480
II −0.00623 −0.0148 0.0318 0.0536
III 0.0256 −0.117 −0.000164 −0.0114
IV −0.0195 −0.124 −0.0538 −0.00105
Crisis Year I 0.241 0.155 0.163 0.179
II −0.118 0.191 −0.0682 0.190
III 0.192 0.150 0.115 0.177
IV 0.213 0.138 0.148 0.169
Trade Openness I 0.960∗∗ 2.066∗∗∗ 0.539 3.075∗∗∗
II 1.552∗∗∗ 1.733∗∗∗ 2.035∗∗∗ 2.542∗∗∗
III 0.802∗ 1.667∗∗∗ 0.406 2.746∗∗∗
IV 0.622 1.638∗∗∗ 0.219 2.875∗∗
log( M2GDP ) I 0.400 0.729 0.415
∗ 0.299
II 0.502∗∗∗ 1.221∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.844∗
III 0.305 0.686 0.299 0.321
IV 0.502∗∗ 1.150∗∗ 0.545∗∗ 0.703
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) I
II
III
IV −0.359 −0.599∗ −0.444 −0.563
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification I is based on the sample from 1970-2007
Specification II is based on the sample from 1990-2007
Specification III is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with debt variable
Specification IV is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with M2 variable
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Table F.8: Effects on FPI
Variable Specification Non-IV Non-IV IV IV
Industrial Emerging Industrial Emerging
log( GDPPopulation ) I 7.77e − 05∗∗∗ 0.000112 7.78e − 05∗∗∗ 8.26e − 05
II 4.47e − 05∗∗∗ 3.88e − 05 4.15e − 05∗∗∗ 4.07e − 05
III 5.57e − 05∗∗∗ −4.97e − 06 5.92e − 05∗∗∗ −6.10e − 06
IV 5.61e − 05∗∗∗ −6.22e − 06 5.83e − 05∗∗∗ −7.56e − 06
ER Volatility I 0.332 0.000642∗ 0.103 0.00761∗∗
II 0.644∗ 0.00803 0.108 0.00805
III 0.0659 0.000725∗∗ −0.164 0.000823∗∗∗
IV 0.111 0.000730∗ −0.247 0.000895∗∗
log( DebtGDP ) I −0.175∗ −0.152
II −0.159 −0.156
III 0.129 0.150
IV −0.185 −0.168
Year ∗ log( DebtGDP ) I
II
III −0.468∗∗ −0.482∗∗
IV
K Open I 0.496∗∗∗ 0.0908 0.508∗∗∗ 0.108
II 0.348 0.132 0.419∗ 0.135∗
III 0.411∗∗∗ 0.0917 0.438∗∗∗ 0.101
IV 0.396∗∗ 0.0679 0.468∗∗∗ 0.0779
ER Regime I 0.159 0.124 0.141 0.0524
II −0.00652 −0.0195 −0.00413 −0.0311
III 0.137 0.0387 0.119 0.00632
IV 0.134 0.0364 0.126 −0.0107
Anti-Corruption I −0.268∗ −0.171∗ −0.211∗ −0.121
II −0.266∗∗ −0.156 −0.130 −0.144
III −0.258∗∗ −0.175∗ −0.191∗∗ −0.136
IV −0.273∗∗ −0.251∗∗ −0.165 −0.201∗
Crisis Year I 0.170 −0.00745 0.325 −0.0236
II −0.0575 0.0802 0.123 0.0782
III −0.0159 −0.0725 0.197 −0.0765
IV −0.0161 −0.0464 0.191 −0.0503
Trade Openness I 2.323∗∗ 1.478∗∗∗ 3.123∗∗∗ 2.037∗∗∗
II 2.535∗∗∗ 1.214∗∗∗ 4.268∗∗∗ 1.359
III 1.740∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗ 2.780∗∗ 1.478∗∗∗
IV 1.672∗∗ 1.123∗∗∗ 2.885∗∗ 1.723∗∗
log( M2GDP ) I 1.092
∗ 0.850∗∗ 0.985∗ 0.623
II 0.265 1.067∗∗∗ 0.199 0.9995
III 0.838 0.758∗∗ 0.751 0.636
IV 0.929 1.155∗∗∗ 0.573 1.037∗∗∗
Year ∗ log( M2GDP ) I
II
III
IV −0.111 −0.561 0.219 −0.644
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specification I is based on the sample from 1970-2007
Specification II is based on the sample from 1990-2007
Specification III is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with debt variable
Specification IV is based on a sample from 1970-2007 with a year dummy and interaction term with M2 variable
203
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aghion, P., Bacchetta, P., Ranciere, R., and Rogoff, K. (2006). Exchange rate volatility
and productivity growth: The role of financial development. Working Paper 12117,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Aguiar, M. and Gopinath, G. (2005). Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current
account. Journal of International Economics, 69(1):64–83.
Aizenman, J. (1992). Exchange rate flexibility, volatility and the patterns of domestic
and FDI. IMF Working Papers 92/20, International Monetary Fund.
Aizenman, J. and Noy, I. (2005). FDI and trade - Two way linkages? Economics Study
Area Working Papers 76, East-West Center, Economics Study Area.
Albuquerque, R. (2003). The composition of international capital flows: Risk sharing
through foreign direct investment. Journal of International Economics, 61(2):353–
383.
Alesina, A. and Tabellini, G. (1989). External debt, capital flight and political risk.
Journal of International Economics, 27(34):199 – 220.
Alfaro, L., Chanda, A., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., and Sayek, S. (2006). Foreign direct invest-
ment, financial markets and economic. 2006 meeting papers, Society for Economic
Dynamics.
Ambler, S., Cardia, E., and Zimmermann, C. (2004). International business cycles:
What are the facts? Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(2):257–276.
Asdrubali, P., Sorensen, B. E., and Yosha, O. (1996). Channels of interstate risk sharing:
United States 1963-1990. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(4).
204
Athanasoulis, S. G. and van Wincoop, E. (2000). Growth uncertainty and risk sharing.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 45(3):477–505.
Backus, D. K., Kehoe, P. J., and Kydland, F. E. (1992). International real business
cycles. Journal of Political Economy, 100(4):745–75.
Bai, Y. and Zhang, J. (2012). Financial integration and international risk sharing. Jour-
nal of International Economics, 86:17–32.
Beers, D. and Bhatia, A. (1999). Sovereign defaults: Hiatus in 2000? S & P Credit
Week.
Bengui, J., Mendoza, E. G., and Quadrini, V. (2012). Capital mobility and international
sharing of cyclical risk. Technical report.
Bennett, A., S., M. V. C., Schadler, S., and Kahn, R. B. (1993). Recent experiences with
surges in capital inflows. IMF Occasional Papers 108, International Monetary Fund.
Bracke, T., Bussire, M., Fidora, M., and Straub, R. (2008). A framework for assessing
global imbalances. Occasional Paper Series 78, European Central Bank.
Buiter, W. H. and Szegvari, I. (2002). Capital flight and capital outflows from Russia:
Symptom, cause and cure. Working Papers 73, European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, Office of the Chief Economist.
Bulow, J. and Rogoff, K. (1989). Sovereign debt: Is to forgive to forget? American
Economic Review, 79(1):43–50.
Calvo, G. A. (1996). Capital flows and macroeconomic management: Tequila lessons.
International Journal of Finance & Economics, 1(3):207–23.
Canova, F. and Ravn, M. O. (1996). International consumption risk sharing. Interna-
tional Economic Review, 37(3):573–601.
205
Chang, R. and Velasco, A. (2001). A model of financial crises in emerging markets.
Technical Report 2.
Chinn, M. and Ito, H. (2008). A new measure of financial openness. Journal of Com-
parative Policy Analysis, 10(3):309–322.
Chuhan, P., Claessens, S., and Mamingi, N. (1998a). Equity and bond flows to Latin
America and Asia: The role of global and country factors. Journal of Development
Economics, 55(2):439–463.
Chuhan, P., Claessens, S., and Mamingi, N. (1998b). Equity and bond flows to Latin
America and Asia: The role of global and country factors. Journal of Development
Economics, 55(2):439–463.
Collier, P., Hoeﬄer, A., and Pattillo, C. (1999). Flight capital as a portfolio choice.
Policy Research Working Paper Series 2066, The World Bank.
Cuadra, G. and Sapriza, H. (2006). Sovereign default, terms of trade and interest rates
in emerging markets. Technical report.
Cuadra, G. and Sapriza, H. (2008). Sovereign default, interest rates and political uncer-
tainty in emerging markets. Journal of International Economics, 76(1):78–88.
Darby, J., Hughes Hallett, A. J., Ireland, J., and Piscitelli, L. (1998). The impact of
exchange rate uncertainty on the level of investment. CEPR Discussion Papers 1896,
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Demyanyk, Y., Ostergaard, C., and Sorensen, B. E. (2008). Risk sharing and portfolio
allocation in EMU. European Economy - Economic Papers 334, Directorate General
Economic and Monetary Affairs, European Commission.
206
Dooley, M. P. (1988). Capital flight: A response to differences in financial risks. IMF
Staff Papers, 35(3):422–436.
Dooley, M. P. (1996). Capital controls and emerging markets. International Journal of
Finance & Economics, 1(3):197–205.
Dooley, M. P., Fernandez-Arias, E., and Kletzer, K. M. (1994). Recent private capital
inflows to developing countries: Is the debt crisis history? NBER Working Papers
4792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Dornbusch, R., Fischer, S., and Samuelson, P. A. (1977). Comparative advantage, trade,
and payments in a Ricardian model with a continuum of goods. American Economic
Review, 67(5):823–39.
Easterly, W., Islam, R., and Stiglitz, J. E. (2000). Shaken and stirred: Explaining growth
volatility.
Eaton, J. (1987). Public debt guarantees and private capital flight. Technical report.
Edison, H. J., Klein, M., Ricci, L. A., and Slok, T. (2002). Capital account liberalization
and economic performance: Survey and synthesis. IMF Working Papers 02/120,
International Monetary Fund.
Edison, H. J. and Warnock, F. E. (2003). A simple measure of the intensity of capital
controls. Journal of Empirical Finance, 10(1-2):81–103.
Edwards, S. (1999). How effective are capital controls? Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 13(4):65–84.
Edwards, S. (2001). Capital mobility and economic performance: Are emerging
economies different? NBER Working Papers 8076, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc.
207
Esquivel, G. and Larrain, F. B. (2002). The impact of G-3 exchange rate volatility on
developing countries. G-24 Discussion Papers 16, United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development.
Felices, G. and Orskaug, B.-E. (2008). Estimating the determinants of capital flows to
emerging market economies: A maximum likelihood disequilibrium approach. Bank
of England working papers 354, Bank of England.
Fernandez-Arias, E. and DEC (1994). The new wave of private capital inflows: Push or
pull? Policy Research Working Paper Series 1312, The World Bank.
Fernandez-Arias, E. and Montiel, P. J. (1996). The surge in capital inflows to developing
countries: An analytical overview. World Bank Economic Review, 10(1):51–77.
Fidora, M., Fratzscher, M., and Thimann, C. (2006). Home bias in global bond and
equity markets - The role of real exchange rate volatility. Working Paper Series 685,
European Central Bank.
Flood, R. P., Matsumoto, A., and Marion, N. P. (2009). International risk sharing during
the globalization era. Technical report.
French, K. R. and Poterba, J. M. (1991). Investor diversification and international equity
markets. American Economic Review, 81(2):222–26.
Froot, K. A. and Stein, J. C. (1991). Exchange rates and foreign direct invest-
ment: An imperfect capital markets approach. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
106(4):1191–217.
Ghosh, A. R., Gulde, A. M., and Wolf, H. C. (2003). Exchange Rate Regimes: Choices
and Consequences, volume 1 of MIT Press Books. The MIT Press.
208
Giovanni, J. d. (2005). What drives capital flows? The case of cross-border M&A
activity and financial deepening. Journal of International Economics, 65(1):127–149.
Hansen, B. E. (1999). Threshold effects in non-dynamic panels: Estimation, testing,
and inference. Journal of Econometrics, 93(2):345–368.
Haveman, J. D., Lei, V., and Netz, J. S. (2001). International integration and growth:
A survey and empirical investigation. Review of Development Economics, 5(2):289–
311.
Henry, P. B. (2007). Capital account liberalization: Theory, evidence, and speculation.
Journal of Economic Literature, 45(4):887–935.
Hernandez, L. and Rudolph, H. (1994). Domestic factors, sustainability, and soft landing
in the new wave of private capital inflows. Mimeo, The World Bank.
Hopenhayn, H. A. and Vereshchagina, G. (2009). Risk taking by entrepreneurs. Ameri-
can Economic Review, 99(5):1808–30.
Imbs, J. and Mauro, P. (2007). Pooling risk among countries. CEPR Discussion Papers
6461, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Islamaj, E. (2008). Financial integration and consumption smoothing: A survey.
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., Sorensen, B. E., and Yosha, O. (2003). Risk sharing and industrial
specialization: Regional and international evidence. American Economic Review,
93(3):903–918.
Kant, C. (1996). Foreign direct investment and capital flight. Princeton studies in in-
ternational economics, International Economics Section, Department of Economics
Princeton University.
209
Khan, S. M. and Khan, Z. S. (2007). World investment report 2006, foreign direct
investment from developing and transition economies: Implications for development
by united nations conference on trade and development (UNCTAD). United nations
publications, new york (2006). Journal of Asian Economics, 18(3):553–561.
Kose, M. A., Prasad, E., Rogoff, K. S., and Wei, S. J. (2006). Financial globalization: A
reappraisal. NBER Working Papers 12484, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Kose, M. A. and Prasad, E. S. (2010). Emerging Markets: Resilience and Growth Amid
Global Turmoil. The Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC.
Kose, M. A., Prasad, E. S., and Taylor, A. D. (2011). Thresholds in the process
of international financial integration. Journal of International Money and Finance,
30(1):147–179.
Kose, M. A., Prasad, E. S., and Terrones, M. (2003). Volatility and comovement in a
globalized world economy: An empirical exploration. IMF Working Papers 03/246.
Kose, M. A., Prasad, E. S., and Terrones, M. (2005). How do trade and financial inte-
gration affect the relationship between growth and volatility? Technical report.
Kose, M. A., Prasad, E. S., and Terrones, M. (2007). How does financial globaliza-
tion effect international risk sharing: Patterns and channels. Journal of Development
Economics.
Kose, M. A., Prasad, E. S., and Terrones, M. (2009). Does financial globalization pro-
mote risk sharing? Journal of Development Economics, 89(2):258–270.
Lane, P. and Burke, D. (2001). The empirics of foreign reserves. Open Economies
Review, 12(4):423–434.
210
Lane, P. R. and Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2007). The external wealth of nations mark ii:
Revised and extended estimates of foreign assets and liabilities, 1970-2004. Journal
of International Economics, 73(2):223–250.
Levy, H. and Sarnat, M. (1970). International diversification of investment portfolios.
American Economic Review, 60(4):668–75.
Lewis, K. (1999). Trying to explain home bias in equities and consumption. Journal of
Economic Literature, 37(2):571–608.
Lizarazo, S. (2009). Contagion of financial crises in sovereign debt markets. Working
papers, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
Majd, S. and Pindyck, R. S. (1987). Time to build, option value, and investment deci-
sions. Journal of Financial Economics, 18(1):7–27.
Malik, S. (2011). A model of risk sharing and default in emerging economies. Working
paper, Cornell University.
Martinez, J. V. and Sandleris, G. (2011). Is it punishment? Sovereign defaults and the
decline in trade. Journal of International Money and Finance, 30(6):909–930.
McLeod, D. (1993). Capital flight. The concise encyclopedia of economics, Library of
Economics and Liberty.
Melitz, J. and Zumer, F. (1999). Interregional and international risk-sharing and lessons
for EMU. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 51(1):149–188.
Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. and Lane, P. R. (2003). International financial integration. The
institute for international integration studies discussion paper series, IIIS.
211
Montiel, P. and Reinhart, C. M. (1999). Do capital controls and macroeconomic policies
influence the volume and composition of capital flows? Evidence from the 1990s.
Journal of International Money and Finance, 18(4):619–635.
Obstfeld, M. (1994a). Are industrial-country consumption risks globally diversified?
Technical report.
Obstfeld, M. (1994b). Risk-taking, global diversification, and growth. American Eco-
nomic Review, 84(5):1310–29.
Obstfeld, M., Shambaugh, J. C., and Taylor, A. M. (2010). Financial stability, the
trilemma, and international reserves. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
2(2):57–94.
Olivei, G. P. (2000). Consumption risk-sharing across G-7 countries. New England
Economic Review.
Pakko, M. (1998). Characterizing cross-country consumption correlations. The Review
of Economics and Statistics, 80(1):169–174.
Pineau, G. and Dorrucci, E. (2006). The accumulation of foreign reserves. Occasional
Paper Series 43, European Central Bank.
Quinn, D. (1997). The correlates of change in international financial regulation. The
American Political Science Review, 91(3):531–551.
Reinhart, C., Calvo, G., and Leiderman, L. (1993). Capital inflows and real exchange
rate appreciation in Latin America: The role of external factors. MPRA Paper 7125,
University Library of Munich, Germany.
Reinhart, C. M. and Rogoff, K. S. (2004). Serial default and the paradox of rich-to-poor
capital flows. American Economic Review, 94(2):53–58.
212
Reinhart, C. M. and Rogoff, K. S. (2011). From financial crash to debt crisis. American
Economic Review, 101(5):1676–1706.
Rodrik, D. (2006). The social cost of foreign exchange reserves. Working Paper 11952,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Schneider, B. (2003). Resident capital outflows: Capital flight or normal flows? A
statistical interpretation. Working papers, Overseas Development Institute.
Sorensen, B. E., Wu, Y. T., Yosha, O., and Zhu, Y. (2007). Home bias and international
risk sharing: Twin puzzles separated at birth. Journal of International Money and
Finance, 26(4):587 – 605.
Sorensen, B. E. and Yosha, O. (1998). International risk sharing and European Monetary
Unification. Journal of International Economics, 45(2):211–238.
Sung, H. and Lapan, H. E. (2000). Strategic foreign direct investment and exchange
rate uncertainty. Staff general research papers, Iowa State University, Department of
Economics.
Taylor, M. P. and Sarno, L. (1997). Capital flows to developing countries: Long and
short-term determinants. The World Bank Economic Review, page 51470.
Tong, H. and Wei, S.-J. (2009). The composition matters: Capital inflows and liquidity
crunch during a global economic crisis. NBER Working Papers 15207, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Velasco, A. (1987). Financial crises and balance of payments crises : A simple model of
the southern cone experience. Journal of Development Economics, 27(1-2):263–283.
Yeyati, E. L. and Williams, T. (2011). Financial globalization in emerging economies:
213
Much ado about nothing? Business school working papers, Universidad Torcuato Di
Tella.
Yue, V. Z. (2010). Sovereign default and debt renegotiation. Journal of International
Economics, 80(2):176–187.
214
